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CHINA'S GROWING INVOLVEMENT IN GLOBAL HEALTH GOVERNANCE: CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS*

Huaigao Qi
Fudan University, Fudan, China
huaigaoqi@fudan.edu.cn

ABSTRACT

The outbreak of the COVID-19 global pandemic has exposed deficiencies in global health governance. China has been active in making intellectual and material contributions to the global fight against COVID-19 while achieving significant progress in containing the epidemic domestically. China's contribution to global cooperation in the fight against the virus can be reflected in: (1) China has actively shared its experience in COVID-19 control and the treatment of infected cases with the international community; (2) China has sent 37 medical expert teams to help improve measures of diagnosis, treatment, prevention and control in 34 countries as of July 2021; (3) China has done its best to provide medical supplies to more than 150 countries and 13 international organizations as of July 2021; (4) China has made efforts to make vaccine accessible and affordable in developing countries. The implications of China's involvement in global health governance include: (1) advocating the concept of "building a global community of health for all"; (2) supporting the leadership role of the World Health Organization in global health governance; (3) improving the global health governance system and WHO's ability; and (4) cultivating public health talent with knowledge of international rules and diplomatic skills.

Keywords: the COVID-19; global health governance; China; Building a global community of health for all

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 global pandemic is the most extensive to afflict humanity in a century. A serious crisis for the entire world, and a daunting challenge, it poses a grave threat to human life and health. Since the Wuhan Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in central China's Hubei Province detected cases of pneumonia of unknown cause in late December 2019 (Xinhua, 2020a), China has adopted strong measures on epidemic prevention and control to contain the spread of the virus domestically. At the same time, China has provided the international community with epidemic control strategies and measures, dispatched medical and disease control experts to relevant countries to help fight the pandemic, and offered vaccine assistance to developing countries. China has also proposed the concept of "building a global community of health for all", actively leading global public health governance, and making intellectual and material contributions to the global battle against the coronavirus.

The global outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic and deficiencies in global health governance

Globally, as of 9 August 2021, there have been 202,608,306 confirmed cases of COVID-19, including 4,293,591 deaths, reported to World Health Organization (WHO) (WHO, 2021a). As of 9 August 2021, in the region of Americas, 78,718,104 confirmed cumulative cases of COVID-19 with 2,032,256 deaths have been reported; in the region of Europe, 61,333,662 confirmed cumulative cases with 1,231,439 deaths have been reported; in the region of South-East Asia, 39,271,048 cases with 593,565 deaths have been reported; in the region of Eastern Mediterranean, 13,169,171 cases with 243,217 deaths have been reported; in the region of Africa, 5,156,790 cases with 122,537 deaths have been reported; in the Region of Western Pacific, 4,958,767 cases with 70,564 deaths have been reported (see Table 1) (WHO, 2021a). As of 9 August 2021, the United States (U.S.) (35,501,444 confirmed cases, 611,504 deaths), India (31,969,954 confirmed cases, 428,309 deaths), Brazil (20,151,779 confirmed cases, 562,752 deaths), Russia (6,469,910 confirmed cases, 165,650 deaths) and France (6,154,798 confirmed cases, 111,102 deaths) registered the five highest number of confirmed COVID-19 cases (WHO, 2021a).

Table 1. Confirmed cases of COVID-19 by WHO Region as of 9 August 2021

WHO Region	Cumulative cases	Cumulative deaths
Americas	78,718,104	2,032,256
Europe	61,333,662	1,231,439
South-East Asia	39,271,048	593,565
Eastern Mediterranean	13,169,171	243,217
Africa	5,156,790	122,537
Western Pacific	4,958,767	70,564
Global	**202,608,306**	**4,293,591**

Source: World Health Organization, *WHO Coronavirus (COVID-19) Dashboard*, as of 9 August 2021,https://covid19.who.int/?gclid=EAIaIQobChMIi7fvroXO8QIVQ7eWCh0Whwk6EAAYA SABEgLDmPD_BwE,%20accessed%20on%205%20July%202021.

COVID-19 pandemic has hit the global economy hard. The World Economic Outlook released in April 2021 pointed out a contraction of –3.3% in the global economy in 2020 (IMF, 2021). This makes the economic downturn the worst recession since the Great Depression, and far worse than the 2007–2008 Global Financial Crisis (Gopinath, 2020). The GDP of the major economies in the world (with the exception of China's GDP growth of 2.3%) all experienced negative growth: -3.5% in the U.S., -6.6% in the Euro Area, -4.8% in Japan, - 9.9% in the United Kingdom (U.K.), -5.4%

in Canada, -8.0% in India, -3.4% in the five Southeast Asian countries (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam), -3.1% in Russia, -4.1% in Brazil, and -8.2% in Mexico (IMF, 2021). The negative impact on low-income households has been particularly severe, undermining the remarkable progress made in eliminating extreme poverty since the 1990s.

The fundamental idea underpinning global health governance is that the assets the world has at its disposal to improve peoples' health could be deployed more effectively and more fairly (WHO, 2013). Health governance implies "the use of formal and informal institutions, rules and processes by states, intergovernmental organizations, and non-state actors to deal with challenges to health that require cross-border collective action to address effectively" (Fidler, 2010).

The outbreak of the COVID-19 global pandemic has exposed several deficiencies in global health governance. First, there were late, incomplete and erroneous reports of COVID-19 cases in many countries. Second, some countries ignored the warnings and technical guidance of WHO, too slow to act on COVID-19. Third, the member countries of WHO lacked mutual communication and cooperation. Fourth, WHO had insufficient capacity in cross-sector horizontal coordination and cross-level vertical management. In general, most countries lacked serious preparations for this global pandemic, and there was also a lack of leadership, core emergency response capacity and strategic medical resources (Han, 2020).

The reasons for the deficiencies in the global health governance system are as follows:

First, nationalist governments have subverted global health governance in the response to the COVID-19 (Gostin et al., 2020b). The COVID-19 began against a backdrop of strong mainstreamed exclusionary nationalism in key countries around the world, in particular in Europe and North America (Bieber, 2020). The pandemic will strengthen the state and reinforce nationalism (Allen et al., 2020). Nationalist leaders have weakened WHO's authority, blocked a coordinated UN response, and imposed isolationist policies that divide the world (Gostin et al., 2020b). WHO's global health mandate has been challenged by the rising reluctance of national governments to adequately support global health governance (Gostin et al., 2020b). This could be seen most clearly in member state attacks on WHO's leadership and refusal to meet national financial obligations to WHO's programming in the pandemic response—with the U.S., WHO's largest donor, seeking to withdraw from WHO entirely (Gostin et al., 2020a).

Second, the legislative process of the international health law is too slow and the global health governance system is generally "soft" (Zhang, H., 2020). Since the establishment of WHO in 1948, the International Health Regulations (IHR) is the only international legal treaty with the responsibility of empowering WHO to act as the main global surveillance system (Youde, 2010 and Kohl et al., 2012). In contrast, as

the leading global environmental authority, the United Nations Environment Programme administers, or provides secretariat functions for, 15 multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and other entities (UNEP, n.d.).

Third, a few countries have "politicized" the global cooperation against the epidemic in order to shift their responsibility in their poor response to the COVID-19. Since the outbreak of COVID-19, domestic economic recession and social unrest could be observed in some countries due to improper measures to prevent and control the virus. Some politicians have started to incite isolationism and populism, and have highly politicized the epidemic control, taking as political weapons to "blame" and "smear" WHO and other countries (Qu, 2020).

Fourth, the increased rivalry between China and the U.S. has reduced the effectiveness of the international cooperation against COVID-19. The COVID-19 pandemic should have been a buffer, a relief valve or a binder for the China-U.S. relationship, but due to all sorts of accidental mishaps, it has become a transformer, an accelerator and a catalyst that intensifies the game between China and the U.S. instead (Yuan, 2020). Under the Trump Administration, the U.S. and China have failed to cooperate effectively in the prevention and control of the pandemic, and instead relations have deteriorated, making it difficult for WHO to play a powerful role. In the context of the China-U.S. strategic competition, some Western media claimed that the COVID-19 has prompted a strategic contention between China's model and the Western model with an ideological meaning (Liu, 2021 and Yuan, 2020). As a matter of fact, models or systems vary in advantages and disadvantages, as no single model or system proved to be successful to suit the conditions of a particular country. China will never sell its model nor accept Western models.

Regarding the shortcomings exposed in the global public health governance, the international community needs to seriously learn lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic and take effective measures to improve global health governance.

China's contribution to global cooperation in the fight against the COVID-19

While making significant progress in containing the pandemic domestically, China has also made intellectual and material contributions to the global fight against the coronavirus. China's significant contribution to global cooperation in the fight against the virus can be reflected in the four aspects:

First, China has actively shared its experience in COVID-19 control and the treatment of infected cases with international community. Starting 3 January 2020, China has been regularly informing WHO, relevant countries and regions about the pneumonia outbreak; China began to inform the U.S. of the pneumonia outbreak and response measures on a regular basis (Xinhua, 2020a). On 9 January 2020, China informed WHO of developments and the initial progress that had been made in

determining the cause of the viral pneumonia (The State Council Information Office of China, 2020). On 12 January 2020, China Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the Chinese Academy of Medical Sciences (CAMS) and the Wuhan Institute of Virology (WIV), as designated agencies of the National Health Commission (NHC), submitted to WHO the genome sequence of the novel coronavirus (2019-nCoV), which was published by the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data to be shared globally (The State Council Information Office of China, 2020). On 12 March 2020, together with WHO it held an international briefing via video link on China's experience in COVID-19 control (The State Council Information Office of China, 2020). On 20 March 2020, China held a special foreign ministers' video conference with Japan and Republic of Korea upon the initiative of China, sharing experience in fighting the epidemic and strengthening policy coordination. In March 2020, The Knowledge Center for China's Experiences in Response to COVID-19 was launched by Health Human Resources Development Center (HHRDC) of the NHC, open to all countries to share experience in epidemic prevention and control, as well as in the treatment of infected cases (HHRDC of the NHC, 2020). As of 8 September 2020, China has conducted more than 70 exchanges on the virus prevention and control with international and regional organizations (Xinhua, 2020c).

As of June 2020, the NHC has worked out diagnosis, treatment, prevention and control solutions, had them translated into three languages, and shared them with over 180 countries and more than 10 international and regional organizations (The State Council Information Office of China, 2020). And as of May 2021, the NHC has published eight updated versions of diagnosis and therapeutic solutions and eight updated versions of prevention and control protocols, sharing experience with other countries without any reservation.

Second, China has sent medical expert teams to help relative countries improve measures of diagnosis, treatment, prevention and control. On 29 February 2020, voluntary medical experts from the Red Cross Society of China arrived in Iran; on 7 March 2020, a Chinese medical team dispatched by the Red Cross Society of China arrived in Iraq, carrying China-aided COVID-19 prevention supplies; on 12 March 2020, the first batch of Chinese medical experts carrying China-assisted medical supplies arrived in Italy to help with its epidemic prevention and control effort; on 18 March 2020, the second group of Chinese medical experts arrived in Italy, carrying nine tonnes of medical supplies donated by China; on 22 March 2020, a Chinese medical team carrying ventilators, medical masks, test kits and other medical materials arrived in Serbian; on 23 March 2020, a team of Chinese medical experts carrying a batch of medical materials arrived in Cambodia; on 26 March 2020, China's third medical team carrying ventilators, medical monitors, masks and other medical supplies arrived in Italy; on 28 March 28, a Chinese medical expert team carrying medical supplies arrived in Pakistan; on 29 March 2020, a team of Chinese

medical experts carrying medical supplies, arrived at Laos; on 30 March 2020, a team of Chinese medical and scientific experts carrying test kits, medical protective equipment, medicines and other China-donated medical supplies arrived in Caracas, capital of Venezuela (Xinhua, 2020a). As of July 2021, China has sent 37 medical expert teams to 34 countries, providing the recipient countries with virus prevention experience and tactics (Cctv.com, 2021).

The Chinese medical expert teams have helped relevant countries improve measures of diagnosis, treatment, prevention and control, effectively containing the development of the pandemic. For example, China's third medical team to Italy has been to local hospitals, communicating with Italian experts face to face, sharing experience in COVID-19 control and providing treatment advice, including containment measures, and example cases of treating novel coronavirus patients with severe symptoms (Chinanews.com, 2020).

Third, China has done its best to provide donations and medical supplies to the international community. In the opening of the 73rd World Health Assembly on 18 May 2020, China announced that it would provide US$2 billion of international aid over two years to support the global fight against the pandemic, especially for helping developing countries recover. As of 4 July 2021, China has provided test kits, protective suits, ventilators and other protective materials to more than 150 countries and 13 international organizations affected by the pandemic (Cctv.com, 2021). In terms of the assessed contributions payable by WHO Member States and Associate Members for the 2020-2021 biennium, China's assessed contribution of US$11.5 million, makes it a second biggest financial contributor to WHO (WHO, n.d. and McCarthy, 2020).

Chinese enterprises such as Alibaba, Huawei, BGI Genomics, Tencent and Vanke, have made notable contributions to global fight against coronavirus. Jack Ma Foundation and Alibaba Foundation have donated essential medical supplies to many countries to support them in the battle against the COVID-19. Amid the pandemic, the good deeds of Chinese telecommunications company Huawei is particularly noteworthy. As at 26 March 2020, Huawei has donated 10,000 N-95 masks; 20,000 isolation gowns; 50,000 medical goggles; and 10,000 gloves to New York State of the U.S (New York State Government, 2020). As at 6 April 2020, Huawei has already delivered to Canada more than a million masks, 30,000 goggles and 50,000 pairs of gloves (Klippe, 2020). It can be expected that Chinese private enterprises will play a more significant role in the future international cooperation against the pandemic (Zhang, Q., 2020).

Fourth, China has made efforts to make vaccine accessible and affordable in developing countries. On 18 May 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping addressed at the opening of the 73rd session of the World Health Assembly, announcing that the COVID-19 vaccine will be made a global public good when it is developed and

deployed in China, to ensure vaccine accessibility and affordability in developing countries (Xinhua, 2020b). On 7 May 2021, the Sinopharm COVID-19 vaccine was listed by WHO for emergency use (WHO, 2021b). On June 1 2021, Sinovac-CoronaVac COVID-19 vaccine was validated by WHO for emergency use (WHO, 2021c). Both the Sinopharm product and the Sinovac-CoronaVac product are inactivated vaccines, their easy storage requirements make them highly suitable for low-resource settings (WHO, 2021b and WHO, 2021c). As at 5 August 2021, China has donated and is donating vaccines to more than 100 countries, and has exported more than 770 million doses of vaccines to over 60 countries, the most of any nation in the world (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021b). China will strive to provide 2 billion doses of vaccines to the world throughout this year (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). Under our combined efforts, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Egypt, Indonesia, and Brazil have become the first ones in their respective regions to have the production capacity of COVID-19 vaccines, which charted a new chapter of unity and self-reliance among developing countries (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021b).

China has worked together with the COVID-19 Vaccine Global Access (COVAX) partners. The aim of the COVAX is to accelerate the development and manufacture of COVID-19 vaccines, and to guarantee fair and equitable access for every country in the world (Gavi, n.d.). On 8 October 2020, China and Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance, signed an agreement, officially joining COVAX (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2020). China has decided to donate US$100 million to the COVAX Facility for distributing vaccines to developing countries (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021a). China will support COVAX by delivering the first batch of more than 100 million doses of vaccines to the Facility before the end of October 2021 (Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2021b).

The Implications of China's Growing Involvement in Global Health Governance

In responding to the pandemic, China has played an important role in the area of global health governance and continuously strengthened its public health diplomacy. The implications of China's response to COVID-19 pandemic and insights from its involvement in global health governance include:

First, advocate the concept of building a global community of health for all. On 18 May 2020, Chinese President Xi Jinping called for a joint effort of all countries to build a global community of health for all. A global community of health for all means to stand for unity and cooperation instead of casting blames; to uphold science and rationality instead of groundless conspiracy theories (Chinadaily.com.cn, 2020). The aim of building a global community of health for all is to use cooperation to protect and promote the health, security, and sustainable development of all humanity (Ma, 2020). This was the solemn commitment made by China and governments

around the world in the UN Charter and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.

The concept of "a global community of health for all" embodies the spirit and value of humanitarianism, and is a further enrichment and expansion of the concept of "A Global Community of Shared Future" advocated by China. When facing this virus, the common enemy of humanity, it is important that the international community rises above national interest and ideology, and actively engages in international health cooperation based on humanitarianism, creating the conditions for building a global community of health for all (Zhang and Wang, 2020). In the future, China will remain committed to the idea of building a global community of health for all.

Second, support the leading role of WHO in global health governance. The 193 member states constituting the UN commit to WHO's overarching mission: the promotion of global health. WHO has both the role of a global health monitor and of the central coordinator in case of an epidemic that may pose a global risk (Genevaz, 2021). As the most important multilateral institution for global health governance, WHO is actively committed to the prevention and control of the pandemic, becoming the "coordinator" of global cooperation against the epidemic, the "complement" to the weakness in the global fight against COVID-19, and the "provider" of global norms and technologies against the virus (Jin, 2020). The international community expects a strong WHO, but its authority and effectiveness depend on the various support provided by its member states (Tang, 2020).

China will continue to give WHO political and financial support, in favor of its leading role in global health governance. As a responsible country that upholding multilateralism and international cooperation, China can actively advocate the "depoliticization" of global health governance on the platform of WHO, and China can provide support for the establishment of a global disease prevention and control mechanism under WHO framework, which focuses on scientific research and cooperation, with doctors, epidemiologists, rescuers and public health experts providing professional policy advice on the operation of mechanism (Zhang and Wang, 2020).

Third, improve the global health governance system and WHO's ability. The pandemic is an extensive test of the global health governance system. WHO's central role remains absolutely essential, but WHO lacks both the authority and the resources to mount an effective response to a global emergency that affects all countries (Gostin et al., 2020b). It needs to be acknowledged that WHO has exposed the problem of insufficient authority in guidance and coordination on the prevention and control of the pandemic, and the problem of inadequate fulfillment of the International Health Regulations (2005) by some countries could also be seen. When the pandemic could be brought under control, the international community need to make a full assessment

of the existing global health governance system, identify the root of the problem and make efforts to learn lessons and remedy weaknesses. An impartial, independent and complete assessment is a prerequisite for effectively improving the global health governance system in the aftermath of a pandemic. The international community should strengthen and leverage the role of WHO and improve the global disease prevention and control system to better prevent and respond to future pandemics.

On improving the global health governance, there are four points on what China can do. China can help WHO to enhance its capacity of monitoring, early-warning emergency response, and coordination with the other countries. China can provide financial and human resources to those countries which lack the ability to comply with IHR (2005). China can deploy skilled healthcare professionals at very short notice to wherever the need arises under the leadership of WHO. China can call on the world to realize the global solidarity in the framework of the UN and WHO, which has been weakened by nationalist governments and conflicts between the U.S. and China.

Fourth, cultivate public health talent with knowledge of international rules and diplomatic skills. Participation in global health governance requires versatile talents with knowledge of health emergency, health security and global health governance, as well as diplomatic skills. In response to the epidemic, the value and necessity of cultivating outstanding talents in public health in China was highlighted. China is already facing shortage of public health personnel with 0.63 public health personnel per 1000 population in 2018 and worst still, there is a significant shortage of experienced senior health professionals in the country (Wang, et al. 2020). In recent years, as the NHC of China is selecting and training a global health talent pool, and with the development of domestic disciplines of global health, the reserve of talents in the field of global health governance and diplomacy has gradually increased. However, compared to developed countries, China still lacks a sufficient health workforce with the necessary competencies for global health engagement (Ma, et al. 2021).

China can focus on the following areas to cultivate talents for health emergencies and health diplomacy: (1) Take cultivating public health talents as a long-term strategy. China can consider establishing a talent pool of public health talents with long-term national investment to respond to various public health emergencies. (2) Appoint health attachés in embassies or missions of key countries or regions. The health attachés will coordinate global health-related affairs and provide crucial information and intelligence for global health decision-making. In the long run, the training of health attachés will provide a strategic talent pool for China to participate in global health governance. China needs to continue to improve the training system for public health talents and provide them with practical opportunities on the international stage. (3) Improve the "revolving door" mechanism between scholars

and officials in the field of public health. China needs to promote the circulation of public health scholars and officials, and support scholars and think tanks to actively participate in the rule making of global health governance.

CONCLUSION

As of 9 August 2021, there have been 202,608,306 confirmed cases of COVID-19, including 4,293,591 deaths, reported to WHO. The global outbreak of coronavirus has revealed the deficiencies of global health governance. The reasons for the deficiencies of the global health governance system include: nationalist governments have subverted global health governance in the COVID-19 response; the legislative process of the international health law is too slow and the global health governance system is generally "soft"; a few countries have "politicized" the global cooperation against the epidemic in order to shift their responsibility in poor COVID-19 response; and the increased rivalry between China and the U.S. has reduced the effectiveness of the international cooperation against COVID-19.

While China has achieved significant progress in containing the pandemic domestically, it has also contributed ingenuity and strength to the global fight against the coronavirus. China's significant contribution to global anti-pandemic cooperation can be demonstrated in: (1) China has actively shared its experience in COVID-19 control and the treatment of infected cases with international community. As of 8 September 2020, China has conducted more than 70 exchanges on the virus prevention and control with international and regional organizations, and launched online knowledge center to share experience in epidemic prevention and control. (2) China has sent medical expert teams to help relative countries improve measures of diagnosis, treatment, prevention and control. As of July 2021, 37 Chinese expert teams have been sent to 34 countries. The Chinese medical expert teams have helped relevant countries effectively contain the development of the pandemic. (3) China has done its best to provide donations and medical supplies to international community. As of 4 July 2021, China has provided a variety of protective materials to more than 150 countries and 13 international organizations. (4) China has made efforts to make vaccine accessible and affordable in developing countries. As of 5 August 2021, China has donated and is donating vaccines to more than 100 countries, and has exported more than 770 million doses of vaccines to over 60 countries, the most of any nation in the world. China has also worked together with the COVAX partners.

