

INDONESIA'S MARITIME FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE: FROM NATIONAL INTEREST TO MULTILATERAL LEADERSHIP

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Abstrak: Penelitian ini bertujuan menjelaskan faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi perubahan kebijakan luar negeri maritim Indonesia pada masa pemerintahan Presiden Jokowi, dari periode pertama yang berfokus pada kepentingan nasional, hingga periode kedua yang menekankan pentingnya kepemimpinan multilateral. Penulis berargumen bahwa kebijakan luar negeri maritim Indonesia mengalami perubahan karena dorongan pemimpin, advokasi birokrasi, restrukturisasi domestik, dan guncangan eksternal. Penelitian ini menggunakan metode eksplanatif kualitatif, dengan sumber data melalui dokumentasi, dan menggunakan konsep perubahan kebijakan luar negeri Hermann untuk menganalisis studi kasus. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa terdapat empat faktor yang menyebabkan perubahan kebijakan luar negeri maritim Indonesia, yaitu visi Jokowi dari Poros Maritim Dunia menuju Pandangan ASEAN terhadap Indo-Pasifik, advokasi Kementerian Luar Negeri terhadap diplomasi maritim, restrukturisasi Kementerian Kelautan dan Perikanan, serta pandemi Covid-19 dan persaingan Amerika Serikat dan Tiongkok sebagai guncangan eksternal. Empat faktor tersebut menyebabkan terjadinya perubahan program kebijakan luar negeri maritim Indonesia dari pembangunan ekonomi menjadi tatanan internasional, perubahan masalah atau tujuan dari isu keamanan dalam negeri menjadi isu stabilitas kawasan, serta perubahan orientasi dari kepentingan nasional menuju kepemimpinan multilateral.

Kata Kunci: Perubahan Kebijakan Luar Negeri, Kebijakan Maritim, Indonesia, Kepentingan Nasional, Kepemimpinan Multilateral

Abstract: This research seeks to explain the factors which stimulated Indonesia's maritime foreign policy change during Jokowi's leadership, from focusing on national interest during his first term, into multilateral leadership during his second term. The author argues that Indonesia's maritime foreign policy changed due to the leader's decision, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, and external shock. This research utilizes an explanatory qualitative method, with data collection from documentation, and analyzes the study case using Hermann's foreign policy change concept. This research finds that there are four factors that caused Indonesia's maritime foreign policy change, which are Jokowi's vision from Global Maritime Fulcrum towards ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' advocacy for maritime diplomacy, the

Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries' restructuring, and Covid-19 and the US-China rivalry as external shocks. Those four factors influenced program change in Indonesia's maritime foreign policy from economic development to international order, problem or goal change from domestic security to regional stability, and international orientation change from national interest towards multilateral leadership.

Keywords: Foreign Policy Change, Maritime Foreign Policy, Indonesia, Indo-Pacific, Multilateral Leadership.

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INTRODUCTION

This research seeks to explain the factors which contributed towards Indonesia's maritime foreign policy change during President Jokowi Widodo's (Jokowi) leadership, from focusing on national interest during his first term, towards multilateral diplomacy during his second term. After inaugurated as Indonesia's seventh president in 2014, Jokowi was determined to conduct foreign policies which would bring tangible benefit for the Indonesian society¹. Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi explained that there are four pillars of Indonesia's foreign policy, which are maintaining Indonesia's maritime sovereignty, protecting Indonesian workers overseas, strengthening regionalism in the Asia Pacific region, and developing Indonesia into a global maritime axis². Hence, Jokowi announced the Global Maritime Fulcrum (GMF) policy, as a vision to transform Indonesia into an international commercial hub linking the Indian and Pacific Oceans³.

During President Jokowi's first period of presidency in 2014 to 2019, the Global Maritime Fulcrum was implemented to obtain Indonesia's

¹ E. Huijgh, *The Public Diplomacy of Emerging powers* (Los Angeles: Figueroa Press, 2016), 29; J. Rolfe & A. Butcher, *Indonesia: Continuing the move to a fully functioning democracy*. (CSS Strategic Background Paper – 19, Centre for Strategic Studies, 2014), 33.

² *Ibid.*, 23; D. E. Weatherbee, *Trends in Southeast Asia – Understanding Jokowi's Foreign Policy* (ISEAS – Yusef Ishak Institute, 2016), 11-13.

³ B. Putra, *Indonesia's Leadership Role in ASEAN: History and Future Prospects* (Istanbul: 2nd International Conference on Education, Social Sciences and Humanities, 2015), 217.

national interest⁴. Firstly, developing infrastructure to improve Indonesia's maritime connectivity and society's welfare⁵. Jokowi had been active in international business forums, inviting foreign investors to invest in Indonesia's maritime infrastructure and transportation development projects⁶. Indonesia also cooperated with China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to construct various seaports, airports, highways, and railways across the archipelago⁷.