Implications of China's response to the pandemic and its involvement in global health governance include: First, advocate the concept of building a global community of health for all. The concept of "a global community of health for all" embodies the spirit and value of humanitarianism and is conducive to the international community to rise above national interest and ideological differences. Second, support the leading role of WHO in global public health governance. On the platform

organized by WHO, China can actively advocate the "depoliticization" of global health governance, providing support for the establishment of a global disease prevention and control mechanism under WHO framework. Third, improve the global health governance system and WHO's ability. China can help WHO to enhance its capacity of monitoring, early-warning and emergency response; China can provide financial resources and deploy skilled healthcare professionals to countries in need of emergency assistance under the leadership of WHO; China can call on the world to realize the global solidarity in the framework of the UN and WHO. Fourth, cultivate public health talents with knowledge of international rules and diplomatic skills. China can take measures to cultivate public health talents as a long-term strategy, appoint health attachés in embassies or missions of key countries or regions, and improve the "revolving door" mechanism between scholars and officials in the field of public health.

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USING ONLINE PLATFORM FOR COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT DURING THE COVID-19 PANDEMIC

Anif Fatma Chawa[1]

[1]Department of Sociology, Universitas Brawijaya, Malang, Indonesia
anif_chawa@ub.ac.id

ABSTRACT

The spread of the Coronavirus disease across the world remains unstoppable with destructive negative impacts on health and the socio-economic life of communities. Government, organizations and impacted communities have established various development programs to overcome these impacts. However, multiple protocols in combating the virus (wearing mask, social distancing or staying 6 feet apart and avoiding crowds) have hampered the distribution of these programs to the communities. This study aims to examine how community engagement process has been conducted by using online platform. The study sourced data from fifteen community development programs conducted by undergraduate students. Before the pandemic, these programs were distributed to the communities offline. This study found several online platforms which were used mostly by those students including webinar and meeting software, such as zoom, website and social media like Instagram and Facebook. These platforms were employed to conduct webinar, inform, and involve other groups or communities in the programs. As a result, the communities have become more active and familiar in utilizing online platforms to establish various development programs. However, this study also identifies some problems which hinder the community engagement process including online communication issues and lack of the accessibility of communities using the internet.

Keywords: community engagement, covid-19, pandemic, community development

INTRODUCTION

The spread of the Coronavirus disease of Covid-19 across the world remains unstoppable with destructive negative impacts on health and the socio-economic life of communities. This pandemic has been caused by a new strain of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus or SARS-Co-V (Lu, et al., 2020; Nishiura, et al., 2020).The first outbreak was emerged in December 2019, in Wuhan, China, as pneumonia (Lu, et al., 2020). To break the chain of virus transmission, the World Health Organization (WHO) has established Covid-19 protocols including wearing mask, social distancing or stay 6 feet apart from others and avoiding crowds (Wong & Kohler, 2020; Makridis & Wu, 2020; Xu, et al., 2020). These protocols have caused a complex impact on people's livelihood. Including in these impacts are health deterioration and psychological aspects of life, such as severe illness and weight gain

or obesity during lockdown and mental breakdown (Bian, 2020; Sun & Lu, 2020). Others are socio-economic impacts particularly affecting individuals and households with middle and lower income as illustrated in the picture below (Chawa, 2021):


Figure 1: The Flow of the Socio-Economic Impact of the Covid-19 Pandemic

Figure 1. shows two kinds of impacts, first is direct impact in which households lose revenue because of the illness and the death of their breadwinners due to the pandemic; second is indirect impacts which emerge especially when social distancing through quarantines, lockdown and curfew continues (Buheji, et al., 2020; Chawa, 2021). During this time, those individuals and households have lost their jobs or revenue, decreasing their standard of living, particularly in saving and consuming, then pushing them into poverty.

Various strategies have been conducted by countries around the world to response to the Covid-19 pandemic. Several countries put their effort on the capacity of government to break the chain of virus transmission as well as to overcome the impacts of Covid-19. The countries which have succeeded in conducting this strategy are New Zealand (Baker, Wilson, & Anglemyer, 2020) and China (Lu, et al., 2020; Lu, Ji , Zhang, Zheng, & Liang, 2021). Other countries have involved community participation to response to the pandemic by using community-based approach or other kinds of community engagement strategies. Community engagement has required the willingness and responsibility or collective action of its members as coined by Putnam as social capital (Putnam, 1993). Community members have participated to ensure the distribution, availability and access of marginal groups toward public facilities during the lockdown (Miao, Schwarz, & Schwarz, 2021; Zollet, et al., 2021). Research studies show that community engagement approach is effective to break the chain of corona virus transmission as well as overcome various impacts which caused by the pandemic.

However, the implementation of community engagement approach could be problematic. The engagement process could imply greater personal interaction and risk of virus transmission (Makridis & Wu, 2020). This problem has challenged the implementation of various community engagement projects (Lucas, Targema, Jibril, Samboa, & Istifanus, 2020; Sinclair & Vestrheim, 2020). Several questions were raised during these projects, such as which methods and tools are used to amplify community voices when face-to-face meetings were not possible, how digital solutions benefit community engagement and what the main challenges are in engaging the communities during Covid-19 (Sinclair & Vestrheim, 2020). This article aims to show the implementation of community engagement projects which had been conducted during the pandemic. These projects were run by some undergraduate students as part of their course namely *Praktek Kerja Nyata* (PKN) by doing community service or internship to put their knowledge into practice. Before the pandemic, these projects were done offline by face-to-face meeting with the community members. However, following the outbreak, the students started to transform their strategy by using online platform to engage with the community members. This article aims to demonstrate online platforms chosen to undertake the project as well as various issues that hinder the implementation of the projects.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Community engagement has been defined as a process by which community members come together to reflect on and make decisions about the future of their community (Fedorowicz, Arena, & Burrowes, 2020, p. 2). Several parties including government, organizations and academics have employed this strategy to encourage people to take collective action and responsibility related to various issues as well as to find the solutions to address them without the need to be compelled (Enwereji & Ezeama, 2020). Moreover, Enwereji and Ezeama explain that community engagement is a proven strategy of co-producing knowledge, capacities and actions to address issues affecting people's well-being. In relation to the pandemic, community engagement is assumed to have been effective to respond to public health emergencies, critical in the-making of effective health policies and properly improving governance in health systems because it is appropriate with the needs and expectations of vulnerable people (O'Mara-Eves, Brunton, Kavanagh, Jamal, & Thomas, 2012; O'Mara-Eves, et al., 2015; Ramsbottom, O'Brien, Ciotti, & Takacs, 2018).

Many countries are experienced with community engagement strategy to ~~responses~~ respond to various health crisis, including pandemics. In Kenya, government involves community leaders to provide data base related to economic or food resilience of their members during the quarantine (Gerard, Imbert, & Orkin, 2020). In South Africa, local community members have involved intensively to address Ebola pandemic because they are in the best position to have appropriate information regarding the needs and preference of these members (Anoko, et al., 2020; Marshall,

2016). Related to the Covid-19 pandemic, Italy and China have involved community members to ensure the process of distribution, availability and accesibility of powerless people toward public services during the lockdown (Miao, Schwarz, & Schwarz, 2021; Zollet, et al., 2021).

Community engagement strategy requires the its practitioners to build a good relationships with and among the community members before starting the projects or development programs. This engaging process is also needed to 'help create new connections between diverse community members and make resource available within the community, encouraging community member to become involved in the lives of their neighbor' (Fedorowicz, Arena, & Burrowes, 2020, p. 2). This engaging community process could be conducted in various common forms, such as community mapping, community action planning, surveys, community-based participatory resarch and focus groups (Fedorowicz, Arena, & Burrowes, 2020).

However, the engaging community process has been challenged by several issues during the Covid-19 pandemic. The most challenging issue is related the communication and interactions process with and among the members of community due to the fact that face-to-face meetings are not possible to be conducted during the pandemic. To address this issue, several online platforms are available for engaging community. The community engagement practitioners should consider the target audience and the key messages which are going to be delivered to determine the most appropriate tool to use (Fedorowicz, Arena, & Burrowes, 2020). Fedorowicz, Arena and Burrowes give some examples of how to use digital or online platform to engage with community as follows:

1. Social media, such as Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn and Tik tok
   Social media platform can offer a quick way to informally engage with community members, particularly young people. This tool can be employed to give information and provide consultation with and among community members.
2. Webinar and Meeting Software, such as Zoom, GoToMeeting, Google hangouts, Loom and WEBEX.
   Webinar software can be a great tool to engage community members in deeper conversations, and they can help build and maintain connections while people are social distancing. Meetings can also be recorded, which helps record discussions. Moreover, not only can these kinds of digital tools be used to inform and in consultation, but it can also be employed to involve the community members in various projects and development programs.
3. Collaborative Project Planning Tools, such as Shape, Miro, Whimsical, Idea flip.
   These tools can be used to make collaboration with community in conducting the projects. All of these platforms allow users to create visual brainstorming spaces and organize ideas for strategic planning. Some include tools such as flowcharts, mind maps, workflow organizers, and surveys. Because many of these tools are

quite advanced, they are best used by the main project team or by an advisory committee.

4. Survey Platforms such as Qualtrics, Survey Monkey, Google Forms

Surveys are a great way to gather information about community members and their needs or gather feedback on proposed plans and ideas. They can also be used to generate ideas, but they generally work best when both the questions and response choices (if not open-ended) are clear and direct.

Moreover, Oxfam provides a guideline the way by which engaging community can be conducted by using online platform (Oxfam, 2020). First, engaging community should be conducted by employing different technologies to communicate via online or by phone. Second, the community engagement practitioners should ensure that communities have the means, capacity and accessibility to use these technologies and if internet connection is needed. Third, ensuring the engagement of all groups is also necessary in both host and displaced communities, in environments where everyone can feel comfortable to speak up.

METHODS

This study employed secondary data that involved the review of fifteen project documents of community services which were conducted by undergraduate students as part of their course namely *Praktek Kerja Nyata* (PKN). To conduct these projects, the students were required to use community engagement strategy. Before the pandemic, the community engagement projects should be conducted offline that requires face-to-face interaction. Since the Covid-19 pandemic, all those projects should be changed into online platforms by utilizing various kinds of digitals tools.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Using Online Platform in Conducting Community Engagement Projects

Praktek Kerja Nyata (PKN) is a compulsory course which should be programmed by undergraduate students at the end of their studies. The students could choose whether running a community service projects or doing an internship programs in several businesses and government institutions as well as NGOs. This course would provide practical lesson for students so they can apply the knowledge which they have learnt in campus. To undertake PKN, the undergraduate students should build engagement with various people including community. During the pandemic, these students should transform the engagement process from offline or face-to-face meeting or door-to-door activities to online-based communications by utilizing several digital tools. This study found common community engagement projects as well as online platform that have been conducted by most of the undergraduate students in conducting these projects.

Campaigns

Most the students ran several campaigns as part of community engagement projects. A campaign is defined as an intended of communication strategy to generate specific outcomes of effect, and it is addressed to a relatively large number of individuals, usually within a specified period of time and through an organized set of communication activities (Rogers & Storey, 1987). The main objectives of these campaigns are to educate, inform and socialize people regarding crucial issues including the alleviation of stigma on people with disabilities and mental health, people with HIV AIDS and also people with problems related to violence against women and children. Several strategies were employed by the students to run the campaigns as follows:

Website Seminar (Webinar)

Webinar was chosen because it could reach relatively large audience by using most common online platforms such as zoom and YouTube live. This picture below is an example of webinar which was conducted by the students with the topic Family Life during the Pandemic.

Source: *PKN* document

Picture 1. Poster and Webinar of Family Life Issues
During Covid-19 on Zoom and you tube

Picture 1 shows a webinar as a campaign run by the students on Zoom and YouTube to deliver their project related to violence against women and children that happen in many families during the pandemic. In this project, the students delivered the message that violence against women and children could happen in a family and anywhere.

Social Media Campaign

Beside webinar and meeting software, the students used social media to run the campaigns to attract larger audience. The favorite social media used includes Instagram (IG) and Facebook (FB). Picture 2 and 3 show some social media campaigns established by the students via Instagram and Facebook. The students provided various attractive content such as photos, audio and videos to deliver their message.

Source: *PKN* document

Picture 2. Hashtag for Reducing Stigma on People with Mental Health Issues

Source:*PKN* document

Picture 3. Local Food Product Marketing

Picture 2 and 3 show social media campaigns run by the students on Instagram and Facebook. Picture 2 shows a project delivered by the students using Instagram to alleviate the stigma on people with disabilities and picture 3 illustrates a marketing project run to promote local food products of *Desa Aenganyar, Giligenting Island, Madura*. By using Facebook, the students have built an online marketing place for local community, allowing them to sell products and reach many customers living off the *Giligenting Island*.

Virtual Training

The undergraduate students also established online training program for their PKN projects. During pandemic, most learning process has been conducted online through various digital tools, such as google meet and zoom. However, many teachers have a lack of capacity to run a distance learning by using various digitals tools or online meeting software such as zoom, meet and Microsoft Teams and google classroom. To overcome this issue, the students established a virtual training project to increase skills and capacity of teachers to make various learning contents such as audio, videos, files, pictures, links and deliver all these contents to the meeting software.

Online Survey

Online survey also becomes a common community engagement chosen by the students for their *PKN* projects. This survey was conducted to gather information related to the community members or some crucial issues such as political issues. Students employed Google Forms as the common survey platform for their *PKN* project. Picture 4 shows a google form employed to gather data from the online survey.


Source:*PKN* document

Picture 4. Survey of Community Participation to Monitor Local Election in Batu

Picture 4 shows a survey project conducted by the students to gather data related to participation of community to control or monitor local election in Batu, Malang, East Java. Due to the pandemic, survey activities should be conducted online using google form or survey monkey shared through Email, WhatsApp, Facebook and other kinds of online media. This online platform was deemed to more appropriately comply with the Covid-19 protocols, particularly social distancing and avoiding crowds to break the chain of virus transmission.

The above explanation illustrates how undergraduate students employed various online platforms to undertake the community engagement projects as part of their PKN. These platforms are expected to reach larger and diverse community members. However, the students have been challenged by various issues in engaging process with community members to establish PKN projects, particularly during pandemic due to the Covid-19 protocols which requires less face-to-face and door-to-door communication and social interaction.

Engaging Communities During a Pandemic: Some Issues

Online platform is deemed more effective to be employed as a strategy for conducting community engagement projects during the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the establishment of these projects would be challenged by crucial issues related to the Covid-19 health protocols. This study found that the students who undertake their PKN projects have difficulty communicating with the members of the community because they have to follow all the health protocols. To overcome this issue, the students have to use online communication via internet using digital media in numerous methods including email, SMS and instant messenger, particularly WhatsApp as well as zoom meeting to have discussion regarding the planning and monitoring of the PKN projects.

Source:*PKN* document

Picture 5. Zoom Meeting and WhatsApp Discussion in the Project Planning and Monitoring Proses

Picture 5 illustrates online communication employed by PKN students in the planning and monitoring of their PKN project. However, if face-to-face meeting should be conducted, the students are required to follow strict Covid-19 protocols as illustrated in picture 6.

Source:*PKN* document

Picture 6. Offline Meeting with the Covid-19 Protocols

Picture 6 illustrates face-to-face meeting or interaction conducted by PKN students in a strict Covid-19 protocols. However, this study reviews other crucial issues explained by PKN students in their documents. These issues arose due to the fact that they found many knowledge gaps of community members elaborated in the following:

1.   Capacity and accessibility of community members in using digital media

The students found that some community members have a lack of capability of using digital media for online communication. For instance, several members are not familiar yet with digital media such as website, email, Instagram, Zoom meeting and Facebook. Other community members do not have enough accessibility to the Internet because they cannot afford to subscribe data plan for Internet access. Some live in a remote area with limited internet connections. This study also found that some community members do not have smartphone for online communication. All these limitations have hindered the participation of the community in the PKN projects.

2.   Lack of knowledge and information related to the Covid-19 pandemic and its protocols

This study found the fact that not all community members do understand and accept the information about the Covid-19 pandemic and its health protocols. As a consequence, the members of community want to have face-to-face meeting with the students without complying the Covid-19 protocols. As a result, PKN students should

give information to those members related to the health protocols during the pandemic and why it is important to follow the protocols.

The Covid-19 pandemic has transformed every aspect of people live, particularly in terms of communication and social interactions with other people. Although in a different way, online platform still becomes the most effective way by which people could communicate with others without impinging the Covid-19 protocols. This platform has been used by PKN students to establish their community engagement projects although some issues still hamper the implementation of these projects.

CONCLUSION

This study showed that online platform could become the most effective way to conduct community engagement projects during the Covid-19 pandemic. The implementation of these project could employ numerous online platforms such as instant messengers and meeting software. This study found there are common community engagement projects which have been conducted by undergraduate students using online platform including campaign projects in various forms, such as webinar and social media campaigns, virtual training projects via zoom meeting and online surveys using the google forms. However, the implementation of community engagement projects using these digital media during a pandemic has been challenged by a crucial issue or problem related to knowledge gaps among community members regarding the capacity and accessibility of community members in using digital media as well as lack of knowledge and information related to the Covid-19 pandemic and its protocols. It would be better for community engagement practitioners to consider these gaps as well as finding solutions to this problem before initiating or conducting their projects and development programs.

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SOCIAL WELFARE AND RELIGION: A SOCIAL ACTION OF AL-KAROMAH MOSQUE IN THE PANDEMIC ERA

Khoirun Nisa'[1], Wiwik Setiyani [2]
[1]Graduate School Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta
nisatasrif@gmail.com
[2]Universitas Islam Negeri Sunan Ampel, Surabaya
wiwiksetiyani@uinsby.ac.id

ABSTRACT

The Covid-19 pandemic has colored socio-religious life to this day. One way to respond to the pandemic is by carrying out social activities that benefit the community. This article will discuss three academic problems, including; *First*, how did the idea of sadaqah *centelan* come about during the Covid-19 pandemic. *Second*, how to innovate social action with sadaqah *centelan*. *Third*, how the community responds to sadaqah *centelan* as social action innovation. This research was conducted at the Al-Karomah mosque in Wiyung Surabaya. The data collection method used in-depth interviews with people directly involved in the sadaqah *centelan* activity at the Al-Karomah mosque. Some of the research findings include; *first*, effectiveness, efficiency, and on target with the assistance provided by the mosque for worshipers who stop at the mosque or live around the Wiyung area; s*econd*, the implementation of the sadaqah *centelan* is carried out by taking the alms that the mosque management has provided for congregations who have economic limitations. On the other hand, those who can give alms can take the alms package program, which varies nominal value. *Third*, the community appreciates the initiation of the committee, which can provide convenience and comfort to the congregation. Sadaqah *centelan* is an effective and efficient strategy in reducing the risk of spreading covid-19. The innovation in charity teaches Muslims to increase social worship and create a social distraction during the pandemic can be an inspiration for other mosques in grounding alms in innovative ways.

Keywords: social action, sadaqah centelan, pandemic

INTRODUCTION

The COVID-19 pandemic is still not over. The community carries out various social activities to take care of each other (Sunarto, 2021, h. 68). Social action is one of the agendas that many people choose to stay active and creative during the pandemic. The Al-Karomah mosque is a place of worship that also has social activities. The mosque, located on Gunungsari street, Wiyung, Surabaya, holds an uncommon alms that distinguishes it from religious meals in general. This alms is known as '*Sadaqah Centelan*'. This activity has occurred since a year ago at the beginning of the

pandemic, specifically before this year's Ramadan. Sadaqah Centelan is social action (Tobroni, 2020, h. 388) carried out by the administrators of the Al-Karomah mosque.

The purpose of Sadaqah Centelan is to provide social assistance to others without direct physical contact. Social activities initiated by the administrators of the Al-Karomah mosque are unique because there are no specific requirements and criteria, neither for people who want to donate nor for those who want to take alms provided, which means that there is no special treatment that distinguishes people who receive alms. Furthermore, items that can be donated are primary needs. These items can be in the form of food and other materials such as rice and money. The mosque administrator will distribute it to the congregation and residents around the Al-Karomah mosque.

Sadaqah Centelan attracts public attention. Many people deliberately pass on the street where the Sadaqah Centelan is provided. It makes people interested in participating in this charity and vice versa, taking advantage of this social activity. Sadaqah Centelan is one of the social change movements to carry out social action, namely a mechanical response to conditions that arouse people's hearts because of the prevailing social norms and values (Talcott Parsons, 1979).

The social action of the Al-Karomah mosque has provided a stimulus to other communities to participate in the Sadaqah Centelan. Therefore, it is important to explore the case as a form of social phenomenon. This study is derived from three hypotheses. First, how the idea of Shadaqah Centelan come about during the Covid-19 pandemic. Second, how to innovate social action with Sadaqah Centelan. Third, how the community responds to Sadaqah Centelan as social innovation.

This study aims to analyze the concept of Sadaqah Centelan, which the committee of the Al-Karomah mosque manages. Although the pandemic still hits and affects human life, many positive activities can be done. Sadaqah Centelan teaches us the importance of giving alms/infaq to others, especially those who need primary needs to fulfill their daily life.