Secondly, protecting Indonesia's outer maritime borders to protect its 200 miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Indonesia believed that China's claim over the South China Sea as its traditional fishing ground based on the Nine Dash Lines is illegal under international law⁸. Hence, in response to China's claim, the Indonesian Military (TNI) conducted routine military practice and show off force in 2013-2014, and opened a military base in Natuna Island in 2018⁹. On the other hand, Jokowi had also refused Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott's policy to send back illegal refugee boats to Indonesian shores¹⁰. This indicates Indonesia's determination to

⁴ E. A. Laksmana & R. A. Supriyanto., "Abandoned at Sea: The Tribunal Ruling and Indonesia's Missing Archipelagic Foreign Policy," *Asian Politics & Policy*. Vol.10, No. 2. (2018): 300-321.

⁵ A. B. D. Polanunu & D. N. Kusumaningrum "Indonesia Sebagai Middle Power: Strategi Niche Diplomacy dalam Manifestasi Pembangunan Kelautan Berkelanjutan Berbasis Blue Economy." *Padjajaran Journal of International Relations (PADJIR)*. Vol.4 No.2. (2022): 146-163; D. Scott. "Indonesia Grapples with the Indo-Pacific: Outreach, Strategic Discourse, and Diplomacy." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*. Vol. 38 No. 2. (2019): 194-217.

⁶ Rolfe & A. Butcher, *Indonesia: Continuing the move to a fully functioning democracy*. (CSS Strategic Background Paper – 19, Centre for Strategic Studies, 2014), 3.

⁷ F. I. Pratiwi, I. Puspitasari, I. Hikmawati & H. Bagus. "Global Maritime Fulcrum: Indonesia's Middle Power Strategy Between Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) and Free-Open Indo Pacific (FOIP)." *Central European Journal of International and Security Studies*. Vol.15 No.3. (2021) 30-54.

⁸ E. A. Laksmana & R. A. Supriyanto., 300-321.

⁹ P. Parameswaran., "Delicate Equilibrium: Indonesia's Approach to the South China Sea." in *Power Politics in Asia's Contested Waters: Territorial Disputes in the South China Sea*, ed. E. Fels & T-M. Vu (Springer International Publishing, 2016), 319-336.

¹⁰ N. H. Hart & D. McRae, *Indonesia: Balancing the United States and China, Aiming for Independence* (The United States Study Centre at The University of Sydney, 2015), 22.

safeguard its northern and southern maritime boundaries from external threats.

Thirdly, protecting Indonesia's maritime natural resources from transnational crimes. The Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Susi Pudjiastuti implemented a policy to capture illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing vessels from neighboring countries which caught fish from Indonesia's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). Afterwards, the captured vessels were destroyed and sunk into the sea¹¹. Indonesia implemented sinking the ship policy to prevent economic losses and environmental degradation due to IUU fishing¹². Additionally, Indonesia also collaborated with Australia to counter IUU fishing in the neighboring states' maritime border through the Indonesia-Australia Fisheries Surveillance Forum (IAFSF) in 2018 until 2022¹³.

However, the Global Maritime Fulcrum was not effective in establishing Indonesia's multilateral leadership on maritime issues. This was because the implementation of Global Maritime Fulcrum focused more on Indonesia's domestic affairs¹⁴. Additionally, the growing rivalry between China's Belt and Road Initiative and the United States' (US) Free and Open Indo-Pacific also overshadowed the significance of Global Maritime Fulcrum in the region¹⁵.

Consequently, during Jokowi's second period of presidency in 2019 until 2024, the Global Maritime Fulcrum was no longer emphasized. Instead, Foreign Minister Marsudi highlighted the importance of multilateral diplomacy, to build an Indo-Pacific cooperation based on the

¹¹ F. Heiduk, *Indonesia in ASEAN: Regional Leadership between Ambition and Ambiguity* (SWP Research Paper, German Institute for International and Security Matters, 2016), 33.

¹² R. A. Alvian, G. C. Putri & I. Ardhani, "Haluan Baru Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia: Perbandingan Diplomasi 'Middle Power' Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono dan Joko Widodo." *Jurnal Hubungan Internasional*. Vol.6 No.2. (2018): 151-168.

¹³ T. Tiaradipa & N. L. Hidayatullah, "Indonesia's Maritime Security Strategy in Countering Illegal Fishing through the Indonesia-Australia Fisheries Surveillance Forum in 2018-2022." *The Sunan Ampel Review of Political and Social Sciences*. Vol. 3 No. 2 (2024): 145-161.

¹⁴ E. A. Laksmana & R. A. Supriyanto., 300-321.

¹⁵ F. I. Pratiwi, I. Puspitasari, I. Hikmawati & H. Bagus., 30-54.

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) centrality¹⁶. This maritime foreign policy change was initiated in 2019 when Indonesia proposed an ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, determining ASEAN's position amidst China and US' rivalry in the region.

Firstly, Indonesia participated in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). Indonesia became a member of the IORA, which was established in 1997 for improving regional and economic cooperation between 23 member states¹⁷. Subsequently, Indonesia became the chair of IORA in 2015-2017, organizing IORA's initial Leaders' Summit and signing the Jakarta Concord. Indonesia also received an observer status in the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) since 2011, due to its sovereignty over West Papua¹⁸.

Secondly, Indonesia hosted the Archipelagic and Island States (AIS) Forum. Indonesia proposed the AIS Forum during the 1ST United Nations (UN) Ocean Conference in New York in 2017, held the 1ST AIS Ministerial Meeting in Manado in 2018 with the signing of the Manado Joint Declaration by 21 states, and held the 2ND Ministerial Meeting in Manado in 2019 which successfully gained support from 25 states and 4 international organizations. The 3RD Ministerial Meeting was held online in 2020 due to the Covid-19 pandemic. Finally, Indonesia held the 1ST AIS High Level Meeting and the 5TH AIS Ministerial Meeting in Bali in 2023¹⁹. The AIS member states are committed to sustainable use of the sea and its marine resources to achieve Sustainable Development Goals 14, and Indonesia is committed to address the AIS member states' environmental problems²⁰.

¹⁶ D. Scott. "Indonesia Grapples with the Indo-Pacific: Outreach, Strategic Discourse, and Diplomacy." *Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs*. Vol. 38 No. 2 (2019): 194-217.

¹⁷ A. B. D. Polanunu & D. N. Kusumaningrum., 146-163.

¹⁸ D. Scott., 194-217.

¹⁹ Archipelagic & Island States Forum, "Archipelagic & Island States Forum Secretariat Report 2023", in <https://online.fliphtml5.com/hecyj/loca/#p=34> accessed 14 April 2024.

²⁰ Setkab. "AIS Forum Summit in 2023 to Sharpen Global Strategy on Climate Change", in <https://setkab.go.id/en/ais-forum-summit-in-2023-to-sharpen-global-strategy-on-climate-change> accessed March 2024.

Indonesia's maritime foreign policy changes signified Jokowi's vision for developing Indonesia's maritime capability, in order to contribute to the international community in accordance with its national interest²¹. Therefore, the factors which stimulated Indonesia's maritime foreign policy change during Jokowi's leadership, from focusing on national interest during his first term, into multilateral leadership during his second term will be further discussed in this research. The author argues that Indonesia's maritime foreign policy changed due to the leader's decision, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, and external shock.

METHOD

This research uses qualitative explanatory method. Qualitative explanatory method is used to obtain an in-depth understanding or acquire knowledge by explaining the causes and implications of a social phenomenon. The researcher becomes the key instrument in collecting data by examining documents and interpreting information to acquire additional meaning²². This research gathers references of Indonesia's maritime foreign policy change from books, journal articles, and news sites, and utilizes Hermann's foreign policy change concept to explain the factors contributing to Indonesia's maritime foreign policy changes.

Foreign policy change could be defined through four different levels of change. Firstly, adjustment changes in the degree of efforts to obtain the same policy purpose through the same method. Secondly, program changes in the action and resources utilized to obtain the same policy goals. Thirdly, problem or goal changes of the foreign policy. Finally, international orientation changes, when states decide to alter their international role and activities²³.

²¹ E. A. Laksmana & R. A. Supriyanto., 300-321.

²² J. W. Creswell & D. Creswell, *Research Design – Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Method Approaches*, Fifth Edition (Los Angeles: SAGE Publications, 2018).

²³ C. F. Hermann., "Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy," *International Studies Quarterly*. Vol. 34, No. 1. (1990): 3-21.

According to Hermann's learning approaches, there are four factors contributing towards foreign policy change. Firstly, leader driven, usually by the head of state or government's decision to change foreign policy for a better cause. The leader needs to be able to convince the government of the necessity to change foreign policy, allocate resources, and implement the change. Secondly, bureaucratic advocacy happens when a part of the governmental body initiates, or supports change of the state's foreign policy. Thirdly, domestic restructuring, which is a support group from the society capable of influencing change in the state's foreign policy. Finally, external shocks are international dynamics which impacted the state, detrimental to the state's position in international relations, triggering the state to respond it by redirecting its foreign policy²⁴.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The results and discussions are explained in two parts. Firstly, the four factors that caused Indonesia's maritime foreign policy change, which are Jokowi's decision, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' advocacy, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries' restructuring, and Covid-19 pandemic and the US-China rivalry as external shocks. Secondly, the three kinds of change in Indonesia's maritime foreign policy, i.e. program change, problem or goal change, and international orientation change.