Sadaqah Centelan is not the only social action that formed during the pandemic. Some research conducted by the following scholars are used as a literature review and will show the differences between this research and previous studies. Tasminatun and Makiyah (2020) through their work entitled *"Pembentukan Kelompok Sedekah Sampah oleh Ibu-Ibu PKK RW 09 Kwarasan, Nogotirto, Gamping Sleman"* showed the creativity of *Sadaqah Sampah* which was initiated by the Kwarasan women community. This social activity invites the community to manage trash independently and provides community service to the environment. This innovation should be appreciated considering that the waste management process is difficult enough. The women manage organic and non-organic waste that can still be recycled or sold to collectors. The money from selling the trash is donated to orphans and schools (Tasminatun and Makiyah, 2020, h. 787-789), and it continues today.

In another study conducted by Nasrullah Sapa et al., (2020) with research tittle *"Altruisme Dalam Sistem Ekonomi Islam: Memaksimalkan Nilai Spiritual Dan Ketahanan Sosial Dalam Pandemi Covid-19"*. Sapa sees the concept of altruism in Islam as a way to achieve spiritual satisfaction and community resilience in the pandemic era. Altruism or *Itsar* is an attitude of prioritizing others above their interests. Altruism teaches Muslims to help each other by issuing zakat in the month of Ramadan and giving charity (Sapa et al., 2020, h. 148).

Maulana et al., (2021) in their study entitled "*Manajemen Masjid Persis Al-Istiqomah Pada Masa Pandemi Covid 19 Di Desa Muncangela Kab. Kuningan Jawa Barat*" showed that the mosque can also be proactive in preventing the spread of Covid 19. The Al-Istiqomah mosque located in West Java is a mosque that implements three main functions of house of worship: *idaroh*, *imarah*, and *ri'ayah*. For the author(s), these three functions are the benchmark for a prosperous mosque. However, the main foundation of a mosque is an organizational system, administrative arrangement, financial management, and supervision (Ristyawati, 2020, h. 247). Al-Istiqamah mosque has this kind of thing and also implements strict health protocols for its congregation, such as; limits the duration of praying, provides special clinics to handle the spread of Covid-19, and actively raises humanitarian donations to help the community (Maulana et al., 2021, h. 59) who are exposed to Covid-19.

This study will emphasize the implementation of the Sadaqah Centelan initiated by the Al-Karomah mosque. Sadaqah Centelan has the characteristics that distinguish it from other social actions; specifically, it lies in innovation, alms programs, and community response. Sadaqah Centelan is part of a social activity that is rarely practiced in Surabaya. Therefore, bringing the case to deeper analysis is important and inspiring other mosques in Surabaya to ground alms.

METHOD

Like qualitative research, this study uses observation methods and in-depth interviews. In collecting data, the researcher(s) went to Al-Karomah mosque and interacted with the informants by asking random questions (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006, h. 316) about Sadaqah Centelan. The informants are those directly involved (2006, h. 319) in the Sadaqah Centelan, such as the organizers, givers, and receivers.

Emile Durkheim's theory of social solidarity is used as an analytical knife to see the relations between people due to the pandemic condition. The raw data were analyzed in-depth through the Durkheim social solidarity approach (Herzog, 2018, h. 112). The relationship between Muslims is manifested in alms, which can be done without waiting for the lineage/provisions of zakat. Giving charity is a habit of Muslims who were more active before the pandemic. This research shows the other

side of the pandemic through Sadaqah Centelan managed by the Al-Karomah mosque through this mix and match.

Social Action of al Karomah Mosque in Pandemic Era

The Al-Karomah mosque is located on Gunungsari street, Wiyung, Surabaya. The mosque was founded in 1980 and had a large enough capacity to accommodate the congregation. In general, mosque facilities are equipped with rest and parking areas, a mosque foyer (used for recitations and studies), halls, libraries, hundreds of administrators, preachers, and seven imams (Irul, Interview, 2021). The mosque is quite active with various religious activities, especially during Islamic celebrations. The Al-Karomah mosque is known as one of the worship houses with an excellent management system and innovative programs, and the new one is Sadaqah Centelan (Imam, Interview, 2021).

The Al-Karomah mosque provides health services for its congregation, both medical and non-medical therapies such as ruqyah and cupping, increasing the body's immune system and curing various diseases. Non-medical treatment is held once a week, every Wednesday (Syarifudin, interview, 2021). The congregation also performs a medical check-up by showing a member card called LAKESJAM (*Layanan Kesehatan Jama'ah*). During the pandemic, the committee still opened aqiqah services (Irul, Interview, 2021) for children who were about to be circumcised.

This year, the Al-Karomah mosque holds Sadaqah Centelan and collective Qurban, Pledge, and coaching for converts every Friday. Another social innovation is open donation for used items (or named '*memanfaatkan barang bekas menjadi berkah*'). It shows that the community can donate their used items to the Al-Karomah mosque. They also provide a special service for picking up used items according to residents' requests. Another innovation is the '*Ganti Kemul*' service, '*Sedekah Kain Kafan'* and *'Layanan Kirim Doa*', which are carried out en masse every Friday night (Sulaiman, Interview, 2021). Since the pandemic period, specifically in the last two years, the Al-Karomah foundation has held Karomah Mart by providing necessities (goods required to meet the immediate needs of human beings, for example, food, medicine, clothing, and bed-clothes). One informant said this mart is part of Sadaqah Centelan itself (Imam, Interview, 2021). Karomah Mart is one of the other innovations by the Al-Karomah foundation due to the pandemic and to make it easier for residents to meet household needs and avoid crowds in traditional/ modern markets. This is an effort to reduce the spread of Covid-19 (Kurniawan, 2020, h. 25), which is still rampant.

The Al-Karomah mosque made new changes in the implementation of social action activities. The pandemic has forced mosque administrators to adapt all religious activities to current conditions. Health protocols are strictly enforced. Hand sanitizer

is provided for easy use by the congregation and distribute masks to those who do not have or forget to bring their masks (Ilham, Interview, 2021). Mosque administrators did not even hesitate to reprimand the congregation who did not comply with health protocols. Social distancing is implemented under government regulations. The administrators impose restrictions on prayer rows with a distance of one meter between one congregation and another. In distributing Sadaqah Centelan, the regulations are increasingly tightened (Sulaiman, Interview, 2021) because they meet directly with the community.

Furthermore, the implementation of Friday prayers, Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha, are also limited by following government regulations to pray at home (Hakim, 2021, h.77). One of the mosque administrators informed all congregations through social media, including Whatsapp and Facebook (Zahra, Interview, 2021). Restrictions are also applied to annual activities such as the Prophet's birthday, Islamic new year, nisfu' syaban, and other religious activities.

All activities that are usually attended by their congregation are limited. In a sense, these activities are not eliminated but are celebrated modestly by mosque administrators to avoid the crowds (Imam, Interview, 2021). The congregation can still celebrate it by worshiping in their respective homes. However, these restrictions (Tobroni, 2020, h. 371) solely prevent the spread of Covid-19.

Besides the restrictions on religious activities that apply (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2016, h. 319), it does not necessarily stop the Al-Karomah mosque from innovating amid pandemics. The committee shows that the pandemic has not killed their religious activities. On the contrary, the pandemic has become the force (Fitriani, Agrosamdhyo & Mansur, 2020, h. 70) of the Sadaqah Centelan idea, initiated in early 2019. Sadaqah Centelan means that the congregation takes alms that have been provided by the mosque administrator and can also give alms/infaq to the mosque. Sadaqah Centelan is a two-way activity. The mosque provides free necessities and food to the congregation and vice versa; the mosque also accepts alms/infaq from anyone who wants to give alms at the Al-Karomah mosque (Syarifudin, Interview, 2021). One of the informants said that:

> "...The idea of Sadaqah Centelan came from the mosque administrators; we are interested in sharing with others in this difficult time. At least we try to reduce the burden of other people's lives by sharing food; this is all we can do so far. All administrators are directly involved in the process of Sadaqah Centelan" (Imam, Interview, 2021).

Sadaqah Centelan is an interesting phenomenon for the surrounding community. Every Friday, the community gets food which is distributed free of charge by the mosque management. Friday was chosen (Maqom, 2020, h. 37; Hasbi, 2012, h. 71) as momentum for free food distribution because Muslims perform Friday prayers. More than that, the administrators believe that Friday is a blessed and major day in

Islam. Muslims are advised to do a lot of good deeds on this day. After praying, they can immediately eat the food that is already available. Some of them immediately enjoyed it at the mosque, and some of them chose to take home and enjoy it at their respective homes. One of the congregation expressed his happiness in eating the food "yes, absolutely, I'm happy because before leaving, I didn't have time to eat, thank God I got it," she said (Iqbal, Interview, 2021). Another informant argued that:

> "The distribution of food and necessities is routinely done once a week... and the reason why it's Friday is that we can directly distribute it to the worshipers, and we don't have to wait or deliver to their homes. And maybe many of them haven't had time to eat before leaving, so yes, they can eat here. We also immediately provide drinks as well, so they are not thirsty...." (Jufrianto, Interview, 2021).

Sadaqah Centelan received various responses from the community and people who had just stopped by at the mosque. In the sense that they are quite enthusiastic about the charity. One of the visitors expressed his opinion about Sadaqah Centelan, "This is good, the ideas and the activities are positive, after all, not all houses of worship hold charity like this. So far, this is the second time I have received necessities from the Al-Karomah mosque, lucky me" (Ipang, Interview, 2021). Some congregants initiated to help mosque administrators distribute necessities and food. Essentially distributing food every Friday is the mosque's strategy to ensure the congregation's welfare (Arditama Lestari, 2020, h.160) during the pandemic.

Sadaqah Centelan was a choice of Social Action Towards Social Welfare During the Pandemic

The pandemic continues to squirm and is an unsolved phenomenon. No one can predict when this situation will end. A condition forces the community to survive (Ristyawati, 2020, h. 424) amid limitations. The Al-Karomah mosque urges the congregation to maintain health by limiting communication and direct contact, gatherings, and actions not following health protocols (Irul, Interview, 2021). Indeed, these regulations challenge the mosque, which tends to create social problems such as economic crises (Hadiwardoyo, 2020, h. 87), health and food supplies (primary needs).

The Al-Karomah mosque used crucial conditions during the pandemic to innovate. Once again, the mosque is concerned with distributing necessities and free food to ensure its congregation's welfare. As in the previous discussion, mosque administrators also provide medical check-up services for the worshipers in health. They can get free medical treatment by showing their membership card (Jannah, Interview, 2021). In addition, the mosque pays attention to its congregation in almost all aspects. They started by meeting the needs of worship, health services, circumcision (Sulaiman, Interview, 2021). However, Sadaqah Centelan is the most active activity and is prioritized by mosque administrators.

In distributing groceries and free food, the administrators make special stands placed in front of the mosque. Hundreds of food stocks are stored in carts by stacking them. Under the scorching heat of the sun, there were two men in charge of distributing food to the countless passersby. Residents automatically go to the cart and take alms by waiting in line and maintaining social distance. Mosque administrators also distribute masks and hand sanitizer, and anyone can take the food that is distributed, and there are no special requirements (Zahra, Interview, 2021).

Every week, mosque administrators organize all the items, especially basic necessities, pack them into bags and then put them on the stand. Each bag is labeled to make it easier to identify it. Meanwhile, people who want to give alms or take alms can communicate with the mosque administrators who are on standby there. As chairman of the Al-Karomah foundation, Imam explained that originally Sadaqah Centelan was in the form of food provided every Friday, amounting to 1200 packs (Sulaiman, Interview, 2021). Because the number is large and sometimes it doesn't run out, the mosque administrators feel it becomes redundant (stale) if not distributed. Thus, the packaged rice program was changed to Sadaqah Centelan in the form of necessities that were considered more effective and valuable (Iqbal, Interview, 2021) and not afraid to go stale and could be taken home.

Sadaqah Centelan does not always run smoothly. The Al-Karomah foundation admits that they face serious challenges in carrying out this activity. Technically, the process of distributing groceries and free food did not experience any problems. Sadaqah Centelan received moral support from various parties. The local government also showed its support and appreciation for the Al-Karomah mosque. However, Sadaqah Centelan has helped many people, especially those who have a financial crisis. But economically, they experience stumbling blocks, as explained by one of the mosque administrators that:

> "The problem we face is sponsorship; we cooperate with sponsors such as NGOs. Many outsiders collaborate and donate funds to the Al-Karomah mosque. So this mosque has a wide scope managed by the Al-Karomah foundation with an incredible management system. We manage Sadaqah Centelan together by mobilizing the entire board. But the bad news is that some sponsors have decided to stop collaborating with the Al-Karomah Foundation; how else, the pandemic is why we lost many sponsors. As a result, the mosque's income has decreased, thank God we (the mosque) still have an 'Eternal Fund' (*Dana Abadi*)". (Imam, Interview, 2021).

The foundation gets funds from sponsors that even reach one billion in a year, but they only received five hundred million per year during the pandemic in the last two years. Al-Karomah itself has established cooperation abroad, such as Jordanian and Malaysian NGOs. Al-Karomah has five pillars: piety, broadcasting, da'wah, development, humanity, and economy. In grounding Sadaqah Centelan, they reported it on their Radio, Television (Karomah TV) and, also through social media (Youtube)

(Sarifuddin, interview, 2021) and large banners in front of the mosque. Through all these information media platforms (Sumangkut, Mumu, & Shirley, 2020, h. 56), the public can find out about Sadaqah Centelan. One of the administrators explained that:

> "....Our goal is to relieve the indigents, day laborers, and those in need. The Al-Karomah Foundation decided to continue holding Sadaqah Centelan even though one day the pandemic would end. We see many people are enthusiastic about this charity. Hopefully, we can do much better." (Ilham, interview, 2021).

Practically people not only get the alms they want, but there are other important things. Through this program, the mosque management has succeeded in prospering and making it a shelter for the worshipers. In short, people can pray with pleasure and get unexpected alms, as in the word of God, which means 'unexpected sustenance' (Q.S. At-Thalaq: 3).

The community enthusiasm motivated the mosque management to finally decide to continue these activities in the month of Ramadan (Muhammad Ali, Interview, 2021). Moreover, the pandemic is not over yet (Hanindharputri, 2021, h. 94); for them, it is a way of virtue that can move people's hearts. In the end, Sadaqah Centelan made the Al-Karomah mosque more than just a house of worship but showed its function as a comfortable and pleasant place for the community (Fitriani, 2021, h. 70). Through this, charity emphasizes that alms are duty and part of the habit as social beings.

The Significance of Religious Values in Social Solidarity that Forms Social Welfare.

In Islamic teachings, giving alms is part of '*amal ma'ruf nahin munkar*', meaning that people can 'cooperate in righteousness and piety, but do not cooperate in sin and aggression (Q.S. Al-Maidah: 2). This verse emphasizes how important cooperation is in virtue (Syafiq, 2015, 381). Furthermore, the social innovation of the mosque is in line with the core teachings of Islam to compete in goodness or known as *ta'awun* (Afandi, 2018). The principle of *ta'awun* is to help each other unconditionally. In one hadith, the Prophet said, 'the most beloved people to Allah are those who are most beneficial to people. The most beloved deed to Allah is to make a Muslim happy or to remove one of his troubles' (Elias, 2013).

Mosque administrator admits this is not just about giving alms, human value. They realize that society is going through difficult times during the pandemic. It is an honor for them to help others and see them happy (Jufrianto, Interview, 2021). On the other hand, religion and humanity are two exclusive things, different but interdependent (McGrath, 2020, 23). In essence, vertical worship is essentially social worship. The mosque management knows the virtues of giving charity so that the distribution of necessities and food is a real action of the mosque during the pandemic. One of the informants confirmed that:

"...And for those who want to donate at the Al-Karomah mosque, they can choose the type of alms they want. So anyone can give alms in the form of goods and electronic money via credit cards and barcodes. We also provide 'Sadaqah Centelan drive thru' during this pandemic. We aim to make it easier for people who want to give alms/infaq; once again, it is our initiative to maintain social distance to prevent the spread of Covid-19". (Fauzan, Interview, 2021).

It is undeniable that the strategy (Sadaqah Centelan) has been able to assist the community according to the target because they pick up and choose the goods they need (Jufrianto, Interview, 2021). The innovation of the mosque administrators through Sadaqah Centelan is a new variant of giving charity (Amanda, 2020, h. 218). Their foresight in seeing the community's needs to stay on target (Setyawati & Rustanta, 2021, h. 106) is part of touching people's hearts to keep caring for each other. One of the administrators emphasized that

"Through Sadaqah Centelan, we will always be there for the community, and Sadaqah Centelan will continue to exist after the pandemic ends. We hope that everyone remains enthusiastic in giving charity and stays strong during this pandemic". (Sulaiman, Interview 2021).

Mosque management sees the pandemic and Sadaqah Centelan as social glue between congregations. During the pandemic expansion (Syah et al., 2020, h. 33), health protocols are crucial (Awad et al., 2020, h. 456), mosque administrators are aware of the importance of building communal immunity to avoid exposure to Covid-19. The pandemic health protocol does distance the body, but, in reality, the congregation's hearts are closed. Even though the congregation gets food distribution, everyone must comply with health protocols by keeping a distance and wearing masks. The worshipers can also use the hand sanitizer provided, and the good thing is, the visitors obey and respond well (Irul, interview, 2021) to the mosque's regulations.

Society can create phenomena that have positive and negative implications for the system(Umanailo, 2019, h. 29). However, it is also required to fix the chaos that can spoil stability in society (Susilo, 2019, h. 28). Social innovation initiated by the Al-Karomah mosque is what Durkheim calls a form of community cooperation and solidarity in shaping social change. Solidarity is a condition of mutual trust between individuals in a community or society (Umanailo, 2019, h. 1884). This feeling makes them closer, respect, and help each other because they have an emotional bond.

Durkheim divides the concept of solidarity into two types, namely *mechanical solidarity* (solidarity based on collective awareness due to feelings of shared destiny and responsibility) and *organic solidarity* (solidarity formed due to differences in background and social status). Durkheim's analysis in seeing community solidarity by the realities of people's lives during a pandemic. However, one thing that Durkheim forgets is that organic social solidarity (Herzog, 2018, h. 116-17) is not solely due to work or the interests of certain parties.

Durkheim considers cooperation and mutual trust between the community because of their interests and temporary nature (Umanailo et al., 2019, h. 1870). In fact, during the COVID-19 pandemic, it is time for us to forget about differences (opinions, ethnicity, religion, and background / social status) and prioritize the safety and welfare of the community. Finally, what society needs the most is cooperation, concern, and social solidarity to deal with the pandemic. Social awareness is the right way to deal with the characteristics of the COVID-19 pandemic.

Sadaqah Centelan brings blessings to the Al-Karomah mosque and the community. Both the Al-Karomah mosque and the people who give alms to the mosque are undergoing social worship felt by the community. There are two dimensions of worship in Islam: social and individual worship (Muzammil, 2020, h. 36). Social worship has the advantage of reward because it is higher in value than individual worship. Alms is one of the social worship highly recommended by the Prophet (Rifqi, 2019, h. 3). However, a person is not a believer (not a true Muslim) if he does not love or care about others as he loves themselves because Giving alms is a way of life for Muslims. Social well fear is an important part of creating innovations that are managed by a mosque.

Community behavior is directed by a sense of empathy (Schlembach, 2020, h. 194) and social awareness of the prevailing social norms and values. For mosque administrators, communal safety and health are paramount. One informant confirmed that 'we have to take care of each other to feel safe and comfortable during the pandemic' (Ilham, Interview, 2021). Al-Karomah mosque always tries to ensure the welfare of the congregation by providing the goods and services needed. Worship and charity must go hand in hand (Razak, 2020, h. 253) so that the worldly and hereafter aspects remain in balance.

In the month of Ramadan, mosque administrators inform their activities more broadly. And in this year's Ramadan, Sadaqah Centelan is prepared differently. Every day, the mosque management informs the congregation who want to donate necessities; they also provide alms packages from Rp. 10,000,- up to Rp. 150.000,-. Donors also can choose food packages according to their abilities without bothering to provide goods because these items are taken directly from the store owned by the Al-Karomah foundation (Ali, Interview, 2021).

For the congregation, interpreting the month of Ramadan during a pandemic is not uncommon, including this year's Eid al-Adha sacrifice (*qurban*). The head of the mosque management said that for this year's qurban, the mosque only sacrificed eight cows, which is 50% of the usual number, which can reach up to 15/16 cows (Fauzan, Interview, 2021). But qurban during a pandemic can be interpreted in simple ways, such as complying with health protocols, making time for others, not spreading hoaxes during the pandemic (Rayani & Purqoti, 2020, h. 907; Tenriawali et al., 2020,

h. 125), being a Covid-19 volunteer, and vaccinating are forms of qurban. Sacrifice can be made with small things by helping and strengthening each other.

Sadaqah Centelan shows that worshipers are not only led to becoming ritually pious but also socially. The month of Ramadan is the right moment to increase spirituality. Through social innovation, the mosque management has utilized it optimally by continuing Sadaqah Centelan to bring people known and closer to one another (Zahra, Interview, 2021) and God. Moreover, the spiritual approach (Najoan, 2020, h. 67) has the great power to get closer and always be grateful to God

Finally, the pandemic is not a barrier to improving spirituality but strengthens a fragile heart (Siagian et al., 2021, h. 4). It is an opportunity to translate our social piety concretely through creative, innovative, effective, and efficient alms. In the end, Sadaqah Centelan shows that we still can innovate creatively amidst the expansion of the pandemic. The Al-Karomah mosque teaches us that, during an economic crisis, they try to ensure the congregation's welfare by prioritizing the humanitarian aspect.