Jokowi's Vision from Global Maritime Fulcrum towards ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific

The first factor that influenced Indonesia's maritime foreign policy change is leader driven. A leader convinces the need of policy change, utilizes resources, and implements the change²⁵. President Jokowi's foreign policies are characterized by pragmatism and economic interest oriented²⁶.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ A. R. M. Umar "The "Jokowi Doctrine": Indonesia's vision for international order" in <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/jokowi-doctrine-indonesia-s-vision-international-order> accessed April 2024

So, when policies are not effective in bringing tangible benefits for the Indonesian society, Jokowi is not reluctant to change them by being more active in international diplomacy.

Initially during his first presidential term, Jokowi convinced international business partners that Indonesia is open for foreign investment, in order to transform Indonesia into an international maritime hub²⁷. Jokowi convinced China that the Global Maritime Fulcrum is compatible with the Belt and Road Initiative, receiving \$87 billion investment in 2014 for infrastructural development. Indonesia also utilized its geostrategic position, human and natural resources to support the BRI maritime connectivity through business-to-business cooperation. Conversely, China seeks to connect Indonesia to a wider Maritime Silk Road (MSR) which extends from Asia to Africa and Europe²⁸.

Nevertheless, Jokowi decided to discontinue the Global Maritime Fulcrum during his second term of presidency. Susanto argued that a global maritime power should have a strong economic capacity from marine product exports, with outward-looking foreign policies capable of influencing other states in maritime affairs, yet Indonesia's position is still far from ideal²⁹. Moreover, Sulaiman argued that the term 'fulcrum' is problematic, because it refers to balancing other powers, meanwhile Indonesia doesn't have a grand strategy for its overall maritime security concerns³⁰.

Therefore, during his second presidential term, Jokowi prefers to promote the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific instead. The ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific highlights the importance of ASEAN-based multilateralism such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), etc. to establish a rule-based order and promote international cooperation among Indo-Pacific

²⁷ B. Putra, 217.

²⁸ F. I. Pratiwi, I. Puspitasari, I. Hikmawati & H. Bagus., 41.

²⁹ I. Arifia & K. A. Mawalia "Understanding the cause of declining Maritime Fulcrum Agenda performance" in <https://unair.ac.id/understanding-the-cause-of-declining-maritime-fulcrum-agenda-performance> accessed April 2024

³⁰ Y. Sulaiman "Global Maritime Nexus: towards a Grand Strategy for Indonesia" in <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpret/jokowi-doctrine-indonesia-s-vision-international-order> accessed April 2024

states. This includes ASEAN having a strategic role in the Indo-Pacific, dialogue for peaceful dispute settlement to prevent rivalry, mutual economic development, and maritime domain in the dynamic regional architecture³¹.

President Jokowi persuaded ASEAN member states to implement the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific during the 35TH ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in 2019. The implementation of the outlook involves four cooperation segments, which are maritime affairs, connectivity, Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and economy³². Furthermore, Jokowi launched the ASEAN Indo-Pacific Forum (AIPF) to implement the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific during the ASEAN Summit in Jakarta in 2023. The forum seeks win-win cooperation in response to the Indo-Pacific rivalry with three main agenda, including green infrastructure, supply chain resilience, and industrial development³³. This indicates Jokowi's maritime vision changed from the Global Maritime Fulcrum to the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific.

The Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs's Advocacy for Maritime Diplomacy

The second factor which influenced Indonesia's maritime foreign policy change is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' bureaucratic advocacy. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs becomes a governmental body that initiates and supports change of the state's foreign policy³⁴. Out of the four pillars of Indonesia's foreign policy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had been

³¹ ASEAN "ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific" in https://asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/ASEAN-Outlook-on-the-Indo-Pacific_FINAL_22062019.pdf accessed April 2024

³² Humas Kemasetneg "Presiden Jokowi Ajak Negara ASEAN Konkretkan Implementasi Outlook ASEAN Tentang Indo-Pasifik" in https://setneg.go.id/baca/index/presiden_jokowi_ajak_negara_asean_konkretkan_implementasi_outlook_asean_tentang_indo_pasifik accessed April 2024

³³ Humas "Presiden Jokowi Buka ASEAN-Indo-Pacific Forum" in <https://setkab.go.id/presiden-jokowi-buka-asean-indo-pacific-forum> accessed April 2024

³⁴ C. F. Hermann, 3-21.

working on maintaining Indonesia's maritime sovereignty, protecting Indonesian workers overseas, and developing Indonesia into a global maritime axis since Jokowi's first term of presidency. Eventually, the Ministry worked harder to strengthen regionalism in the Asia Pacific region during Jokowi's second term of presidency through various multilateral forums, including becoming the chair of ASEAN, East Asia Summit and the Group of Twenty (G20) in 2023³⁵.