CONCLUSION

The turmoil of the pandemic is used by society with various activities, including work, study, and praying at home. And some spend it with social action. Al-Karomah mosque, located in Wiyung, Surabaya, became one of the mosques that initiated a social action amid a pandemic, the program called 'Sadaqah Centelan'. Sadaqah Centelan is an Innovation for Social Action during the Covid-19 Pandemic that started at the beginning of the pandemic and continues today. The public can take free food distributed by the administrators of the Al-Karomah mosque and vice versa; people also can donate to the mosque.

Sadaqah Centelan received a positive response from the congregation or people who just stopped by or lived around the Wiyung area. Meanwhile, for the administrators of the Al-Karomah Mosque, Friday as the agenda of distributing necessities and free foods is seen as an investment for social services. Pandemic is not a threat but to strengthen each other and avoid a fragile heart, for example, filled with religious activities. This study shows that; *First*, pandemics can motivate us to innovate and be creative through alms; *Second*, greasing alms as a social adhesive; *Third*, to increase social pursuit and always prioritizing the humanitarian aspect.

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INVOLVEMENT OF THE INCUMBENT'S WIVES IN THE 2020 REGIONAL HEAD ELECTION DURING THE CORONA PANDEMIC

Khalimatus Sa'diyah
Gadjah Mada University, Yogyakarta, Indonesia
khalimatussadiyah808@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

The purpose of writing this article is to examine how the incumbent wives are involved in the 2020 Regional Head Election amid a pandemic as part of launching their political dynasty. Even if you look at the current Coronavirus, it is feared that the moment of the 2020 Regional Head Election could increase the spread and transmission of the Coronavirus. However, on the other hand, if the 2020 Regional Head Election is continuously postponed, many regions will not have a legitimate leader. The approach of this research is descriptive qualitative, while to obtain data, the author uses secondary data from journals, news, and other relevant sources. Meanwhile, to dissect this case, the writer uses Anne Philips' theory of women's political representation, Schumpeter's concept of procedural democracy, and political dynasties. The analysis process begins with data collection, data reduction, data presentation, and conclusion drawing. The result shows that the implementation of the 2020 Regional head Election during the Corona period, which was attended by prospective leaders of the incumbent's wives, became a moment to increase the role of women in politics and part of the political dynasty.

Keywords: political dynasty, regional head election, women, pandemic

INTRODUCTION

The Covid-19 pandemic has hit the world since this virus first spread in the Wuhan area, the People's Republic of China. Millions of lives have been lost due to contracting the Coronavirus. All countries also feel the impact of the virus emergence that spreads through droplets and the air. Directly the existence of the Coronavirus has revolutionized the existing order of life. The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends implementing a lockdown policy to reduce physical contact in the community. Indonesia itself is one of the countries that is currently overwhelmed by the spread of the virus outbreak (Mas'udi, 2020). Data shows that positive cases of Corona in Indonesia as of December 10, 2020, were 598933 (Covid19.go.id, 2020). Every day the confirmed cases of Covid-19 continue to increase. There are at least 32 areas with a red zone, including DKI Jakarta, West Java, East Java (Rizal, 2020). Areas whose status is a red zone mean they have a curve for the spread of the Coronavirus.

The number is increasing day by day. Large-Scale Social Restrictions (PSBB) is one of the efforts made by the government during the pandemic to suppress the massive spread of the virus.

The impact resulting from the Coronavirus can weaken a country in various fields. For example, many employees are affected by Termination of Employment, the tourism sector becomes sluggish, investment declines, the implementation of the Regional Head Election is postponed, and various other risks. WHO then gave another recipe in dealing with this challenging situation, namely implementing the New Normal. According to Sigit Pamungkas, this term is a process of changing behavior in society when carrying out everyday activities but equipped with health protocols to reduce the risk of contracting the Coronavirus (Habibi, 2020). WHO recommends implementing the New Normal for countries capable of controlling only positive Coronavirus cases (Mas'udi, 2020). However, the Indonesian government also does not want to be left behind in adopting this method. So it can be said that Indonesia is still too premature to follow the WHO directives. However, there are several reasons why the government of this country continues to implement the New Normal when the curve has not improved. Among them are restoring the country's economy and revitalizing the wheel of life.

One of the impacts of the Coronavirus on the political field is the postponement of the simultaneous regional head elections in 270 regions in Indonesia. The Pilkada initially planned for September 2020 had to be changed and postponed to December. Although at the beginning of the discussion between General Election Commissions and the government and House of Representatives, they gave three options for the postponement, namely in December 2020, March 2021, and September 2021 (Farisa, 2020). However, President Jokowi finally decided that the political contestation performance would be held on December 9, 2020, and stated in Presidential Decree No. 22 of 2020. The policy immediately drew much criticism, even some who rejected it. Some groups have asked the government to hold power to postpone the regional head election, considering that currently, in various regions, the spread of the Coronavirus has not recovered but tends to increase. The implementation of the regional head election during this pandemic is like two opposite sides. The government is trying its best to carry out the constitution's mandate through its policy, namely Regulation in place of Law Number 02 of 2020. However, on the other hand, public awareness is still too low in applying health protocols.

A week after the regional head elections took place, Coronavirus cases had formed new clusters in several regions in Indonesia. Some of the areas in question include Banten, Purbalingga, Jakarta. According to the Covid-19 Task Force spokesperson, Ati Pramudji Hastuti, spreading the Coronavirus occurs during voting and other processes ranging from declarations and registrations to campaigns that

cause crowds. When referring to the results of the investigation conducted by the Indonesian Ombudsman in 207 polling stations spread across the territory of Indonesia, especially those holding regional head elections, almost 99% of personal protective equipment was well distributed before the regional head elections began (BBC, 2020). In addition, the health protocol has been implemented according to procedures ranging from limiting the number of voters, arranging voter attendance schedules, providing handwashing facilities, and others.

In addition to the news of the spread of Corona, which increased during the regional head election, there was an exciting phenomenon; namely, 29 incumbent wives will participate as regional head candidates. It is a form of progress, considering that the participation rate of women in the 2018 regional head election was only 8.85% and increased to 10.6% in the 2020 regional head election (Medistiara, 2020). Although there is an increase, this number is still far from ideal because the reference to women's representation in the regional head election is 30%. Of the 29 incumbent wives who came forward in the regional head election, they came from various backgrounds, bureaucrats, parliament members, business people, and other fields.

The participation of the incumbent's wife in this regional head election is like two opposing sides. First, this can be momentum for women who want to fight for a sense of equality and justice for all women, people with disabilities, the elderly, and other marginal groups in Indonesia. Verbal or physical harassment that often targets women is one proof that women are often treated as second-class citizens. It happened during the 2020 regional head election campaign, in which a tweet from one politician was directed at one of the candidates for deputy mayor of South Tangerang, namely Rahayu Saraswati (Retaduari, 2020). So it takes the responsibility of many parties, especially women, in creating gender justice. Nevertheless, on the other hand, the participation of the incumbent's wives in the 5-year agenda is one way to launch a political dynasty in an area. It is undeniable that controlling power in the regions encourages family or relatives to continue to enliven the political stage.

RESEARCH PROBLEMS

Based on the background above, the formulation of the problem in this article is as follows:
1. How are the dynamics of the participation of the incumbent's wives in the 2020 regional head elections viewed from the theory of women's political representation?
2. How is the participation's analysis of the incumbents' wives in the head election forming a political dynasty?

THEORY

Theory of Women's Representation

The existence of women in the political arena can indeed be understood as a phenomenal social reality. It is not easy to achieve between women and politics, especially in developing countries like Indonesia, which adheres to a patriarchal culture (Sutinah, 2006). So that male voices still dominate in various political decision-making processes. This recognition can occur considering that men are considered parties who can take responsibility, lead and even protect a group from the minor level, namely the family, to the highest level, namely the state. This recognition makes the wife and children (in the family sphere) represent their political aspirations through their fathers or husbands.

Over time, the role of women in politics cannot be underestimated. It is known from research conducted by Stanley (1990) in the United States. The study results indicate that there has been a relatively large wave of change in which many women have entered politics. The book entitled The Politics of Presence by Anne Phillips (1995) explains the theory of women's representation in the world of politics, the presence in the political arena is an excellent supporting tool in fighting for the interests of their people. This theory states that there is a reasonably strong relationship between substantive representations and descriptive representations. It means that when the number of women's representation in parliamentary seats is high, women's interests will tend to be prioritized. The existence of differences between women and men is the basis of this theory. Some of these differences include educational background, parenting patterns, type of work, the possibility of violence against women, and sexual crimes that women may experience.

Anne Phillips (1995) describes two types of political representation: politics of idea and politics of presence. The concept of idea politics is a condition in which political representatives bring various ideas from the people or groups they represent. In contrast, the notion of presence politics is the demand for a balanced representation between women and men, the demand for the same thing among the different ethnic groups that make up society so that the concept of the politics of ideas is related to politics presence.

Political Dynasty

Political dynasties can be interpreted as a form of control of power in government, especially at the local level. Based on the traditional political meaning, the concept of political dynasties is a strategy carried out by the authorities in placing family, relatives, and relatives in strategic positions to perpetuate power and control to remain in their sphere of life. The eternal power and control will directly make it easier for them to control various things, especially those concerning the interests they want to achieve. Indonesia, which adheres to a decentralized system, makes political

elites mobilize votes when fighting on the political stage. The opening of space in the direct election of regional heads throughout Indonesia gave rise to petty kings or what can also be referred to as a form of local Cendana family. This term refers to the Cendananisasi family, which has ruled Indonesia for approximately 32 years (Efendi, 2018).

There are three types of political dynasties in Indonesian politics: the regeneration model, the cross-chamber dynasty model, and the cross-regional dynasty model. All three have different concepts. First, the regeneration dynasty model is a political dynasty built in one area by carrying out candidates with family ties to the incumbent. For example, in region A, it is led by someone for two terms, then to continue the domination of his power, the incumbent brings his wife or child or sister to run in the regional head election. Second, the cross-room dynasty model is a dynasty formed because of the spread of relatives in a family and becomes an official either in an office or becomes a member in the legislative and executive institutions. The spread of relatives in several positions will complicate the function of checks and balances, considering that they will try to use their power to suppress control from the community. The last model is the cross-regional model. This type of political dynasty is built by a group of people who want to spread their influence and power elsewhere by placing one of their families there (Paisal & Eko, 2019).

The side effect of political dynasties is to distort the dignity of democracy. It is because of feudalism and the tradition of monarchy that continues to take root and even become a culture in Indonesia. Moreover, political dynasties also strengthen the practice of corruption, collusion, and nepotism. The spread of political dynasties in Indonesia cannot be separated from the absence of a solid legal framework so that political dynasties continue to develop, become trends, and are difficult to blame. In the end, political dynasties only provide space for politicians and bureaucrats to put the interests of individuals or groups above the interests of their people. At least three factors make political dynasties increase in Indonesia: network strength, capital, and position in the party (Karyudi, 2013). If an incumbent owns the three things above, his efforts to maintain power will be easy.

Schumpeter's concept of democracy

Schumpeter is the founder of the theoretical understanding of democracy, which is limited to a procedural process to choose political leaders. Procedural democracy, according to Joseph Schumpeter, emerged as a sharp critique of several democratic theorists in the previous era. The definition of democracy by Plato, Aristotle, Dahl, and several other classical political scientists who refer to the concept of the common good and the will of people can be interpreted that the public interest is the engine driving the implementation of democracy. Schumpeter denied this understanding because, in reality, the election of people's representatives in the general

election only prioritizes the political interests of the people elected to occupy public positions and will ignore what the community expects. The political reality in the field is very far from the ideal expectations formulated together (Schumpeter, 2017). Even if the people's will is fulfilled, it is not fully implemented, or it can be said that only a small portion is implemented.

RESEARCH METHOD

This research is a type of qualitative - descriptive research that describes a process of how events or phenomena can occur and what characteristics exist in a phenomenon (Nassaji, 2015). The author is conducting this research must first collect the required data in a complex manner, considering that the data is essential in the analysis process to produce in-depth research results. The ability of researchers to analyze and observe the object of research is vital in this type of research so that the final results presented are different from previous research and obtain their uniqueness (Rahmat, 2019).

The approach used in this research is a library approach (research library). Relevant data were obtained from various sources, including books, journals, and other scientific works relevant to the research topic. The data collection process is carried out systematically so that the analyzed data can provide answers to the problem formulation and produce conclusions. When using this approach, the series of processes is to collect library data and then read and record it by the author and process it until the final result is obtained (Supriyadi, 2017). Using these secondary sources is also intended to support and facilitate the author in understanding and interpreting the phenomenological nature that occurred in the past (Rahmat, 2019).

Process in research Qualitative carried out in four stages, starting with data collection, data reduction, data presentation, and conclusions (Dull & Reinhardt, 2014). The data collection stage is done by looking for data from various library sources. The data reduction stage is a process in which summarizing, selecting, and focusing on the main and important things. The reduced data will provide a clearer picture and refer to the research topic raised. Then the third stage is to display data or present related data, which allows concluding. Then the last stage is drawing conclusions which are the results of research that answer the research focus based on the results of data analysis (Rijali, 2019).

THE WOMEN CANDIDATES OF REGIONAL HEADS ELECTION

The simultaneous regional head elections that were held several months ago did raise pros and cons. The implementation of the five-year democratic party this time is carried out with strict health protocols to prevent new clusters of Coronavirus. First,

what must be understood is the concept of regional head elections, which has an understanding as a new institutional framework implemented to realize the democratization process in a region (Hanafi, 2014). The first regional head election was held in June 2005. The spirit that emerged from the regional head election restored the people's political rights by the Regional People's Representative Assembly. In addition, the existence of this political contestation performance is also an effort to improve the life of Indonesian democracy after the New Order regime, which tends to be authoritarian towards the Reformation era. People can also choose a candidate for leader according to their wishes. So it can be said that implementing direct regional head elections creates a process of strengthening and deepening democracy and efforts to realize good and effective governance.

Interestingly, the 2020 regional head election increases women's involvement as candidates of regional heads in various regions. There are 157 or 10.6 percent female candidates; five women advanced in the governor election, 127 women in the regent head election, and 25 in the mayoral election (Kemenpppa, 2020). A total of 29 of them are wives of the incumbent. This number is an improvement considering that the participation rate of women in regional head elections is only 8.85%, and in the political arena in 2020, it will be 10.6%. The participation of the incumbent's wife in political contestation supports Anne Phillips's theory in which the relationship between the politics of ideas and the politics of presence will support the interests of the represented group. The inclusion of the wives of incumbents in this five-yearly event is a form of attendance politics. These representatives will represent women's groups and other marginalized groups to fight for their interests. It will be a form of progress considering the patriarchal culture that is deeply rooted in Indonesia and makes the situation or group more dominated by men. In addition, the amount of political capital that must be owned by every candidate who goes forward in the regional head election will indirectly make anyone who goes forward (predominantly female candidates) his guts shrink.

Some of the candidates running on the political stage in 2020 and the incumbent's wife are Ipuk Fiestiandani (wife of Banyuwangi regent Abdullah Azwar Anas who has served two terms since 2010). Ipuk ran with Sugira and was promoted by several parties, including PDIP, NasDem, PPP, Hanura, and Gerindra. The General Election Commission's real count results showed that Ipuk and her partner beat their rivals with 51.2% votes. Another candidate named Etik Suryani ran as a candidate for regent of Sukoharjo along with Agus Santoso. Etik Suryani is the wife of the incumbent Wardoyo Wijaya. The pair won with 52.7% of the vote. This success cannot be separated from social capital, owned capital, and support from 4 big parties: PDIP, Golkar, and Demokrat. The wife of the incumbent who ran for regional head elections was also carried out by Kustini Sri Purnomo, who was none other than the wife of the Sleman Regent, Sri Purnomo. Kustini succeeded in continuing the throne of power

that her husband had held. Although only supported by two parties, it did not prevent her from winning. General Election Commission declared Sri won with 38.9% of the votes (Kumparan 2020). Many more incumbent wives have advanced in this five-year event, but the author will focus on only one candidate, namely Kustini Sri Purnomo.

The discussion on candidate Kustini is indeed related to exciting points in the regional head election in Sleman. Kustini is the wife of the incumbent regent, Sri Purnomo, who came forward with Danang Maharsa. There are two pairs that they have to fight, namely pair number 01 Danang Wicaksana Sulistya and Raden Agus Choliq, while other rivals that Kustini must face are Sri Muslimatun, who is the incumbent deputy regent, and Amin Purnama. Among the three pairs running as candidates for female regents are Kustini and Sri Muslimatun. Rivalry occurs between the two considering that each candidate wants to win even though they know each other well. The advancement of Kustini and Sri Muslimatun shows that women are no longer a barrier for anyone to come forward and be elected by the people in an area. The result of the real count shown by the Sleman General Election Commission was a victory in favor of the Kustini and Danang Maharsa.

The Human Development Index (HDI) of Indonesian women has indeed made progress. It was recorded that 0.80% occurred in 2018, and in 2019 it became 69.18%. However, this figure is still far from the planned target. To achieve a better HDI, four aspects become indicators: education, health, political and economic empowerment. Based on the findings from The Indonesian Institute of the four indicators above, if examined more deeply, actually there has been no significant change. In education, literacy rates and the ratio of women's primary education participation are still low compared to men, namely 94% for women and 97% for men. Second, the Indonesian economy is dominated by women, but women's participation in the labor market is low, reaching 54%. Then in the political field, there was a decrease in the number of Ministers in the Jokowi era cabinet, where there were only five female ministers out of the total 34 (Wahyuni, 2019). Pro-women and children policies may be put forward with the advancement of these incumbent wives. It is done by the Regent Kustini, who continues to strive to improve the quality of life and the role of women and the welfare of children through development programs that are friendly to gender equality in their regions. Implementing the Gender Mainstreaming program in all agencies in the Sleman district is a concrete step in reducing policy inequality that has been happening so far (Fakhruddin, 2021).

If it is correlated with the concept of political dynasties and Schumpeter's concept of procedural democracy, the increased participation of incumbent wives can also be a bridge in continuing power in their family sphere. Indonesia is a country that adheres to the principle of regional decentralization so that local governments have the authority to regulate their households in related fields. Unfortunately, with the granting

of such authority, the implementation of decentralization often deviates from the dignity of democracy itself. The implementation of this decentralized system only gave birth to political dynasties, which led to the opening of space for politicians and bureaucrats to put the interests of individuals or groups above the interests of the people. In addition, it does not rule out the possibility of disintegration and growing feelings of excessive autonomy. It is not surprising that several areas are not in line with the policies issued by the central government during this pandemic.

If you pay attention, the political dynasty that the incumbents are trying to build is included in the model of a regeneration political dynasty. The wives of incumbents are carried in their territories to become leaders and continue the steps and milestones of leadership from their previous husbands' relationships. It supports Schumpeter's concept about democracy, which is limited to procedural and respects the common good. This phenomenon has been happening for a long time in Indonesia. Such political practice manifests that the government elites want the control of resources and authority to remain in their hands through their wives and do not want to be obtained by others. Direct regional head elections are negative access to decentralization policies that make democracy hijacked by people's interests and specific goals. The existence of this political dynasty will be a strategy for politicians to accommodate personal closeness and ignore the candidate's capabilities. It is not impossible that later the wives of these incumbents will make their children as candidates for regional heads when their leadership period is over.

Seeing the case of the Sleman Kustini regent and her husband's background, Sri Purnomo, it can be said that her position is relatively high. In terms of capital, Kustini has total assets of up to Rp 12.9 billion (Hanafi, 2020). Kustini's large capital is not difficult to carry out a campaign that can cost hundreds of millions. Of course, the purpose of the campaign is to increase his branding so that the people of Sleman are more familiar with it. Rationally think of economic capital. The bigger the economic capital, the easier it will be to win the existing political battle. Even political rivals who have low political capital are even closer to victory. It is based on thinking that the greater the economic capital in political contestation, the easier and lighter it will be to mobilize resources, whether mobilizing the masses, the media, or others who support the victory of the candidate concerned.

Second, in terms of the network owned, an established social network will accumulate voter votes. Kustini is the wife of the incumbent; it is common knowledge that the people of Sleman already know her. Her status as the wife of the incumbent will elevate Kustini's social status. Kustini has earned a place in the community in terms of position. No wonder, from the quick count, Kustini won.

On the other hand, Kustini has absolutely no experience as a political party cadre. However, her position as the wife of the incumbent regent has become a

stepping stone, thus making Kustini popular. So Kustini's network of strengths and modalities makes it seem like she has got a red carpet in winning voters' votes in regional head elections.

CONCLUSION

The elected regional heads will be clamped with political interests that could threaten the sustainability of the reform ideals for democratization and the decentralization policy. The existence of money politics practices carried out by prospective candidates to get votes from their constituents will undoubtedly ask for reciprocity when those nominated wins through corruption, collusion, and nepotism practices to return the funds they spent during the campaign. So that transactional politics like this injures democracy and makes people distrust the regional heads and political parties that oversee them. In the end, the people become victims because what they should get is neglected. Welfare is the last choice for regional heads to pay attention to. The concept of the common good and the will people in procedural democracy is only a sweet promise made during the campaign, so that it is under Schumpeter's view that the reality is far from the ideal expectations of society. So from the analysis above, it can be concluded that the increasing number of women advancing in political contestation, especially from the incumbent's wife, has become a new spirit in making more equitable policies for women and children. However, it cannot be denied that their presence is part of establishing political dynasties in various regions in Indonesia.