The idea of promoting ASEAN centrality in the Indo-Pacific is not new. Former Indonesian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marty Natalegawa coined the Dynamic Equilibrium doctrine, an idea that there should not be any great power domination in the Indo-Pacific, and that multilateral interactions in the region should be based on ASEAN centrality³⁶. In addition, Indonesia had been known for being the first among equals in ASEAN, which relies on diplomatic capability to address regional affairs instead of using limited military power³⁷. Ultimately, Natalegawa's doctrine led to the popularity of the East Asia Summit or ASEAN+8 led by Indonesia during the Yudhoyono presidency³⁸.

Besides reiterating the Dynamic Equilibrium doctrine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs also brought the idea of Indonesia's leadership on maritime affairs during Jokowi's second presidential term, which has not been done by the Yudhoyono presidency. Different from the Global Maritime Fulcrum, Indonesia's maritime diplomacy during Jokowi's second term doesn't only focus on national interest, but also working with neighboring states for mutual economic cooperation as well³⁹.

Indonesia's effort to attain leadership on maritime issue was seen during Jokowi's first term by becoming the chair of IORA since 2015 and successfully held the first IORA summit and the signing of Jakarta Concord

³⁵ A. R. M. Umar.

³⁶ S. Darmosumarto. *Indonesia and the Asia-Pacific: Opportunities and Challenges for Middle Power Diplomacy*. Young Strategists Forum – Policy Brief, the German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2013.

³⁷ F. I. Pratiwi, I. Puspitasari, I. Hikmawati & H. Bagus., 45.

³⁸ G. Flake, & X. Wang. *MIKTA: The Search for a Strategic Rationale*. Perth USAsia Centre, 2017.

³⁹ A. R. M. Umar.

in 2017⁴⁰. However, IORA has limited membership of states geographically connected to the Indian Ocean. Therefore, Indonesia seeks to enhance its leadership on maritime affairs to reach wider memberships of states through the AIS Forum during Jokowi's second period of presidency.

Indonesia proposed the Archipelagic and Island States (AIS) Forum during the 1ST United Nations (UN) Ocean Conference in New York in 2017, and held the 1ST AIS High Level Meeting and the 5TH AIS Ministerial Meeting in Bali in 2023⁴¹. President Jokowi allocated US \$ 5 million to foster cooperation among AIS Forum members for 2022-2025⁴². The contributed funding will be used for scholarships, research, marine resources-based businesses, climate change mitigation, sustainable ocean governance and digitalization of start up businesses⁴³.

Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi emphasized the AIS Forum's importance, not only to facilitate government-to-government cooperation, but also practical collaboration between community-based entities⁴⁴. For instance, the AIS Blue Economy Dialogue hosted on 9 October 2023 in Bali became a platform to discuss best practices to determine the Blue Economy Development Index (BEDI). Additionally, the AIS Blue Business Summit on 6 until 11 October in Bali gathered business owners to discuss resource mobilization and sustainable financial mechanisms. Moreover, Indonesia also held the Sustainable Business Ecosystem Training for women entrepreneurs on 23-24 October 2023 in Jakarta⁴⁵. This shows that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs supported the Indonesian government's efforts

⁴⁰ F. I. Pratiwi, I. Puspitasari, I. Hikmawati & H. Bagus., 46.

⁴¹ Archipelagic & Island States Forum

⁴² S. Haryati "Strengthening archipelagic states' solidarity through AIS Forum", 2023 in <https://en.antaranews.com/news/296193/strengthening-archipelagic-states-solidarity-through-ais-forum> accessed March 2024

⁴³ A. Santoso, "Indonesia calls for AIS Forum unity, collaboration", 2023 in <https://en.antaranews.com/news/295890/indonesia-calls-for-ais-forum-unity-collaboration> accessed March 2024

⁴⁴ Y. A. Sinaga "Archipelagic, island countries agree to make AIS Forum an organization", in <https://en.antaranews.com/news/295851/archipelagic-island-countries-agree-to-make-ais-forum-an-organization> accessed March 2024

⁴⁵ Archipelagic & Island States Forum

in being more active in maritime diplomacy during Jokowi's second presidential term.