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COALITION CHOICE AND ELITE PERSONALISATION IN *PARTAI AMANAT NASIONAL* (NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY) FACTIONALISM 2020

Lavica Anky Riswanda
Universitas Indonesia, Depok, Indonesia
lavicaanky@gmail.com

ABSTRACT

This paper seeks to analyze the causes of factionalism within PAN in 2020. The findings show that a combination of two factors caused factionalism. First, the policy regarding coalition choice after the 2019 presidential election and elite personalization within the party. We interviewed several DPP PAN (PAN's Central Executive Board) officials and collected documents from the media, previous research, and the party's internal document to obtain the data. PAN's coalition choice was divided into three key factors. First, pragmatism to maximize power (office-seeking) instrumentally by influencing the government's policy. Second, the ideological factor related to party elites' effort to return PAN to a centrist party based on the 2019 election results evaluation where PAN's proximity to Islamic conservatives failed to boost votes. Third, there is regime intervention through legal criminalization threats to several PAN cadres. The personalization of Amien Rais exacerbated this coalition choice in PAN. Amien's influence can bring PAN tendency to be Jokowi's opposition even though it is not a formal party decision. PAN's coalition choice policy led to divisions due to Amien Rais' camp support to the Mulfachri Harahap candidacy in Congress.

Keywords: factionalism, PAN, coalition choice, elite personalization

INTRODUCTION

This paper will explain the impact of the choice of government coalition after the presidential election on intra-party factionalism. This finding is interesting because the choice of coalition often brings friction within the party; hence it can not be separated from the efforts to gain political parties in the circle of power. This argument will be elaborated with the personalization factor of the elite within the party, which gave rise to intra-party groups. Since the reformation era, several parties in Indonesia became victims of intra-party factionalism, which led to divisions of the party (Fiona and Tomsa, 2017). Several cases of internal party factionalism were caused by various things, such as ideological differences, social and cultural differences, and personal leadership struggles. While on external factors, factionalism can occur due to the electoral system, political system, to regime pressure. After the fall of the New Order,

factionalism in Indonesia was caused mainly by the interests of the party elites. It was based on pragmatism—power struggles in the General Chairman succession—and elite pragmatism through coalition support in the presidential election. Even the competition between these elites led to an internal conflict that led to divisions (Budiatri et al., 2018).

The National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional/PAN), which was established at the beginning of the reformation, was not an exception to the phenomenon of factionalism. At the beginning of PAN formation, the party experienced internal ideological debates regarding the proposal on the party platform. It gave rise to two opposing camps, the Islamist faction led by A.M. Fatwa, which led PAN towards a platform of faith and piety, with Islamist tendency. Meanwhile, the pluralist camp led by Faisal Basri, Toeti Heraty, Arif Arryman, Bara Hasibuan wants an inclusive and open party platform. This feud ended with 16 key figures from the PAN pluralist faction after the 2000 Congress. PAN internal disputes continued in 2006, and PAN experienced a split after PAN support group from the Muhammadiyah Youth Group (Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah/AMM) were disappointed with the party and eventually founded the National Sun Party (Partai Matahari Bangsa/PMB) (Arya, 2006).

Factionalism also occurred under the leadership of Soetrisno Bachir related to the coalition choice in the 2009 presidential election. This split began with Amien Rais' stance, where he wanted PAN to support Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) by building a bargaining position as a vice-presidential candidate. In contrast, Soetrisno Bachir himself wanted to provide support to Prabowo Subianto in the 2009 presidential election (Nainggolan and Wahyu, 2016). Periodically, the factor of coalition choice during the presidential election also led to the PAN factionalism in 2014 and 2019, although it did not result in significant party division. A small group within the party supported Jokowi in the 2014 and 2019 elections against the party's institutional decision.

The party's factionalism occurred again in 2020 after the 5th Party Congress. It was due to opposing views between the Amien Rais and Zulkifli Hasan camps regarding the coalition choice after the 2019 presidential election. Amien Rais wanted PAN to oppose the Jokowi government in the second period, while Zulkifli Hasan and several other DPP PAN officials wished PAN to join the government coalition. The conflict between the two camps led to divisions with the departure of the Amien Rais camp after the support for Mulfachri Harahap during the Congress was defeated by Zulkifli Hasan. The case of factionalism proves that Amien Rais is a critical factor in party division. This finding expands Bima Arya's study in 2006, which wrote that Amien Rais has always been a middle ground for the emergence of PAN internal disputes, and his character plays a significant role in creating stability within the party.

Year	Factions	Background of factionalism	Tendencies
1998-2001	Pluralists vs Islamists	The debate over the direction of the faith and piety party platform vs open and inclusive	Ideological
2004-2006	Muhammadiyah vs Entrepreneurs	The discontent of the Muhammadiyah faction in the party due to the distribution of power	Elite pragmatism
2009	Soetrisno Bachir vs Amien Rais	Coalition support for the 2009 presidential election	Coalition choice
2019-2020	Zulkifli Hasan vs Amien Rais	Coalition support for the 2019 presidential election	Coalition choice and elite personalisation

Table 1. History of Factionalism in PAN

Source: Data processed by the authors through Arya (2006), Nainggolan and Wahyu (2016), Budiatri (2018).

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper will use the factionalism theory from Francoise Boucek regarding *party specific*. Boucek argues how the party's institutional incentives (*party specific*) have implications for factionalism. The concept that we will use to explain the factionalism phenomenon in PAN is how the party policies affect the existence of internal party factions. The coalition choice indirectly affects the response from internal parties, considering that the party is a heterogeneous entity and comprises various interests. These conflicting pressures increase the risk of dissent and defection by providing opportunities for those deprived of both ideas and political rights to challenge party leaders through collective action that may involve the formation of factions (Boucek, 2012).

The choice of a government coalition can also cause internal party divisions when the policy is carried out based on mere pragmatism, especially only to maximize power (*office-seeking*). Budge and Laver argue that coalition bargaining by parties is motivated by two things. First, the strategic position of the government as in political positions that can be intrinsically rewarding for political parties. Second, the office-seeking coalition can be assessed instrumentally where political parties can influence the government's policy. Politicians who want to influence public policy feel better to do so inside the government rather than outside, since apart from providing input based on the constituent's request. The success of the policies carried out by the incumbent will gain public recognition, which can help the party's relationship with the voters and affect the increase of electoral factors. (Budge and Laver, 1986).

The coalition choice is related to the future interests of the party. Ambardi argues that the opposition's proximity to the government coalition attracts parties to carry out rent-seeking activities to finance party operations. In other words, government positions promise material incentives where political parties can make

money through several vital positions in government, both executive and legislative (Ambardi, 2008). The coalition choice is also inseparable from ideological factors. Ideology triggers a conflict between groups because of differences in the party's constituent base and political preferences. The more differences in political ideology mean the greater the potential for conflict within the party to lead to factionalism. (Imawan, 2018).

Disagreement with party policies is also related to elite personalization. An influential figure within the party can influence several cadres to reject the existing party policies. PAN itself falls into the latter category when there is a dominant elite. One other indicator is the interaction between leaders and party politicians in terms of loyalty rather than a commitment to the party's program, ideology, or organizational rules or referring to patron-client and figures that can direct party policies. Elite personalization affects the party itself, an internal division that can develop into conflict (Thiebault, 2017). The elite can form factions to organize and mobilize party cadres to gain support for political leadership. Even these elites will compete for strategic positions within the party and form or join certain factions to support their candidacy and interests (Bettcher, 2005). Power also becomes the motivating factor for competition between politicians, which we can see in the leadership succession in Party Congress (Sartori, 1976).

METHODOLOGY

This study was done through qualitative research by explaining the phenomenon of one case and then doing an in-depth analysis to explain the theoretical aspects. This study seeks to explain the conflict process as a combination of two causes, the coalition choice and the elite personalization in the PAN organizational structures, which cause the emergence of intra-party factions. This study reveals the political process up to factionalism in PAN, why the DPP PAN officials joined the government coalition after the presidential election. This study also seeks to reveal elite personalization within the party, which will explain why Amien Rais rejected the party's policy by choosing to bring PAN as Jokowi's opposition.

To obtain the data, we interviewed and mapping out two clashed camps within PAN. First is the pro-Zulkifli Hasan camp, dominated by several DPP PAN officials. Second, the Amien Rais camp. Before conducting field research, we start by doing literature research and analysis of media discourse to map the actors that cause the emergence of PAN internal factions. The result from literature research was then used to formulate research questions to collect data through in-depth interviews.

THE COALITION CHOICE FACTORS IN THE 2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

We cannot separate the case of factionalism that hit PAN in 2020 from the party's policy of coalition choice that took place after the 2019 presidential election. Long before this friction occurred, this issue can be traced to the party stance that supported Prabowo to re-enter the 2019 presidential election on 9 August 2018. Opinions from provincial-level cadres (Dewan Perwakilan Wilayah/DPW) drives party direction regarding party coalition in the 2019 presidential election. Among 34 DPWs throughout Indonesia, 30 of them supported Prabowo to run for the 2019 presidential election. Meanwhile, the remaining 4 DPWs—Papua, NTT, South Kalimantan, and Riau Islands—supported Jokowi for re-candidacy (Interview with Ahmad Yohan, 22 March 2021).

This duality of support is due to the pragmatism to gain votes for the two opposing camps in the 2019 presidential election, the Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin and Prabowo-Sandi camps. The figures affiliated with Jokowi consistently supported Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election, such as Soetrisno Bachir, Bara Hasibuan, and several regional cadres who felt the need to support Jokowi because they were 'forced' to gain electoral advantage. Viva Yoga Mauladi confirmed that PAN duality is related to the simultaneous implementation of elections; hence PAN cadres in the regions prefer the incumbent to get the coattail effect (Interview with Viva Mauladi, 22 March 2021).

While the Prabowo-supporter camp was initially based on several PAN cadres' stances, which did not want the re-election of Jokowi, this choice of support also comes from the hope of an alternative figure besides Prabowo. However, because the Presidential Threshold rule reaches 20%, giving support to Prabowo is the last resort (Agus Mustofa, 13 March 2021). PAN departure from the government coalition also triggered its sound choice not to support Jokowi in the 2019 presidential election. This argument is based on two things. First, the PAN stance always differs with the government in two political agendas in parliament, the revision of the 2019 Election Law and the rejection of the Perppu Ormas (Law of Mass Organization) formulated by the government. Second, Amien Rais' role is also influential in directing PAN's opposition to the government. Frequently, Amien has become Jokowi's critics, both on his policies and on identity politics (Merdeka, 24 July 2017).

Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin won the 2019 presidential election with 85.607.362 votes (55.50%), while Prabowo-Sandi received 68.650.239 votes (44.50%). At the end of the 2019 presidential election, there was a discourse to build a large coalition as a middle way to overcome the election polarization. Gerindra Party, as the main supporting party for Prabowo-Sandi, joined the government coalition after Prabowo met Jokowi at MRT Jakarta on 13 July 2019 (Kompas, 13 July 2019). Gerindra's move to the governing coalition also triggered the transfer of support for several parties and

closed the possibility of a permanent coalition of the Prabowo-Sandi party. PAN itself followed Gerindra to support the government when the 2019 presidential election was over. This coalition shift is divided into three key factors. First, elite pragmatism is based on a *policy blind coalition*, which was not based on policy considerations but only to maximize power (office-seeking). Second, the ideological factor within the party, and third, regime intervention.

Elite Pragmatism

Elite pragmatism is associated with the historical factor that political parties cannot be far from power. Two main things affect this, first, the wide use of resources in the circle of power. Second, a political party will be considered parties involved in policies made by the government so that they positively impact public perception. Kuskridho Ambardi believes political parties will not be far from the power sphere because the state has an essential role in the financial resources of political parties. The strategic position in the government is helpful to find rent-seeking activities carried out by political parties, which bring a broader impact on party finances. The operational pattern of political parties is not enough if they rely on member fees or the state through government assistance funds, political party funds converted per ballot basis (Ambardi, 2009).

PAN history, which has never opposed the government since the party's founding, also confirmed this. In the 1999 election, PAN got four ministerial positions in the Abdurrahman Wahid government cabinet. It resulted from a political compromise made by PAN for supporting Abdurrahman Wahid as president by making a central axis against Megawati Soekarnoputri. The position of PAN in the government coalition also remained even though Abdurrahman Wahid stepped down as president and was replaced by Megawati Soekarnoputri through MPR Special Session. After the 2004 presidential election, PAN and PKB re-entered the circle of power through SBY's invitation for a coalition, in which he won the election. PAN's position as part of the government coalition also continued in the 2009 presidential election when it supported SBY in his second period. PAN itself got three seats in the Second United Indonesia cabinet. In the 2014 presidential election, PAN supported the government in 2015 and got one ministerial position through a cabinet reshuffle mechanism (Romli, 2017).

PAN position, which cannot be far from power, was related to PAN efforts to fulfill its operational needs. Besides entrepreneurs in the party, as Bima Arya argued, such as the emergence of Hatta Rajasa, Zulkifli Hasan, Soetrisno Bachir, and Eddy Soeparno (Arya, 2006), PAN efforts to optimize party operation are also done by joining the government coalition. Eddy Soeparno, PAN Secretary-General, confirmed this by saying that PAN cannot be an opposition and will always be a part of the government even though as a critical partner. According to him, PAN does not have DNA as an opposition. Eddy Soeparno argues, with such a large party structure to

operate, it also requires excellent logistics. So it is not an exaggeration if PAN has always been part of the government. This logistics is used for the day-to-day party's operational needs and the cost of caring for constituents during the election. Eddy further argued, as an opposition, PAN would not be as strong as PDI-P and PKS because these two have a mass party character with a militant constituent. Since if a party becomes an opposition, it will have difficulty accessing the logistics needed to treat constituents and cadres in the regions (Interview with Eddy Soeparno, 29 March 2021).

Although PAN has yet to get a strategic position in the Jokowi government for the second period until the party congress is over, PAN's effort to maximize power can be seen from the party elites' pattern of behavior in obtaining instrumental benefits in the governing coalition. Ian Budge and Laver argue that office seeking coalition can be assessed instrumentally where political parties can influence a policy that the government will issue. Political parties will expect benefits such as influencing public policy. As for the impact, the party will benefit from voters' support by exploiting political positions advantage in government. Politicians who want to influence public policy feel better to do so inside the government rather than outside, since apart from providing input based on the constituent's request. The success of the policies carried out by the incumbent will gain public recognition, which can help the party's relationship with the voters and affect the increase of electoral factors. (Budge and Laver, 1986).

It can be found in the statement by a member of the People's Representative Council (DPR) Commission IX, Ahmad Yohan, who mentioned the advantage of PAN being in a government coalition is how the party can convey requests or opinions about a policy well compared to being outside of power. For example, several articles in Omnibus law were saved, such as the education cluster, so it did not include them in the DPR plenary session ratification. This request not only came from internal PAN but also came from the party's constituent, Muhammadiyah. This kind of political proximity will not happen when PAN is in opposition because it demands to be against the government (Interview with Ahmad Yohan, 5 April 2021).

Ideological Polarization

The coalition shift can also be seen from the ideological factor. In the study of intra-party factionalism, ideology became the trigger of internal group conflict. In this context, ideology refers to the group's behavior and political action within the party. The visible trend is that the more differences in political ideology, the more significant conflict potential within the party, resulting in factionalism (Imawan, 2018). Eddy Soeparno emphasized that the PAN coalition shift was also due to the growing discourse of intra-party groups who wanted to be outside the government. A senior party figure who led this stance, Amien Rais, argues that the desire to be outside the

government comes from a conservative-view Muslim constituent (Interview with Eddy Soeparno, 29 March 2021).

Amien Rais' stance, which is close to Islamic conservatives, does not come from a vacuum. Amien Rais is often seen as a figure who builds the narrative of ever-increasing injustice against Muslims in the Jokowi regime. Khairul Fahmi, chief of the DPP PAN for Election Winning, said that Amien Rais' concern for Muslims was due to unfair discrimination in political, legal, and economic matters. The context of these Muslims refers to Islamic conservatives who often have different views on various policies with the Jokowi regime (Interview with Khairul Fahmi, 22 March 2021).

From a historical perspective, Amien Rais' presence in the 411 and 212 Actions to protest religious blasphemy by the then Jakarta governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, can be noted as his proximity with Islamic conservatives. It can be said that Amien Rais is building momentum to voice existing injustices, including legal justice, which is considered being in favor of the Jokowi regime. Furthermore, Amien Rais often builds issues of identity politics to garner support from the Muslims. It was seen in Amien Rais' statement that political messages need to be inserted into recitation forums (*pengajian*) ahead of the 2019 presidential election. Amien's closeness to Islamic conservatives can also be seen through moral support given by PA 212 when he was questioned as a witness by Polda Metro Jaya in Ratna Sarumpaet's case about the spreading of false news (hoax) (Kompas, 10 October 2018).

Amien Rais's desire to bring PAN into opposition to the Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin government was met with opposition from several DPP PAN officials. His argument to respect the decision of the Islamic conservatives constituent who opposed Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin was considered irrelevant. Eddy Soeparno assessed that the proximity of the right-wing Muslim favored PKS over PAN and did not significantly impact electoral factors. By becoming part of the government coalition, PAN is not associated with the Islamic conservatives and returns to an open and centrist party platform because there is a concern that PAN will lose its constituent from the nationalists by becoming opposition. (Interview with Eddy Soeparno, 29 March 2021).

If we look at the election returns in the 2014 and 2019 legislative elections, there was a significant increase in PKS votes compared to PAN. As a comparison, in the 2014 legislative election, PKS received 8.480.204 votes and experienced a significant increase to 11.493.663 votes in the 2019 legislative election. This increase in votes was also comparable to the acquisition of parliamentary seats from 40 seats in 2014 to 50 seats in 2019. Meanwhile, PAN experienced votes stagnation from 9.481.621 votes in the 2014 legislative election and 9.572.623 votes in the 2019 legislative election. Although there was an increase in votes, it meant nothing because the seat conversion had decreased from 49 seats in the 2014 legislative election to 48 seats in the 2019 legislative. Indeed, this was a setback for PAN. They dismissed Amien Rais' argument about his political stance that he wanted to be outside the

government to accommodate the interest of the voice of the ummah or the Islamic conservatives. The volatility of Islamic parties' votes during the reformation era showed that Islamic parties always fight over a common constituent, the 'Muslim' with a relatively similar level of competition. It means Islamic parties fight over an identical constituent (Nurhasim et al., 2016).

Party	2014		2019	
	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
PKS	8.480.204	40	11.493.663	50
PAN	9.481.621	49	9.572.623	48

Table 2. PAN and PKS Election Result in the 2014 and 2019 Legislative Elections
Source: Data collected and processed from kpu.go.id

PAN's effort to get closer to the Islamic conservatives did not positively impact PAN's election result; instead, it cost PAN the seats in electoral districts with nationalist voters. As an example, PAN lost the seats in electoral districts with nationalist voters. For example, PAN lost eight seats in Central Java, two seats in East Java, and one seat in Central Kalimantan and North Sulawesi. However, this strategy of getting Islamic conservatives' votes did not mean it lost its electoral advantage altogether. It was recorded that PAN's election result in electoral districts with a Muslim voter such as West Sumatra, Riau, West Java, South Borneo, Central Sulawesi, and DKI Jakarta increased by 1-2 seats in the 2019 legislative election. On the contrary, non-Muslim-dominated electoral districts contributed positively to the PAN seats, such as Papua electoral district with two seats (Interview Ahmad Yohan, 22 March 2021).

Therefore, the party's stance to return as centrist is an effort for the party's strategy in the future to maximize the votes of the nationalists, which have not been adequately handled. If PAN forces their direction to the right-wing by maximizing the ummah's voice, PAN will experience stagnation. PAN will gain an electoral advantage if it works on nationalist constituents such as East Java and Central Java because seats are relatively large compared to Islamic conservatives-dominated electoral districts, such as in several provinces in Sumatra (Aceh, Riau, West Sumatra). It can be said that this ideological debate led to a decrease in PAN votes in the 2019 legislative elections, which resulted in the emergence of elite conflict within the party (Interview with Ahmad Yohan, 22 March 2021).

Province	Seats for 2014 Legislative Election	Seats for 2019 Legislative Election	PAN Seat's Volatility
Aceh	1	1	0
North Sumatra	3	3	0
West Sumatera	1	3	+2
Riau	1	1	+1
Riau Islands	1	1	0
Jambi	1	1	0
South Sumatra	2	2	0
Bangka Belitung	0	0	0
Bengkulu	1	1	0
Lampung	2	2	0
DKI Jakarta	0	2	+2
West Java	7	8	+1
Banten	2	2	0
Central Java	8	0	-8
DI Yogyakarta	1	1	0
East Java	7	5	-2
Bali	0	0	0
West Nusa Tenggara	1	1	0
East Nusa Tenggara	1	1	0
West Kalimantan	1	1	0
Central Kalimantan	1	0	-1
South Kalimantan	0	1	+1
East Kalimantan	0	0	0
North Kalimantan	0	0	0
North Sulawesi	1	0	-1
Gorontalo	0	0	0
Central Sulawesi	0	1	+1
South Sulawesi	3	3	0

Southeast Sulawesi	1	1	0
West Sulawesi	0	0	0
Maluku	0	0	0
North Maluku	1	0	0
Papua	1	2	+1
West Papua	0	0	0
Total	**49**	**44**	**-5**

Table 3. PAN Seat in The 2014 and 2019 Legislative Elections
Source: collected and processed from kpu.go.id

The data above also supports Bima Arya's argument that political parties with an Islamic platform cannot generate electoral power outside their primary constituent. Therefore, moving towards a centrist and open party is considered the best option for the party's survival (Arya, 2006). From a historical point of view, it can be said that PAN has also slowly moved towards a centrist party when entrepreneurs who joined and dominated the party officials structure reduced the role of an Islamic group within the party. The impact was the disillusionment of the Muhammadiyah group, which eventually established the Matahari Bangsa Party in 2004, initiated by the Muhammadiyah Youth Group (Arya, 2006). However, the pattern that occurred in 2020 is how the PAN elite strives to return the party's fundamental purpose (*khittah*) to the centrist spectrum to become an open and moderate party. This tendency to become an open party is also known as a *catch-all party* which positions itself as a party that does not adhere to the political party's ideology, either right or left, but is in the center. This way, the party will gather as much support as possible from various circles of society without being divided into specific groups. (Hague and Harrop, 2001).