The Indonesian Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries' Restructuring

The third factor that contributed towards Indonesia's maritime foreign policy change is the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries' domestic restructuring. Domestic restructuring derives from a support group of the society capable of influencing the state's foreign policy⁴⁶. During Jokowi's first presidential term, Susi Pudjiastuti, an entrepreneur, was appointed as the Minister of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries. Pudjiastuti was known for her policy of destroying and sinking IUU fishing vessels caught in the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)⁴⁷.

Despite being supported by President Jokowi, sinking the ships policy became a controversy which received rejections from other governmental bodies. For instance, the Minister of Law and Human Rights, Yasonna Laoly approved Pudjiastuti's ship licensing moratorium, but rejected her sinking the ships policy. Additionally, Vice President Jusuf Kalla, supported by the Coordinating Minister for Maritime Affairs, Luhut B. Pandjaitan, requested Pudjiastuti to stop sinking the ships and donate them to the Indonesian fishing cooperatives instead⁴⁸. Sinking the ships policy was also criticized for its double standards on destroying IUU fishing vessels from Thailand and Vietnam but not from China, considering the serious consequences⁴⁹.

Nevertheless, domestic restructuring happened when Pudjiastuti was succeeded by Edhy Prabowo, as the Minister of Maritime Affairs and

⁴⁶ C. F. Hermann, 3-21.

⁴⁷ F. Heiduk, 33.

⁴⁸ A. N. P. Pikoli "Critical Analysis of Indonesia's Global Maritime Fulcrum under Joko Widodo: Problems and Challenges." *Publik (Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi)*. Vol. 10 No. 1 (2021): 161.

⁴⁹ I. Gindarsah, & A. Priamarizki, *Indonesia's Maritime Doctrine and Security Concerns*. S. RSIS Commentary, Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 2015, 5.

Fisheries in 2019-2020 during Jokowi's second presidential term. Prabowo argued that sinking the ships policy required lots of budget, and preferred to donate confiscated IUU fishing ships to local fishermen instead. Contrarily, Prabowo's successor, Sakti Wahyu Trenggono implemented sinking the ships policy once more in 2020⁵⁰. The number of ships sunk by Indonesia tends to decrease, from 113 ships in 2015 to 24 ships in 2023, which indicated that sinking the ship policy had created a deterrent impact and that Indonesia has implemented alternative policies including seizure and auction of confiscated IUU fishing vessels⁵¹. This shows that there was a domestic restructuring within the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries' sinking the ship policy, in support of local fishermen.

Covid-19 and the US-China Rivalry as External Shocks

The fourth factor which triggered Indonesia's maritime foreign policy change are external shocks i.e. the Covid-19 pandemic and the US-China rivalry in the South China Sea. External shocks are international incidents which highly affected the state, triggering it to respond them through foreign policy change⁵². Indonesia became more active in multilateral diplomacy during Jokowi's second period of presidency in response to the Covid-19 pandemic and the US-China rivalry.

Initially, the Covid-19 pandemic disturbed Indonesia's maritime foreign policy, by postponing Indonesia and Australia's joint patrol operation in countering IUU fishing in 2020⁵³. In response to the Covid-19 pandemic, Indonesia conducted health diplomacy through collaborative efforts regionally and multilaterally. On the regional level, Indonesia was involved in the ASEAN-Australia Health Security Program to guarantee basic medical assistance for its member states. On the multilateral level, Indonesia proposed a UN General Assembly resolution on Global Health

⁵⁰ T. Tiaradipa & N. L. Hidayatullah, 151.

⁵¹ U. Choiru, U. Q. Lindasari & U. A. Faruq "Dampak Peneggelaman Kapal *Illegal Fishing* di Wilayah Indonesia Ditinjau dari Perspektif Hukum Internasional" *Begawan Abioso*. Vol. 15 No. 2 (2024): 54

⁵² C. F. Hermann, 3-21.

⁵³ T. Tiaradipa & N. L. Hidayatullah, 148.

and Foreign Policy to ensure Covid-19 vaccine availability for developing states which are unable to produce nor purchase vaccines for their society⁵⁴. Exemplarily, Indonesia was also transformed from an aid-receiving state into an aid donor during the pandemic, by providing Indonesian AID humanitarian assistance for developing countries⁵⁵.

On the other hand, the US-China rivalry in the South China Sea pushed Indonesia to be more active in maritime diplomacy⁵⁶. The rising tensions in the South China Sea happens due to China's nine-dash line claim over the maritime area around the Spratly and Paracel Islands as China's traditional fishing ground⁵⁷. Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam rejected China's claim, and urged the international community to comply with the United Nations Convention on the Law of The Sea (UNCLOS) which approved their Exclusive Economic Zone in the area.

The United States (US) responded to China's claim over the South China Sea by promoting the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP), a principle that highlights the South China Sea as an international trading route without any state domination over it. The FOIP is upheld by the QUAD, a coalition of four states consisting the US, Japan, India and Australia which installed military facilities in the region. The United Kingdom (UK) and France also supported the implementation of FOIP in the South China Sea⁵⁸.

Indonesia responded to the US-China rivalry in the South China Sea by maintaining ASEAN centrality and neutrality in Indo-Pacific affairs. Despite being a non-claimant state, Indonesia insisted that there should be

⁵⁴ N. L. Hidayatullah "Middle Power's Role in Health Diplomacy during Covid-19." *The Sunan Ampel Review of Political and Social Sciences*. Vol. 1 No. 1 (2021): 103-106.

⁵⁵ LDKPI "5 Tahun Berdiri, Indonesian AID Dukung Diplomasi & Pembangunan Dunia" in <https://ldkpi.kemenkeu.go.id/berita/Capaian5tahun> accessed October 2024

⁵⁶ F. I. Pratiwi, I. Puspitasari, I. Hikmawati & H. Bagus., 30-54.

⁵⁷ I. Gindarsah, & A. Priamarizki, 7.

⁵⁸ P. Radjendra, M. Wibisono, J. Mahroza & Z. A. Shabuddin "Indonesia's Vision as Global Maritime Fulcrum: a Geopolitical Strategy to Address Geopolitical Shifts in Indo-Pacific", *Journal of Positive School Psychology*. Vol. 6 No. 5 (2022): 8626.

no overlapping claims in the South China Sea, in adherence to UNCLOS. Hence, the goal of the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific is to promote peace, maintain stability and increase economic development in the region⁵⁹. Furthermore, during the 45TH ASEAN Summit in Vientiane, Laos, the Indonesian Vice President Ma'ruf Amin urged direct communication between ASEAN member states and China, which had been agreed since 2016, to decrease tensions in the South China Sea⁶⁰.

Program Change from Economic Development to International Order

The first kind of change in Indonesia's maritime foreign policy is program change from economic development to international order. Program change includes the action and resources utilized to obtain the same policy goals⁶¹. Indonesia's maritime foreign policy initially utilized hard power resources for economic development, and later on changed into using soft power resources to establish international order.

In the beginning, Indonesia made use of its hard power resources to develop the national economy. President Jokowi launched the Global Maritime Fulcrum to develop maritime infrastructure for national economic interconnectivity⁶². Indonesia also implemented sinking the ships policy to protect its Exclusive Economic Zone from IUU fishing vessels⁶³. Besides that, Indonesia strengthened its military presence on the Natuna Island in response to the rising tension in the South China Sea⁶⁴.

Afterwards, Indonesia made use of its soft power resources by being involved in forums promoting international order. Indonesia chaired the IORA since 2015, held the first IORA Summit in 2017, and promoted the

⁵⁹ R. J. P. Irsadanar "Japan and Indonesia as Middle Powers in Indo-Pacific: towards AOIP – FOIP Synergy", *Jurnal Hubungan Luar Negeri*, Vol. 8, No. 2. (2023): 1-15.

⁶⁰ A. Kurmala "Indonesia suggests direct communication on South China Sea dispute" in <https://en.antaraneews.com/news/329042/indonesia-suggests-direct-communication-on-south-china-sea-dispute> accessed October 2024

⁶¹ C. F. Hermann, 3-21.

⁶² A. B. D. Polanunu & D. N. Kusumaningrum.

⁶³ F. Heiduk, 33.

⁶⁴ P. Parameswaran.

signing of the Jakarta Concord and IORA action plan for 2017-2022⁶⁵. Indonesia also initiated the 1ST AIS High Level Meeting and the 5TH AIS Ministerial Meeting in Bali in 2023 to promote government-to-government and business-to-business cooperation on marine resources-based economy⁶⁶. Overall, Indonesia promoted the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific to sustain ASEAN's centrality and neutrality in the midst of rising tensions in the South China Sea⁶⁷.