Regime Intervention

One of the critical factors why PAN changed its direction in favor of the government was regime intervention. During the Jokowi government, the state's involvement in internal party intervention occurred during his 2014-2019 presidential, where the conflict between PPP and Golkar was part of the regime intervention against the party after the 2014 presidential election. Government intervenes by siding with one of the opposing sides within the party. This authority is formally vested in the Minister of Law and Human Rights, who issued decrees (SK) to party leaders the government viewed as pro-Jokowi (Mietzner, 2016).

Mietzner further divides two distinct efforts of each country's behavior toward politics. First, efforts are made subtly or called giving carrots. Carrots here means offering political resources such as cabinet seats and other strategic positions within the government. Second, using coercion, Mietzner uses the analogy of using a stick to

force political opposition to join the government. This coercive effort is carried out by utilizing the government by taking sides with one policy that conflicts with the use of legal instruments as an effort to threaten political parties in opposition (Mietzner, 2016).

The regime intervention toward PAN is shown through legal instruments to provide political threats to PAN cadres. As the incumbent, Jokowi has broad access to political resources in the government; this includes the power of economic and political resources to legal means. Formally administrative power is divided into several types: remunerative power, coercive power, legitimate power, and referent power (Sitepu, 2012). Regarding the threat to regional cadres, it can be proven through Eddy Soeparno's statement that PAN's coalition shift is also based on the regional cadres' aspirations who feel that PAN should be in the government coalition. Hence, cadres in regions who fill public positions such as regional heads and leaders in DPRD do not get political interference, e.g., caught in a legal case or criminalization because PAN was too harsh in criticizing the Jokowi government in the first period (Interview with Eddy Soeparno, 29 March 2021).

Ahmad Yohan's argument supports Eddy Soeparno's statement that different stances that are too harsh on the government will backfire against political parties, including PAN. It refers to the arrest of the South Lampung Regent, Zainuddin Hasan, the younger brother of Zulkifli Hasan, as the PAN General Chairman. This incident coincided with PAN's consistent stance in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election that Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) should be named a suspect for blasphemy (Interview with Ahmad Yohan, 22 March 2021). Even Amien Rais himself was also briefly linked to the medical device case by the defendant, former Minister of Health Siti Fadilah Supari, by receiving a stream of funds from the case. This issue is political because it relates to Amien's critical attitude towards the government by urging the Jokowi regime to process Ahok's blasphemy case; even Amien Rais became the driving force of the masses when he was present at the 212 Action (CNN, 5 June 2018).

The data shows that there is a tendency for the regime to intervene within the party through coercion. The case above is part of the alternative coercive method by utilizing legal instruments as threats against party elites to make political decisions and the involvement of law enforcement officers during Congress. It differs from the first period of the Jokowi government, which was used to strengthen the government coalition because the government coalition party structure is still a minority and can create political stabilization. What Jokowi did in the second period was more focused on shifting Amien Rais, who was considered a threat because his role was quite central as a figure who consistently criticized the government. This argument is quite logical considering that in the first period, even though PAN was in the government coalition, the political stance conveyed by Amien Rais often contradicted government policies

which in the end became a 'thorn in the flesh' (Interview Agus Mustofa, 13 March 2021).

AMIEN RAIS PERSONALISATION WITHIN THE PARTY

The coalition choice indirectly affects the response from internal parties, considering that the party is a heterogeneous entity and comprises various interests. We can see this in Amien Rais' response, who rejected the discourse of coalition shift after the 2019 presidential election. What Amien did was pressure from internal parties to challenge party leaders by taking collective action of resistance, which ultimately resulted in the formation of internal party factions (Boucek, 2012). Amien has done this in line with Sartori's view that political parties will experience division because of disagreement, resistance, and fights between politicians within the party. The party elite became the key to the formation of factions (Sartori, 1976).

Amien Rais, who serves as the PAN Honorary Council, criticized the government coalition's plan and consistently opposed Jokowi. This stance manifests in his criticism that PAN should not join the government coalition to get a ministerial position in the Jokowi government. Amien's accusation confirms that PAN's desire to join the government coalition is part of an effort to maximize power, hoping to get a ministerial position akin to the political stance that occurred in Jokowi's first term. Amien felt that the attempt to join the government coalition was part of the party's betrayal of its voters or constituent (Amien Rais, 5 July 2019).

The pressure to become an opposition is also related to maintaining a balance between the executive and the legislature. The PAN Deputy Secretary-General, Agus Mustofa, who is close to Amien Rais' camp, assessed that the desire to be in the opposition was part of Amien's criticism of the party elite's pragmatic stance under the pretext of Pancasila democracy which ruled out any opposition (Interview with Agus Mustofa, 13 March 2021). Since Jokowi government coalition's map in the second period shows the dominance of the government coalition over the opposition. PAN's support for the government coalition has further strengthened the government's position with 471 seats (82%) compared to the total opposition seats, which were only 104 seats (18%). Borrowing Esti Ekawati's term (2019), the coalition with many parties is known as the *koalisi turah* (overflowed coalition), which affected the lack of government control over the legislature as all political decisions in parliament will be dominated by the government coalition party; and the lack of checks and balances because the opposition control will have collided with the minimum number of seats in parliament (Esti, 2019).

In the historical context, Amien Rais' personalization in PAN is related to the historical factor of his role as the party founder. Even further, Amien can carry out his role as a vote-getter to direct party policies even though he did not hold a structural position within the party (Fiona, 2016). The visible role of Amien is determining the

election of the PAN General Chairman such as Soetrisno Bachir for the 2005 Congress, Hatta Rajasa at the 2010 Congress, and Zulkifli Hasan at the 2015 Congress. This role can be seen through the party's unwritten policy that requires the General Chairman to serve only one term under the pretext of party regeneration. This, of course, strengthens Amien's influence by giving his blessing to a non-incumbent General Chairman candidate (Budiatri et al., 2018).

During Zulkifli Hasan's leadership, Amien Rais' dominance in the party was intense. This personalization attitude is divided into two most important things: encouragement to oppose the Jokowi government and support for Mulfachri Harahap in the 2020 Congress. The drive for PAN's opposition to the Jokowi government can be seen from Amien's consistent stance in criticizing the Jokowi government with various narratives, including policies, identity politics, and the development of democracy (Amien Rais, 2020). The criticisms conveyed by the elite are standard in terms of politics and the state. Besides freedom of expression and speech, criticism is also intended as a check and balance in the democratic space. This attitude showed his consistency as a national figure. Looking back at history, Amien Rais is one of the figures who consistently criticizes the leadership of each regime (Interview with Eddy Soeparno, 29 March 2021). Even Amien Rais was once called a *muezzin* of reform (Amir, 2003: 132 and 144).

The criticism conveyed by Amien Rais becomes a problem when personalization is always inherent within the party. As a result, Amien's various criticisms often contradict the party's stance. Here, we can see that various criticisms conveyed by Amien Rais during the first period of Jokowi's leadership were contrary to the PAN coalition choice that supported the Jokowi government. This issue has become a stumbling block for PAN; it made the party walk and chew gum that is a government coalition partner and becoming an opposition figure (Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, 22 March 2021).

In line with Thiebault (2017), Amien Rais has transformed into a party elite who has the personal power to influence important decisions within the party. He can even carry out party strategies for a broader scope, such as the choice of party coalition, whether to be in the government coalition or the opposition, even though he was not in the party structure. What Amien did has expanded his informal influence. Amien's influence as a party figure could make PAN appear as Jokowi's opposition even though it was not through a formal party decision, instead of through his constant criticism of the Jokowi government. His constant criticism also led to the coalition's decision to become the opposition after the 2019 presidential election.

Support to Mulfachri Harahap

Internal friction in PAN increased ahead of the 5th Party Congress in 2020. Amien Rais, who rejected PAN's plan to join the government coalition, was at odds with Zulkifli Hasan's re-candidacy as General Chairman in Congress. Amien Rais is

suspected of giving his blessing to Mulfachri Harahap's candidacy. This support from Amien Rais was proven during a meeting between DPW and DPD cadres from Central Java, East Java, and Yogyakarta and was attended by Mulfachri Harahap. The meeting was initiated by Amien Rais, which was held in Yogyakarta. (Freedom People, 2019).

Amien Rais' stance to support Mulfachri Harahap is part of his refusal of the party's decision to join the government coalition. Amien Rais, in his political speech with DPW and DPD PAN officials on 30 November 2019 at his residence, said that PAN during Zulkifli Hasan's leadership began to leave the social base and merely oriented to a momentary pragmatism by discussing coalitions with the ruler. Amien's statement shows that pragmatism took the form of PAN's coalition shift by joining the government coalition after the 2019 presidential election to distance the party from its constituent (Amien Rais, 30 November 2019). Amien's efforts to strengthen his legitimacy in the party were also seen in the nomination of Hanafi Rais as Secretary-General. The duet earned the nickname 'Mewujudkan Harapan' (Realizing Hope), abbreviated as MH, taken from the first name of Mulfachri-Hanafi. (Tempo, 15 January 2020).

Amien's involvement in internal party contestation aligns with Bettcher (2005) that the elite can form factions used to organize and mobilize political party cadres to gain support for political leadership. Even these elites will compete for strategic positions within the party and form or join certain factions to support their candidacy and interest (Betcher 2001:63). The competition between politicians is also motivated by power-seeking through leadership succession, such as the Party Congress (Sartori, 1976). Amien's interests were built through the agenda of Congress, hoping Amien's camp won the contest for the PAN General Chairman and was expected to control the party organization structure; thus, it could change the direction of party policy, as the opposition to Jokowi.

The Congress itself resulted in Zulkifli Hasan's victory with 331 votes, while Mulfachri Harahap got 225 votes, Drajad Wibowo with only six votes, and three invalid votes (Kompas, 11 February 2020). The result also broke PAN's tradition that the General Chairman's leadership only lasts for one period and breaks the notion that Amien Rais' blessing in the party plays a vital role in winning the General Chairman election. This victory also strengthened PAN's plan to join the government coalition and dashed Amien Rais' hope of directing the party's policy to become an opposition to Jokowi.

The defeat of the Amien Rais camp in the PAN General Chairman election in the 5th Congress became the peak of friction between the Zulkifli Hasan and Amien Rais camps. As a result of Zulkifli Hasan's victory, Amien Rais was absent in the 2020-2025 PAN organization structure. It is in line with Sartori's view that party cohesiveness will affect cutting cadres who are not in line with party leaders. Amien Rais and his loyalists responded by establishing a new Ummah Party (Partai Ummat)

on 1 October 2020 and declared it on 29 April 2021. Amien, as political patronage, was also supported by his loyalists such as Chandra Tirta Wijaya, Putra Jaya Husin, Muhammad Asri Anas, and Agung Mozin. (Antara, 29 April 2021).

CONCLUSION

PAN factionalism in the 5th Congress in 2020 was not a single event that caused division within the party. Internal frictions have occurred and are related to the political agenda of the 2019 presidential election. The split of support in the 2019 presidential election proves that elite pragmatism within PAN is quite strong. The group that supports Jokowi is driven by several PAN cadres who are consistently part of Jokowi's supporters in the 2014 presidential election and several regional cadres hoping to get a coattail effect to support the incumbent Jokowi, expected to boost votes during the legislative election.

Factionalism encounters its peak after the 2019 presidential election due to the party's decision to join the second term of the Jokowi government. Three key factors cause the decision of the coalition. *First*, elite pragmatism to maximize power (office seeking) within the Jokowi government. By joining the government coalition, PAN can give policy input to the government. Furthermore, this factor is based on a historical tradition where PAN has never been outside of power. This problem also led to financial benefits that the party could use to carry out logistics. *Second*, the ideological factor in returning the PAN party platform to centrist due to Amien Rais' effort to build proximity with the Islamic conservatives is considered electorally detrimental. The decline in DPR seats on nationalist votes such as East Java and Central Java is evidence that PAN is being abandoned by its nationalist constituent and is not benefiting from the Islamic conservatives, which positively impacts PKS. *Third*, the regime intervention factor can be seen in legal instruments to provide political threats to several PAN cadres. This effort can be seen from the suggestions of several regional cadres who do not want to be politically troubled through criminalization threats and PAN's elite conflict of interest tendency due to legal cases involving them; hence the coalition choice can be seen as an effort to secure the elite position in the party.

The phenomenon of robust personalization in PAN is suspected to be the seed for forming the camps within the party. Amien Rais as the principal actor in PAN still has a powerful influence on PAN various policies. His critical stance of the Jokowi government, the invitation to form a coalition with Prabowo-Sandi, to wanting PAN to become the opposition are forms of Amien's influence on party policies. The peak was during the contestation for the PAN General Chairman candidacy during the 5th Congress 2020, where Amien Rais' support for Mulfachri Harahap strengthened his influence within the party. Since apart from being able to direct party policies regarding coalitions, Amien also wants to strengthen his influence by making Hanafi

the PAN Secretary-General. This factionalism shows a significant anomaly throughout the establishment of PAN, that is, the role of Amien Rais, which faded related to the defeat of Mulfachri Harahap in the 2020 Congress. Throughout the history of PAN establishment, Amien Rais' has a significant role in the election of Soetrisno Bachir, Hatta Rajasa, to Zulkifli Hasan as chairman because Amien Rais' blessing actualizes through an unwritten rule: one period of leadership is enough for each PAN General Chairman to create cadres' regeneration. *

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Big Data Analysis: How Public Response to Poverty Eradication Programs in Indonesia during COVID-19 Pandemic?

Dian Rizqi Khusnul Khotimah
[1]Statistics Indonesia (BPS RI), Jakarta, Indonesia
dian.rizqi@bps.go.id

ABSTRACT

Poverty eradication is the main focus of the first Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), namely 'No Poverty'. Nationally, poverty eradication is also implied in the 2020-2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) on the first and second agendas. These are economic resilience and reducing disparities between regions. Various government programs are implemented to reduce poverty. The benefits obtained by the target community need to be measured to reflect the program's success and for government evaluation. Big data through social media analysis can be empowered to gain public perceptions of poverty eradication programs. Therefore, in this study, the Twitter social media analysis approach will be used to obtain public responses regarding various poverty eradication programs in Indonesia during the COVID-19 pandemic, especially the Family Hope Program (*PKH or Program Keluarga Harapan*), Cash Intensive Work (*PKT or Padat Karya Tunai*), Direct Cash Assistance (*BLT or Bantuan Langsung Tunai*), and Pre-Employment Cards (*Kartu Prakerja*). Those data were analyzed using the text mining method. The results of this study indicate that the public response generally accepts and supports the four poverty eradication programs in Indonesia. Those analysis results can be used as evaluation material and input for the Government to make the following policy.

Keywords: public response, government programs, poverty eradication, big data

INTRODUCTION

Poverty eradication is the main priority of national development, aiming to improve general welfare (Bappenas, 2006). The importance of poverty eradication is the number one goal in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) on the United Nations agenda and is expected to be achieved by 2030. Poverty eradication is also the ideal of the Indonesian nation, as stated in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution (*Pembukaan UUD 1945*) in the fourth paragraph, "…*untuk memajukan kesejahteraan umum…* (to promote prosperity general)". Poverty eradication is also implied in the 2020-2024 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) on the first and second agendas; these are economic resilience and reducing disparities between regions (Indonesian Government, 2020).

Poverty eradication is the task of the government, both central and local governments. The Government has made various efforts in Indonesia to reduce poverty by making national development policies that are well-targeted. Development policy programs that focus on reducing poverty include (1) Organizing comprehensive social protection, (2) Expanding and improving basic services, and (3) Developing sustainable livelihoods (Bappenas, 2017).

The social and economic impacts caused by the COVID-19 pandemic significantly affect community welfare due to the limitation of economic activity, which reduces economic growth at a macro level and causes many people to lose their jobs, potentially increasing the number of poor people. The Government has designed and implemented various programs in the context of poverty eradication during the pandemic, including the Cash Intensive Work (Padat Karya Tunai or PKT), Family Hope Program (Program Keluarga Harapan or PKH), Direct Cash Assistance (Bantuan Langsung Tunai or BLT), and Pre-Employment Cards (Kartu Prakerja).

Every poverty eradication program requires an evaluation of the level of acceptance by the public. According to Dunn (1999), there are three critical functions of evaluating government policies, namely (1) Providing valid and reliable information about policy performance to reveal how far specific goals and targets have been achieved, (2) Contributing to clarification and criticism of values that underlie the selection of goals and targets, and (3) contribute to the application of other policy analysis methods, including problem formulation and recommendations. Based on this statement, policy evaluation is the only way to prove the success or failure of implementing a government program, especially for poverty eradication programs.

The evaluation system used by the Indonesian Government is still conventional, in the form of tiered reports from the smallest units in the form of villages, sub-districts, districts, provinces, to the central Government. Collecting evaluations requires a long time and process related to the vast territory of Indonesia and the large population of Indonesia, especially with the many limitations during the current pandemic. A study from the United Nations Global Pulse (UNGP) and the World Bank Group (2015) in El Salvador suggests that social media monitoring can understand and provide feedback on policy reforms. Rounaq Basu (2015), in his research, indicates that social media can be used as an evaluation because it can cover a wide area, the volume of data taken is large, and the time is fast.

In Indonesia, online data sources from social media continue to grow as internet users increase. According to the Global Digital Statistics "Digital 2021: Indonesia" from We are Social (2021), 202.6 million internet users were in Indonesia. Then, 63.6 percent of internet users aged 16 to 64 were active Twitter users. The large percentage of active Twitter users can be used as an online data source to take public responses and opinions on government programs related to poverty eradication. Therefore, this study aims to analyze Twitter data to determine public responses and

views as an evaluation tool for poverty eradication programs in Indonesia during the pandemic. This research hopes to support the optimization of government policies to reduce poverty and protect the community's welfare from accelerating the national economic recovery during the pandemic.

LITERATURE REVIEW

The response has a narrow meaning, namely a reply or response. Soekanto (1993) states that the response is a consequence of previous behavior or an answer to a particular problem. According to Azwar (1988), a person's response can be good or bad attitudes and positive or negative responses. According to the Big Indonesian Dictionary (KBBI), public means many people or general. Based on this theory, the public response refers to a response or reaction that results from positive and negative stimuli along with criticism and expectations conveyed by the general public regarding a matter.

In the context of poverty eradication strategies, poverty is defined as the condition of a person or group of people, men and women, whose basic rights are not fulfilled to maintain and develop a useful life (Bappenas, 2004). Poverty eradication in this study is an effort carried out to prevent, deal with, or overcome a situation through preventive activities and efforts to improve and fulfill the basic rights of the poor so that they can enjoy a dignified life and their rights are recognized in-laws and regulations. In this study, four poverty eradication programs organized by the Government will be analyzed.

Cash-intensive Work (PKT) is an activity to empower rural communities, especially the poor and marginal, which is productive by prioritizing the use of local resources, labor, and technology to provide additional wages/income, reduce poverty, and improve people's welfare. Cash labor-intensive activities are carried out independently by the village by utilizing natural resources, technology, and human resources (Kemendesa, 2018). The PKT program was launched by the Ministry of Villages, Development of Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration (*Kemendesa*).

The Family Hope Program (PKH) provides conditional social assistance to Beneficiary Families (KPM) designated as PKH beneficiary families. The program has been implemented by the Ministry of Social Affairs (*Kemensos*) since 2007, which is internationally known as Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT). PKH benefits are intended for poor families, especially pregnant women and children, persons with disabilities, and the elderly (Kemensos, 2018).

BLT is an abbreviation of Cash Direct Assistance, a government assistance program that provides cash or other assistance, both conditional (conditional cash transfer) and unconditional (unconditional cash transfer) for the poor. In the COVID-19 pandemic era, Direct Village Fund Cash Assistance (BLT-Village Fund) exists,

which is financial assistance to poor families in the village sourced from the Village Fund to reduce the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. The value of the Village Fund BLTD is IDR 600,000 every month for every poor family that meets the criteria and is given for 3 (three) months and also IDR 300,000 per month for the next three months. BLT has been organized by the Ministry of Social Affairs (*Kemensos*) since 2005 (Bappenas, 2020).

The Pre-Employment Cards Program (*Kartu Prakerja*) is a training and incentive fee assistance program for laid-off workers/laborers, job seekers, as well as micro and small business actors who have lost their jobs and experienced a decline in purchasing power due to the Covid-19 pandemic and workers who need increased competence (Kemnaker, 2020). The Pre-Employment Cards Program aims to develop the workforce's competence, increase productivity and competitiveness, and develop entrepreneurship. This program is managed by the Ministry of Manpower (*Kemnaker*).