Problem or Goal Change from Domestic Security to Regional Stability

The second kind of change in Indonesia's maritime foreign policy is the problem or goal change from domestic security to regional stability. There are seven pillars of the Indonesian Ocean Policy Roadmap towards the Global Maritime Fulcrum, including: (1) Maritime and human resources development; (2) Maritime security, law enforcement and safety at sea; (3) Ocean governance and institutions; (4) The development of the maritime economy; (5) Ocean space management and maritime protection (6) Maritime culture; and (7) Maritime diplomacy⁶⁸. During Jokowi's first presidential term, Indonesia's maritime foreign policy focused on resolving domestic security problems through the Global Maritime Fulcrum economic and infrastructural connectivity, sinking the ships policy, and military presence in the Natuna Island to implement goals: (1) Maritime and human resources development; (2) Maritime security, law enforcement and safety at sea; (4) The development of the maritime economy; and (5) Ocean space management and maritime protection. Meanwhile, during Jokowi's second presidential term, Indonesia's maritime foreign policy focused on responding regional stability problems through the IORA, the AIS Forum, and promoting the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific to

⁶⁵ I. G. B. D. Agastia "The Global Maritime Fulcrum as a Strategic Narrative: a Critical Examination of its Emergence, Conveyance, and Decline in Indonesian Strategic Discourse." *Muslim Politics Review*. Vol. 2 No. 2 (2023): 302.

⁶⁶ Archipelagic & Island States Forum.

⁶⁷ Humas Kemensetneg.

⁶⁸ Coordinating Ministry for Maritime Affairs "Indonesian Ocean Policy" in https://maritim.go.id/konten/unggahahan/2017/07/offset_lengkap_KKI_eng-vers.pdf accessed April 2024

implement goals: (3) Ocean governance and institutions; (6) Maritime culture; and (7) Maritime diplomacy.

International Orientation Change from National Interest to Multilateral Leadership

The third kind of change in Indonesia's maritime foreign policy is the international orientation change from national interest to multilateral leadership. International orientation change happens when states decide to readjust their overall role and activities in international relations⁶⁹. Indonesia has consistently conducted its foreign policies based on the independent and active orientation⁷⁰. Being free or independent doesn't mean neutrality, but conducting foreign policy without being dependent on great powers' interests. Whereas being active means enthusiastically contributing towards resolving international problems through ideas and action⁷¹.

During Jokowi's first presidential term, Indonesia's maritime foreign policy orientation focused on obtaining national interest by maintaining security and economic independence. Indonesia strengthened its military presence in the South China Sea to safeguard its sovereignty⁷². Sinking the ship policy deters IUU fishing in Indonesian EEZ⁷³. Whereas the Global Maritime Fulcrum's infrastructural development aims at maintaining economic independency⁷⁴.

Afterwards, during Jokowi's second presidential term, Indonesia's maritime foreign policy orientation focused on being active in attaining multilateral leadership on maritime issues. Indonesia seeks to reestablish dynamic equilibrium through the ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific,

⁶⁹ C. F. Hermann, 3-21.

⁷⁰ I. Gindarsah, & A. Priamarizki, 9.

⁷¹ A. Lubis "The Strategy of Defence Diplomacy in Achieving National Interests and Maintaining the Sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia." The Asian Institute of Research. Vol. 1 No. 4 (2022): 107.

⁷² P. Parameswaran.

⁷³ R. A. Alvian, G. C. Putri & I. Ardhani.

⁷⁴ B. Putra.

maintaining ASEAN centrality in regional affairs⁷⁵. Furthermore, Indonesia's leadership in multilateral forums such as IORA and the AIS Forum highlights its active leadership in contributing towards resolving the member states' maritime problems⁷⁶.

CONCLUSION

This research concludes that there are four factors which caused Indonesia's maritime foreign policy change. Firstly, Jokowi's Vision from Global Maritime Fulcrum which aimed for national economic benefits and infrastructural development towards ASEAN Outlook on the Indo-Pacific to promote regional economic cooperation and peaceful dispute settlement. Secondly, the Indonesian Ministry of Foreign Affairs's advocacy for Indonesia to be actively involved in multilateral diplomacy on maritime issues, such as through the IORA and the AIS Forums to facilitate government-to-government and business-to-business collaboration. Thirdly, the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries' restructuring from implementing sinking the ships policy against IUU fishing, into seizure and auction of confiscated IUU fishing ships. Finally, the Covid-19 became an external shock that triggered Indonesia to promote developing countries' interest multilaterally and provide humanitarian aid. Additionally, the US-China rivalry also externally shocked Indonesia into promoting ASEAN centrality in response to the South China Sea's rising tensions.

This research also finds that there are three kinds of change that happened with regards to Indonesia's maritime foreign policy. Firstly, programs change from using hard power resources to safeguard the national security and develop economic infrastructure, into making use of soft power to promote international order. Secondly, problems or goals change from resolving domestic security problems to implement goals on maritime resources, security, and economy, into responding to regional stability problems to implement goals on ocean governance, maritime culture and diplomacy. Finally, international orientation change happened from

⁷⁵ Humas Kemensetneg.

⁷⁶ A. Santoso.

focusing on attaining national interest through security and economic independency, into focusing on achieving multilateral leadership on maritime issues.

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