Related research is a journal entitled "Harnessing Twitter Data for Analyzing Public Reactions to Transportation Policies: Evidence from the Odd-Even Policy in Delhi, India" by Rounaq Basu, Arnab Jana, Aparup Khatua, and Saptarshi Ghosh (2017). The research contains an analysis of pre-post policies and challenges in collecting public response data. With the existence of social media, it is possible to evaluate the success of a policy more efficiently. This journal proposes using Twitter data to understand sentiment and reactions to public policy. Twitter data on the odd-even transport policy in Delhi is collected and analyzed. The results of the study show that Delhi residents mostly agree with the policy. Such research can also help identify policy problems so that the Government can take corrective action. This research aims to obtain a public response related to government policies in poverty eradication programs.

Another related research is the journal "Using Twitter Data to Analyze Public Sentiment on Fuel Subsidy Policy Reform in El Salvador" by The World Bank (2015). The World Bank and Global Pulse are working together to analyze public discontent with policy reforms for national subsidies to propane gas in El Salvador. The research results on the Twitter data help reveal public opinion and the unexpected impact of fuel reform policies. The results of this opinion can complement household survey data if they are not available in line with this research, which seeks to obtain public perceptions regarding government programs through big data analysis of social media to complement direct survey data, which is challenging to do during the current pandemic.

METHODOLOGY

This study uses a qualitative method, namely text mining. Text mining is defined as extracting information where a user interacts with a set of documents using

analytical tools components in data mining (Feldman, 1995). Twitter data about public responses regarding various poverty eradication programs in Indonesia during the COVID-19 pandemic are used in this study. Twitter data used is the tweet in the Indonesian language. The processed data is sourced from all Twitter users with tweets related to the keywords *'program keluarga harapan'* (family hope program), *'padat karya tunai'* (cash-intensive work), *'bantuan langsung tunai'* (direct cash assistance), and *'kartu prakerja'* (pre-employment cards). Data retrieval is carried out by the scrapping method using the python application and the 'twint' scraping tool. The tweet data were collected from 1 January 2020 to 31 May 2021.

The next stage after data collection is data filtering and text pre-processing using python. Twitter data usually has much noise, so filtering and text pre-processing need to be done (Go et al., 2009). Filtering is carried out on the scrapping data to obtain data related to the three keywords. Pre-processing text is done to correct data that is unsuitable and not ready for analysis through case-folding, URL removal, punctuation removal, stop words removal. Ready-to-analyze data for each keyword were 3,687 tweets for *'program keluarga harapan'*, 6,632 tweets for *'padat karya tunai'*, 16,568 tweets for *'bantuan langsung tunai',* and 69,082 tweets for *'kartu prakerja'*.

Sentiment analysis or opinion mining is a research branch of text mining that determines public perception or objectivity towards a topic, event, or problem. The lexicon-based approach is a sentiment analysis technique that involves calculating the polarity of sentiment by using the semantic orientation of words or sentences in a text or document (Collomb et al., 2014). This analytical research method uses sentiment analysis and descriptive analysis with R in the form of line chart visualization for descriptive tweet data as a whole, pie chart and line chart per keyword for visualization of sentiment analysis, and link words for visualization of the hope for Government contained in the tweet data. The steps taken in conducting analysis and visualization are as follows.

1. Sentiment data classification uses the manual weighting method for each word based on the lexicon dictionary (Shah, M., 2016) to identify negative, neutral, and positive sentiments. If the result is weighted less than one (<0), then the tweet is classified as negative sentiment, if it is equal to zero (0), then it is classified as neutral, and if more than one (>0), then the tweet is classified as positive sentiment.
2. After classifying the sentiment data for each tweet, it is followed by visualization using pie charts and line charts/data trends from each government program to see its sentiment development.
3. Tokenize and merge words in tweets. Tokenization is done to split two words, and then the second to third words are combined again. The first words that are still separated are selected for words that have a special meaning of hope so that the data can be classified, which means expectations of government programs in per keyword.

4. The last step is to visualize the sentence of hope with a link word.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

When a government program is launched to the public, it will get a response from the public itself, will the public respond in an accepting, neutral, or even rejecting manner. As stated by Swatyasti P. (2015), the existence of different public interests will impact the public's response to a government program. Sentiment analysis was formed for the four poverty eradication programs during the pandemic, as summarized in Table 1 below.

Table 1. Percentage of Public Tweets for Each Poverty Eradication Program in Indonesia during Pandemic (January 2020 – May 2021)

Program	Sentiment	Amount	Percentage
(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)	Negative	289	7.84
	Neutral	876	23.76
	Positive	2522	68.40
Padat Karya Tunai (PKT)	Negative	754	11.37
	Neutral	3058	46.11
	Positive	2820	42.52
Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT)	Negative	1998	12.06
	Neutral	7854	47.40
	Positive	6716	40.54
Kartu Prakerja (KP)	Negative	11631	16.84
	Neutral	30966	44.82
	Positive	26485	38.34

Source: Twitter, processed

Table 1 above is a table of public sentiment or opinion from Indonesia's four poverty eradication programs for the period January 2020 to May 2021. Public opinion on the four government programs is dominated by neutral sentiment and positive sentiment from the public. The neutral view is dominated by activity descriptions from photos or only in the form of hashtags for each program or better known as status updates by the public when participating in one of these programs. Words of support and usefulness dominate positive sentiment. The following is a sentiment analysis of each poverty eradication program.

Family Hope Program or **Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)**

Most of the public accepts this PKH program; as shown in Figure 1, positive and neutral opinions dominate the percentage of public opinion about this program. The shares of neutral and positive public opinion are 23.76 percent and 68.40 percent. However, there is 7.84 percent of public opinion criticizes or disagrees with this

program. A large number of positive public opinion shows that this program is feasible to be continued by the Government.


Figure 1. Percentage of Public Opinion related to PKH Program for Jan 2020 – May 2021

The following is a trend of PKH program sentiment. Based on Figure 2, it can be seen that during the period between Jan 2020 to May 2021, tweets with positive opinions are much more significant than tweets with negative opinions. It was followed by a tweet with a neutral sentiment.


Figure 2. Trends in Public Opinion regarding PKH Program for Jan 2020 – May 2021

Figure 3 is a word cloud of public tweets against the PKH program. Wordcloud is a visualization of words that often appear in every public opinion about the PKH program on Twitter.

Figure 3. PKH Program Wordcloud

Figure 3 shows that public opinion about this program is very diverse for each opinion. Neutral opinions are dominated by words in the form of descriptions of activities that are felt or carried out by the community, and positive opinions are dominated by the word's "benefits", "assistance", and others. The following is an example of a few tweets for each opinion. An example of a tweet with a neutral opinion sentiment is "Bhabinkamtibmas Desa Seraya Aiptu I Nyoman Koti Yasa, on Tuesday, 25/05/2021, at 09.30 WITA, carried out monitoring as well as securing account creation activities for residents who received the PKH program/Program Keluarga Harapan in the living room. Village Office Hall" (*translated*). The positive opinion was dominated by tweets from the public who received the assistance or from program implementers. An example of a positive tweet is "Alhamdulillah, a shop under the guidance of the Family Hope Program (PKH), from a capital of IDR 2 million, now has a turnover of IDR 30 million per month #JokowiLawanPandemi" (*translated*).

Furthermore, the following are examples of tweets with negative opinions on the PKH program, such as "There is suspected corruption, the Tangerang District Attorney investigates the Family Hope Program for the 2018-2019 Fiscal Year"; and "Money that was corrupted in 2020 was carried out for social protection due to the COVID-19 pandemic 19 amounting to Rp234.33 trillion with detailed data that Rp129.49 trillion was allocated to the Ministry of Social Affairs with the Family Hope Program (PKH) of Rp41.97 trillion" (*translated*). Based on the example of the negative tweet, it can be seen that negative opinion indicates a problem in public criticism of the PKH program. The Government should pay more attention to the shortcomings that exist in implementing the PKH program, especially in preventing corruption and unfair and unequal allocations.

In addition to negative tweets as criticism, the public also gave hope for the PKH program in the future. Figure 4 is a visualization of some of the public's expectations for PKH policies in the form of link word visualization.


Figure 4. PKH program linkword

Based on Figure 4, public tweets regarding the PKH program expect to increase purchasing power, expand assistance, and reduce burdens. The public also gave input to this program, namely that the Government should improve and optimize the aid budget and an even number of recipients.

Cash Intensive Work or **Padat Karya Tunai (PKT)**

Figure 5. Percentage of Public Opinion regarding PKT Program for Jan 2020 – May 2021

Figure 5 shows the percentage of public opinion about the PKT program. Based on the picture, opinions are dominated by tweets with neutral and positive opinions, which are 46.11 percent and 42.52 percent. It can be concluded that most of the public accepts and support this PKT program. The amount of positive public opinion shows

that this program is feasible to be continued by the Government. But there is still 11.37 percent of public opinion who criticize or disagree with this program.


Figure 6. Trends in Public Opinion regarding PKT Program for Jan 2020 – May 2021

Figure 6 shows that the sentiment trend of the PKT program from early 2020 to May 2021 shows the dominance of tweets with positive opinions and neutral opinions, while negative opinions are below them. It is following Figure 5 regarding the percentage of sentiment towards the PKT program, which is dominated by positive and neutral sentiment

Figure 7. PKT Program Wordcloud

Figure 7 is a word cloud of the PKT program, showing that public opinion about the PKT program is very diverse. The neutral opinion is dominated by descriptions of activities and some public expectations. Negative opinions are highlighted with the word 'impact' and 'pandemic', which show that this program is still not optimal enough to reduce the impact of poverty during the pandemic. The following is an example of a few tweets for each opinion. An example of a tweet with a neutral opinion sentiment is "The Government through @KemenPU is implementing the Cash-Intensive Work (PKT) program for Self-Help Stimulant Housing (BSPS) or popularly known as house renovation for 1,405 housing units that are unfit for habitation (RTLH) in Riau Province. @jokowi" (*translated*). The positive opinion was dominated by tweets from the public who received the assistance or from program implementers. An example of a positive tweet is, "Fortunately, the Government and other ministries and agencies issued various aids for the impact of this pandemic. Thank God I can help the community. Now, the cash-intensive program itself has at least launched a steady 5.9 trillion rupiah." (*translated*)

Furthermore, the following are examples of tweets with negative opinions against the PKT program, namely "@KemenPU Padat Karya Tunai P3TGAI Dusun Timbolasi Questioned, Allegedly Originated So Not Putting Up Information Boards" and "@VADUKA__KOLAK The potential for corruption will be very high. It's just a cash-intensive form" (*translated*). Based on the example of the negative tweet, it can be seen that the negative opinion indicates a problem in the form of public criticism of the PKT program. The Government should pay more attention to the shortcomings that exist in the implementation of the PKT program, especially in preventing the potential for corruption of funds for the PKT program and the possibility of providing random and inappropriate PKT programs.


Figure 8. PKT program linkword

Figure 8 is a visualization of some of the public's expectations for PKT policies in the form of link word visualization. Based on Figure 8, the expectation that often comes out of public tweets related to the PKT program is that it can be a solution for job creation, optimizing human resource potential, increasing people's income, and driving the economy. The public also provided input on this program, namely that the Government should optimize the use of funds and prioritize activities to reduce the impact of the pandemic and accelerate economic recovery.

Direct Cash Assistance or Bantuan Langsung Tunai (BLT)

Figure 9. Percentage of Public Opinion related to the BLT Program for Jan 2020 – May 2021

Most of the public accepted the BLT program; as shown in Figure 9, neutral and positive opinions dominate the percentage of public opinion about this program. The percentages of neutral and positive public opinion are 47.40 percent and 40.54 percent. However, there is 12.06 percent of public opinion criticizes or disagrees with this program. A large number of positive public opinion shows that this program is feasible to be continued by the Government.


Figure 10. Trends in Public Opinion regarding BLT Program for Jan 2020 – May 2021

The following above is the trend of the sentiment of the BLT program. Based on Figure 10, it can be seen that during the period between Jan 2020 to May 2021, tweets with positive and neutral opinions are much greater than tweets with negative opinions.

Figure 11. Wordcloud BLT Program

Figure 11 is a word cloud of public tweets against the BLT program. Wordcloud is a visualization in the form of words that often appear in every public opinion on the BLT program on Twitter. Figure 11 shows that public opinion about this program is very diverse for each opinion. Neutral opinions are dominated by words in the form of descriptions of activities that are felt or carried out by the community, and positive opinions are dominated by words that show the usefulness of assistance. The following is an example of a few tweets for each opinion. An example of a tweet with a neutral opinion sentiment is "Bhabinkamtibmas Aipda Saifrudin monitors the distribution of the Village Fund Direct Assistance (BLT DD) Phase IV with an amount received of Rp. 300,000. - (three hundred thousand rupiah), in Tenam Village for beneficiary families who affected by Covid-19" *(translated)*. The positive opinion was dominated by tweets from the public who felt the assistance. An example of a positive tweet is "A grandmother received BLT (Direct Cash Assistance) Rp. 600,000, - be like Grandma: son, who is this 600k money from?? Officer: Corona helps Grandma... Grandma: Alhamdulillah, may Corona get more fortune and live longer. Officer: ... Ajurrrrr sum :)))" *(translated)*.

Furthermore, the following is an example of a tweet with a negative opinion on the PKH program: "Constraints in Distributing BLT Village Funds, Including Regional Geographical Conditions: There are at least seven obstacles in the distribution of Direct Cash Assistance-Village Funds (BLT-DD). First, the village

needs to re-adjust to the Village Budget due to the emergence of PMK NO 222 Years" and "Allegedly Uneven Distribution of BLT, Village Office Burned OTK in Sidrap #BantuanLangsungTunai #DesaPadangloang #KantorDesaDibakar #TrendingTopic" *(translated)*. Based on the example of the negative tweet, it can be seen that negative opinion indicates a problem in public criticism of the PKH program. The Government should pay more attention to the segmentation of BLT recipients so that the distribution can be fair and equitable. The Government also needs to think about solutions to various obstacles in the distribution of BLT, including geographical constraints.

In addition to negative tweets of criticism, the public also gave hope for the BLT program in the future. Figure 12. It visualizes some of the public's expectations for BLT policies in the form of link word visualization.


Figure 12. BLT Program Link Word

Based on Figure 12, public tweets regarding the BLT program expect to increase purchasing power and reduce burdens. The community hopes this BLT distribution can be integrated with other assistance such as PKH and MSME assistance (Micro, Small, and Medium Enterprise). The implementation of BLT is expected to support efforts to recover the economy during the pandemic.

***Pre-Employment Cards or Kartu Prakerja* (KP)**

Figure 13. Percentage of Public Opinion related to KP Program for Jan 2020 – May 2021

Figure 13 shows the percentage of public opinion on the KP program. Based on the picture, opinions are dominated by tweets with neutral and positive opinions, which are 44.82 percent and 38.34 percent. It can be concluded that most of the public accepts and support this KP program. The amount of positive public opinion shows that this program is feasible to be continued by the Government. However, there is still 16.84 percent of public opinion who criticize or disagree with this program.


Figure 14. Trends in Public Opinion regarding PKT Program for Jan 2020 – May 2021

Figure 14 shows that the trend of sentiment for the KP program from early 2020 to May 2021 shows the dominance of tweets with neutral opinions and positive opinions, while negative opinions are below them. It is following Figure 13 regarding

the percentage of sentiment towards the KP program, which is dominated by positive and neutral sentiment.

Figure 15. Wordcloud Program KP

Figure 15 is a word cloud of the KP program, showing that public opinion about the CCP program is diverse. The neutral opinion is dominated by descriptions of activities and some public expectations. Negative opinions are highlighted with the words failed and wrong, which indicate that the allocation of recipients in this program is still not optimal or not on target. The following is an example of a few tweets for each opinion. An example of a tweet with a neutral opinion sentiment is "See how to register for the 17th Pre-employment Card, the Required Terms and Documents via @wartakotalive #kartuprakerja #prakerja" *(translated)*. The positive opinion was dominated by tweets from the public who felt the assistance. An example of a positive tweet is "Alhamdulillah….. our brothers and sisters who have received Pre-Employment Cards are very beneficial, not only giving money but also being given the training to be able to live independently. Thank you, Mr. President, @jokowi" *(translated)*.

Furthermore, the following is an example of a tweet with a negative opinion on the KP program, such as "@jokowi. The Pre-Employment Card Program is good, but because the selection management operating system is dishonest, corrupt, not transparent, and unaccountable, this program is tantamount to a fraudulent program. Please, @bpkri do the forensic audit. And @KPK_RI keep an eye on this program" *(translated)*, and "It's crazy, now the fraud is getting desperate, personal data somehow can leak into the hands of bad people huhu where is the data from the pre-employment card like that the good name of the bad guys is really bad nipuu" *(translated)*. Based on the example of the negative tweet, it can be seen that negative opinion indicates a problem in public criticism of the KP program. The Government should pay more attention to the shortcomings that exist in the implementation of the KP program,

especially in preventing corruption in the implementation of the KP. Transparency in the management of KPs needs to be clearly spelled out and allocated fairly and equitably. The Government must also be more responsive to take action against all kinds of fraud cases or cyber-crimes related to pre-employment cards so that no more citizens are harmed.


Figure 16. KP Program Link Word

Figure 16 is a visualization of some of the public's expectations for KP policies in the form of link word visualization. Based on Figure 16, the expectation that often comes out of public tweets related to the KP program is that it can improve human resources' competence, skills, and productivity. The public also gave input to this program, namely that the Government should optimize the KP program to overcome the impact of the pandemic, overcome unemployment, and review the accuracy of program targets. The public hopes that the KP program can be a means of policy management towards national economic recovery.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION

Conclusion

Based on the analysis and discussion, the conclusions drawn from this research are as follows. In general, the public's response to Indonesia's four poverty eradication programs during the pandemic period (January 2020 to May 2021) was to accept and support the program, and some were neutral or neutral. There is a small part of the public who do not accept or criticize the poverty eradication programs. The number of positive responses shows that the program is generally successful and feasible to continue to overcome the pandemic's impact and accelerate economic recovery. It can be seen in the public responses to each program below.

The Family Hope Program (PKH) received the largest percentage of positive sentiment compared to the other three programs. PKH received a positive response of 68.40 percent, 23.76 percent of a neutral response, and only 7.84 percent of a negative response. The community hopes that the Government can increase and optimize the aid budget and an even number of recipients in the PKH program to prevent corruption. According to the public, PKH has increased purchasing power, expanded assistance, and reduced the burden on families during the pandemic.

Cash Intensive Work (PKT) had 42.52 percent positive responses and 46.11 percent neutral responses, while the remaining 11.37 percent were negative responses. Based on the negative response to the PKT, the Government needs to prevent the potential for corruption of funds for the PKT program and the possibility of giving the PKT in vain and not on target. PKT is expected to become a solution for villagers, especially farmers, to create job opportunities, optimize human resource potential, increase community income, and drive the economy.

Direct Cash Assistance (BLT) received positive sentiment of 40.54 percent, neutral sentiment of 47.40 percent, and negative sentiment of 12.06 percent. Based on negative tweets about BLT, the Government needs to optimize BLT segmentation fairly and equitably and prevent various obstacles in the distribution of BLT. The implementation of the BLT program is expected to increase purchasing power and reduce the burden on the community during the pandemic.

Pre-Employment Cards (KP) received positive sentiment of 38.34 percent, neutral at 44.82 percent, and quite a lot of negative sentiment compared to other programs, which was 16.84 percent. Based on negative tweets about KP, the Government must be able to manage KP transparently to prevent corruption, and the Government needs to take action against various fraud cases in the form of cybercrime against the implementation of KP. The public hopes that this KP program can improve human resources' competence, skills, and productivity.

Recommendation

Based on the conclusions above, the Government needs to pay more attention to the program's shortcomings based on negative sentiments from the public. It can increase public trust in the program and can minimize problems in the field during program implementation. The Government can use social media with the text mining method as an alternative for evaluating government programs. In the future, it is necessary to create an application or dashboard system to display the evaluation of government programs in real-time through social media analysis. The system is expected to speed up the evaluation process to carry out other policies appropriately and responsively.

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MIDDLE POWER'S ROLE IN HEALTH DIPLOMACY DURING COVID-19: THE CASE OF MIKTA MEMBER STATES

Nur Luthfi Hidayatullah[1]
[1]Sunan Ampel State Islamic University, Surabaya, Indonesia
nur.luthfi.hidayatullah@uinsby.ac.id

ABSTRACT

This article seeks to respond towards the growing skepticism questioning MIKTA's role in middle power diplomacy during the Covid-19 pandemic era. In recent years, the middle power informal forum MIKTA, consisting of Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia has been accused of being dysfunctional with lack of significant contributions towards multilateralism. Moreover, during the Covid-19 pandemic, MIKTA member states struggle to resolve domestic issues such as rising infections rate and economic recession, which indicate their withdrawal from regional and multilateral affairs. This article proves otherwise. The author argues that despite facing domestic problems related to Covid-19, MIKTA member states remain committed towards multilateralism through exemplary domestic regulations and regional contributions in a new public diplomacy role MIKTA has never taken before: health diplomacy. This descriptive-quantitative research implements quasi-experimental method by selecting five states representing middle powers from various regions and examine their health diplomacy role in domestic, regional, and multilateral affairs using indicators from Neo-Liberalist and Constructivist perspectives. This article concludes that MIKTA member states' role in health diplomacy remain essential in supporting global health diplomacy efforts during the pandemic. Domestically, Australia and South Korea's effective Covid-19 containment policy have served as an example for other states to follow. Regionally, MIKTA member states' assistance towards neighboring states highlight their commitment towards regional leadership. Multilaterally, all MIKTA member states have unanimously agreed on the need to support Covid-19 vaccine availability for all countries.

Keywords: Middle Power, Health Diplomacy, Covid-19, MIKTA

INTRODUCTION

This article tends to examine MIKTA member states' roles in health diplomacy during the Covid-19 pandemic. MIKTA was formed during the United Nations (UN) General Assembly session on 25 September 2013 as a ministerial-level informal forum, which consists of five like-minded middle power states, namely Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia (Karadeniz, 2020). Middle powers are states capable of asserting foreign policies to support common good in the

international system, without being dependent on great powers' interests and decisions (Hidayatullah, 2017).

All MIKTA member states have some characteristics in common, being democratic and economically progressive states, as well as members of The Group of Twenty (G20) intergovernmental forum, with different agenda to other multilateral groupings such as The Group of Seven (G7) and BRICS (Kim, Haug & Rimmer, 2018). On the other hand, MIKTA member states remain unique, as they tend to represent various regions in the world during the UN and G20 meetings, becoming the voice of neighboring states and a bridge between develop and developing states in multilateral diplomacy (Cooper, 2015 & MIKTA, 2015). Since its initiation, MIKTA's public diplomacy has been active in seven low-political issues, i.e., energy access, counterterrorism and peacekeeping, economic development, gender equality, democratic promotion, human rights, and sustainable development (Islam, 2019).

However, in recent years there is growing skepticism questioning MIKTA's role in middle power diplomacy. MIKTA has been accused of being a dysfunctional middle power group with lack of significant contributions towards multilateralism. Firstly, MIKTA cannot be categorized as an established International Organization due to lack of institutional, procedural and performance legitimacy (Karadeniz, 2020). Secondly, MIKTA member states prefer to uphold national interest, which made the group highly affected by domestic regulations and budget cuts (Kim, Haug & Rimmer, 2018). Finally, MIKTA is still an incomplete partnership which mainly relies on foreign ministerial cooperation, not yet a Summit or head-of-states forum (Cooper, 2015).

Moreover, during the Covid-19 pandemic MIKTA member states struggled to resolve domestic problems, which indicate their withdrawal from regional and multilateral affairs (Karadeniz, 2020). From January 2020 to August 2021 among MIKTA member states, Turkey has the highest Covid-19 confirmed cases, with Mexico having the highest death rate due to the pandemic (WHO, 2021). In response to rising Covid-19 infection rates, all MIKTA member states have domestically implemented lockdowns, especially throughout metropolitan areas. Consequently, the five middle powers faced economic recessions, indicated by low growth rates and unemployment (Karadeniz, 2020).

The author argues that despite facing domestic challenges due to Covid-19 pandemic, MIKTA member states remain committed towards multilateralism by taking a new role in health diplomacy. Unlike G7 and BRICS which seek a more prominent role to reform the international order, MIKTA's diplomacy tend to support common good within the current international system (Cooper, 2015). Thus, it's important to examine MIKTA member states' health diplomacy during Covid-19 pandemic in domestic, regional, and multilateral scopes.

Literature Review

This literature review is divided into two sections. The first section tends to identify the characteristics of MIKTA's public diplomacy, which differentiates it from other multilateral groupings among G20 most advanced economies in the world, which are the G7 and BRICS. The second section discusses how Covid-19 pandemic influenced MIKTA to take a new role in health diplomacy.

Initially, it's important to distinguish the roles of G7, BRICS and MIKTA in public diplomacy; because MIKTA's performance has been criticized for not achieving much multilateral contributions as compared to BRICS. In fact, the G7, BRICS and MIKTA have served different roles in multilateralism. The Group of Seven (G7) is an intergovernmental forum of the world's most advanced economies (UK, US, Canada, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, and EU), which meet in annual summits to discuss global issues such as economy, climate change and recently Covid-19 pandemic to maintain a major role in the *status quo* international system (G7:2021). On the other hand, BRICS is a middle power forum (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) which meet in annual summits to reform the international system through coordination in international meetings and developing agenda for cooperation in economic and political affairs (Islam, 2019).

Conversely, MIKTA is a middle power informal forum (Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey, and Australia) which meet during G20 and UN sessions, as well as limited MIKTA meetings represented by foreign ministers, not heads of states (Cooper, 2015). MIKTA's objective is not to reform the current international order, but to support global causes and other like-minded states through multilateral diplomacy. Thus, MIKTA's cooperation and development is less formal than BRICS, which gives MIKTA member states flexibility in responding towards global issues in domestic, regional and multilateral scopes (Kim, Haug & Rimmer, 2018).

Before the Covid-19 pandemic from 2014 until 2018, MIKTA conducted public diplomacy by issuing Foreign Ministers' Joint Statements on up-to-date international issues including counterterrorism, human rights promotion, gender equality, climate change, etc. The only time MIKTA released a joint statement related to health security was during the Ebola outbreak in 2014, although without a follow-up foreign policy (Kim, Haug & Rimmer, 2018). Conversely since Covid-19 pandemic, MIKTA's role in health diplomacy became prominent not only in joint statements but also followed with foreign policy by each member state as well as collectively (Karradeniz, 2020).

METHOD

This descriptive-quantitative research implements a quasi-experimental approach to compare situational changes within a designated population when an intervention takes place. A quasi-experiment is done by understanding the characteristics of a target population and its objectives; selecting a sample of units from the population to become an intervention group; selecting another sample of units to become a comparison group; and examining differences between the intervention and comparison groups (James, Garbutt & Simister, 2017). This research starts by explaining middle powers' roles in regional and multilateral affairs as a target population; identifying examples of G7 and BRICS member states' current health diplomacy as a comparison group; selecting MIKTA member states as samples of middle powers and an intervention group; and examining the difference between MIKTA member states' health diplomacy during Covid-19 pandemic to highlight its unique characteristics compared to other middle power groups.

Middle Powers' Roles in Regional and Multilateral Affairs

The term 'middle power' traditionally refers to states which are lower than great powers but higher than small powers in terms of hard power, such as economic and military capabilities (Jordaan, 2003). Middle powers also conduct diplomacy to obtain leadership on low political issues to demonstrate their unique role as compared to great powers (Gilley, 2012). Additionally, middle powers use soft power to build coalitions with other like-minded states in multilateral forums to achieve mutual goals (Neack, 2008). In short, middle powers determine their foreign policy strategies by utilizing their most strategic power resources, such as hard power, diplomatic behavior and/or soft power (Hidayatullah, 2017). Conclusively, by using Realist, Neo-Liberalist and Constructivist perspectives, middle powers' roles in regional and multilateral affairs could be categorized as Enforcer, Assembler and Advocator.

Approach (middle power resources)	Regional or Multilateral Role	Middle Powers' nature in relation to other states in its region
Realism (Hard power)	**Enforcer** (China & Russia)	Fear, able to enforce policy, lack of trust, smaller powers dependent on middle power
Neo-Liberalism (Diplomatic behavior)	**Assembler** (Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa & Turkey)	Trust, long term mutual consultation, institutionalized cooperation, no veto, lack of force, non-interference
Constructivism (Soft power)	**Advocator** (Australia, Canada & South Korea)	Issue-based coalition, *ad hoc*, beyond regional diplomacy, short term influence, needs to be frequently renewed through agreements and protocols

Table 1. Middle Power Roles based on their Resources (Hidayatullah, 2017).

First, based on Realism, Enforcers are middle powers with hard power capability. Hard power indicators include higher military budget and spending compared to neighboring states, having military technology and skilled military force (Holbraad, 1984). Enforcers are capable of enforcing policies towards their neighboring states, especially on issues where smaller powers in the region are dependent on the middle power (Baldwin, 2013 & Griffiths, 2008). Consequently, there is an element of fear and lack of trust within the relationship between a middle power Enforcer and their neighboring states (Hidayatullah, 2017).

China and Russia are examples of middle power Enforcers. China secures its regional influence by limiting the United States' involvement in Taiwan through the One China Policy and dominating the South China Sea based on the nine dash lines principle (Pant, 2012 & Taneja, 2014). On the other hand, Russia can provide energy supplies for its former Soviet neighboring states, preventing European powers from influencing the region (Tsygankov, 2010).

Secondly in line with Neo-Liberalism, Assemblers are middle powers with diplomatic behavior (Hidayatullah, 2017). Assemblers assert leadership in institutionalized regional organizations and maintain cooperation with neighboring states through long term mutual consultation (Cho, 2012). As a result, the relationship between a middle power Assembler and its neighboring states is based on trust, without force, veto power or intervention towards neighboring states' domestic affairs (Hurrell & Cooper, 2000). Furthermore, middle power Assemblers participate in multilateral forums such as the UN and G20 to represent regional interests on behalf of their neighboring states (Lee, 2014 & Guzzini, 2013).

Brazil, India, Indonesia, Mexico, South Africa, and Turkey are examples of middle power Assemblers. All middle power Assemblers demonstrate leadership in regional institutions, such as Brazil in Mercosur, India in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), Indonesia in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), Mexico in the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), South Africa in the African Union (AU) and Turkey in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) (Cooper, 2015). Middle power Assemblers also collaborate in middle power groupings such as Brazil, India, and South Africa in IBSA and BRICS, whereas Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey are involved in MIKTA.

Finally, according to Constructivism, Advocators are middle powers with soft power capability (Hidayatullah, 2017). Advocators usually build coalitions with other middle powers beyond their region to accomplish mutual goals in multilateral forums (Lee, 2015). Coalitions between middle power Advocators are *ad hoc* and short term, based on specific low political issues (Scott, 2013). The role of an Advocator is to assist coalition member states to conduct policies and collaborative action based on the forum's agreed decisions in responding to specific international issues (Nye, 2008). Therefore, Advocators need to frequently renew their coalition with other

middle powers through agreements and protocols in accordance with current international issues (Bezglasnyy, 2013).

Australia, Canada, and South Korea are examples of middle power Advocators. Middle power Advocators promote their role through image branding foreign policies, such as Australia's 'Creative Diplomacy', Canada's 'Niche Diplomacy' and South Korea's 'Global Korea' policies (Lee, 2014). Canada, Australia, and South Korea have also been active in promoting low political issues such as democracy, free trade, and sustainable development. Furthermore, Australia and South Korea have participated in MIKTA to promote collaborative policies on counterterrorism, human rights promotion, gender equality, and climate change (Kim, Haug & Rimmer, 2018).

This research utilizes indicators of middle power roles based on their resources according to Neo-Liberalist (diplomatic behavior) and Constructivist (soft power) perspectives to examine MIKTA member states' health diplomacy roles during Covid-19 pandemic in domestic, regional, and multilateral affairs. Indicators of middle power roles used on this research include diplomatic behavior indicators (trust, long term mutual consultation, institutionalized cooperation, no veto, lack of force, and non-interference) and soft power indicators (issue-based coalition, *ad hoc*, beyond regional diplomacy, short term influence, needs to be frequently renewed through agreements and protocols). Contrarily, this research does not use indicators of middle power roles based on hard power (fear, able to enforce policy, lack of trust, smaller powers dependent on middle power), because they do not represent MIKTA member states' foreign policy behavior in regional and multilateral affairs.

Health Diplomacy

Health is a primary concern for every nation, as every state requires a healthy population to develop its economy productively (Kickbusch & Erk, 2009). When the World Health Organization (WHO) declared Covid-19 a pandemic on 11 March 2020, states struggled to revive their economy as lockdowns disrupted the global supply chain (WHO, 2020). The interdependent nature of global health requires states to collaborate national health policies with foreign policy and diplomacy (Kickbusch & Erk, 2009). Therefore, to attain global health, states need to implement strategic domestic health policies as well as cooperate internationally to curb the spread of diseases (Chattu & Chami, 2020).

The term 'Health Diplomacy' or 'Global Health Diplomacy' refers to formal negotiations, partnerships, and interactions between state and non-state actors in the issue of global health (Katz, 2011). Health diplomacy can further be classified into core, multi-stakeholder, and informal diplomacy. First, Core Diplomacy refers to formal bilateral and multilateral negotiations between states producing treaties and

agreements, for example in the World Health Assembly and health assistance agreement between donor and receiving states (Chattu, 2014 & Katz, 2011). Secondly, Multi-Stakeholder Diplomacy is partnership between states, non-states and multilateral actors negotiating health issues, for instance USAID, NGOs, WHO, etc. (Chattu, 2014 & Katz, 2011). Finally, Informal Diplomacy involves officials and semi-official representatives in public health, such as government officials, private funders, aid donors and recipients, NGOs, etc. (Chattu, 2014 & Katz, 2011).

This research focuses on multi-stakeholder diplomacy, i.e., MIKTA member states' regional and multilateral cooperation on health diplomacy, as well as collaboration with non-state entities such as the WHO and COVAX. Throughout Covid-19 pandemic, states play a primary role in policymaking and health diplomacy, starting from enforcing lockdowns, distributing humanitarian aid and medical kits to other countries, lobbying for vaccines, as well as approving emergency use of test kits. Additionally, MIKTA member states support global health diplomacy efforts by collaborating with non-state entities such as the WHO, COVAX and aid donors. Thus, this research examines to what extent MIKTA member states' health diplomacy during Covid-19 pandemic have implemented the indicators of middle power roles (diplomatic behavior and soft power) in the context of multi-stakeholder diplomacy.

G7 and BRICS Member States' Health Diplomacy during Covid-19 Pandemic

Before examining MIKTA's role in health diplomacy, we need to understand previous health diplomacy efforts done by G7 and BRICS member states during Covid-19 pandemic to distinguish it with MIKTA's role. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic, countries around the world need assistance as they face limited availability of healthcare equipment and medical workers (Gauttam, Singh & Kaur, 2020). Both the United States (US) as a member of the G7 and China as a member of BRICS have not successfully established global leadership in dealing with Covid-19 pandemic (Grenville & Leng in Bland, 2020). In response, other actors besides the WHO, G7, BRICS and the EU are involved in health diplomacy, such as MIKTA (Chattu & Chami, 2020).

Before the Covid-19 pandemic, the G7 had been known for various health diplomacy efforts for instance organizing the International AIDS Conference held by the Group of Eight (G8) and signing the Oslo Declaration on elaborating global health issues with foreign policy (Chattu, 2014). However, G7 member states such as the US and UK did not prepare earlier in responding to the Covid-19 outbreak, which resulted in rising Covid-19 infections locally (Lee & Kim, 2020). The US and EU have also been criticized for not providing humanitarian aid to developing countries earlier, which triggered USAID to provide US$274 million through the UNHCR to help 64 developing countries during the pandemic (Gauttam, Singh & Kaur, 2020).

Conversely, BRICS' international agenda has primarily been about reforming the international economic and political system, which is currently dominated by G7 member states. Hence, the G7's absence of global leadership on health diplomacy during Covid-19 pandemic has provided an opportunity for BRICS member states to attain a major role in health diplomacy. Among BRICS middle powers, China is probably the most influential member state, providing two-thirds of funding for the group (Islam, 2019).

As a middle power Enforcer, China joins the race with G7 member states in manufacturing and distributing the most effective Covid-19 vaccines as health diplomacy (Rudolf, 2021). Developing countries in Latin America, Southeast Asia and the Arab world currently depend on vaccines produced by five Chinese manufacturers (Rudolf, 2021), indicating how smaller powers rely on a middle power Enforcer (Hidayatullah, 2017). Besides that, China has also provided medical and financial assistance to European states such as Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Italy, Hungary, Serbia, and Spain (Gauttam, Singh & Kaur, 2020). Conclusively, China's health diplomacy as a middle power Enforcer currently competes with G-7 member states in providing medical and economic aid for countries around the world during Covid-19 pandemic.

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

Unlike G7 member states which seek to maintain the current international leadership and BRICS member states which strive to reform the international order dominated by the G7, MIKTA member states collaborate to support mutual causes in the current international system through flexible policies in domestic, regional, and multilateral affairs (Kim, Haug & Rimmer, 2018). In terms of health diplomacy, middle power Advocators Australia and South Korea shared medical kits and promoted effective domestic Covid-19 containment policy as an example for other states to implement. On the other hand, middle power Assemblers Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey provided aid and lobbied various international entities to ensure neighboring countries in their regions receive humanitarian and financial assistance during the pandemic. Together, MIKTA member states extend the scope of health diplomacy beyond regional affairs through multilateral platforms such as the UN and G-20, while representing regional interest for international assistance by supporting COVAX.

MIKTA Member States' Domestic Health Diplomacy during Covid-19 Pandemic

Middle powers' domestic health policies are considered as health diplomacy when they directly or indirectly bring significant impact towards other countries' policies. For example, in multi-stakeholder diplomacy, it's important for states to

conduct policies by collaborating with other states and non-state entities, to contribute towards global health diplomacy (Chattu, 2014 & Katz, 2011). Moreover, during the Covid-19 pandemic era states cannot solely rely on domestic policies to curb infection rates and recover from economic recession (Oliver, in Bland, 2020).

Among MIKTA member states, Indonesia, Mexico, and Turkey have not been able to practice health diplomacy through domestic policies during the pandemic. Indonesia had experienced one of the worst cases of Covid-19 outbreak in Asia, with limited funding to alleviate economic recession and unemployment (Rajah in Bland, 2020). In addition, Mexico had one of the highest Covid-19 death rates among MIKTA member states, while Turkey became the second most affected state in the Western region (WHO, 2021). Fortunately, Australia and South Korea have demonstrated exemplary domestic Covid-19 containment policies and assisted other states in carrying out similar policies.

Firstly, Australia has implemented an effective containment policy during early stages of the Covid-19 outbreak, which slowed down the virus's spread of infections (Grenville & Leng in Bland, 2020). This containment policy involved travel protocols, trade facilitation, supporting Covid-19 vaccines development and maintaining plentiful supply of medical equipment for emergency use (Bland, 2020). As a result, Australia is capable of handling both the health and economic impact of the pandemic's first wave within its national borders (Dayant & McLeod in Bland, 2020).

On the other hand, South Korea had also implemented exemplary domestic regulations in containing the spread of Covid-19 transmission (Lee & Kim, 2020). During the early Covid-19 outbreak, South Korea received a sample of the virus from the Chinese government, which gives researchers the opportunity to produce test kits capable of detecting the virus (Jeong, 2020). When Covid-19 infections occurred in South Korea, the government was already prepared to conduct free massive testing, contact tracing, and quarantining serious cases without enforcing lockdowns or travel bans (Lee & Kim, 2020). Additionally, the government had also closed places of mass gathering and moved educational activities online (Jeong, 2020).

After successfully implementing domestic regulations to contain the pandemic, Australia provided policy recommendations to help other states facing similar health and economic consequences related to the pandemic (Pryke in Bland, 2020). South Korea's successful experience in domestic Covid-19 regulations have also benefited other countries during the pandemic. Other states have also adopted similar policies to South Korea, such as walk through and drive through testing, Covid-19 awareness campaign in mass media and publishing daily updates related to Covid-19 cases through social media (Lee & Kim, 2020).

MIKTA Member States' Regional Health Diplomacy during Covid-19 Pandemic

Middle power Assembler's role in regional affairs is characterized by long term mutual consultations based on trust, institutionalized cooperation, and lack of force, veto, or interference towards other countries' domestic affairs (Hidayatullah, 2017). In the context of multi-stakeholder diplomacy, MIKTA member states' regional health diplomacy during Covid-19 pandemic include enhancing mutual consultations with other countries based on trust; utilizing established regional organizations for collaborative action; and providing aid to other countries without intervening towards their domestic affairs. All MIKTA member states have successfully conducted regional health diplomacy during the pandemic.

First, Australia enhanced mutual consultation by initiating the Indo-Pacific Center for Health Security partnership which provided credible information, research laboratory, and national coordination to strengthen governments' capacities and facilities in preventing, detecting, and responding towards public health problems. Besides that, Australia worked together with a regional organization under the ASEAN-Australia Health Security Program, which allocated funding for research and improving health systems among communities and the environment between Australia and Southeast Asian states (Australian Government, 2020). Additionally, to mitigate the economic downturn due to the pandemic, Australia had provided aid to its seventeen out of twenty closest neighboring states without intervening their domestic policies (Pryke in Bland, 2020).

Secondly, Indonesia has reached an agreement with other Southeast Asian states to help one another during the pandemic through collaborative policies, as stated during the ASEAN Summit on 14 April 2020 (Australian Government, 2020). On the regional level, Indonesia worked together with Australia on the ASEAN-Australia Health Security Program to reinforce regional health engagement (Australian Government, 2020). Furthermore, Indonesia helped other countries facing various problems during the pandemic by sending 38 military personnel to help tackle Australia's bushfires in New South Wales, provided humanitarian aid to Fiji affected by typhoon Harold, and assisted Covid-19 treatment for communities in the Central African Republic, Congo, and Lebanon through Indonesian peacekeepers (Sari, 2020). Indonesia had also facilitated medical supplies delivery from China through the Ministry of Defense and Indonesian military's humanitarian aid operation (Sari, 2020). Those medical assistance from China have also benefited ASEAN member states in general (Gauttam, Singh & Kaur, 2020).

Thirdly, Mexico is known as a regional leader of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (Cooper, 2015). Mexico represented CELAC in the UN Security Council on 17 February 2021 to criticize the unfair distribution of vaccines to third world states, especially when Western states prioritize their region on vaccine distribution. Mexico had also lobbied the G-20 to make sure

developing states are not restricted to Covid-19 vaccines access. Consequently, Mexico supported WHO's Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access initiative (COVAX) project to produce 250 million doses of vaccines in 2021, which will run clinical trials in Argentina, then packed and distributed in Mexico to other Latin American countries (Valderrama, 2021).

Next, the South Korean government has instructed 30 firms to produce masks and test kits. Medical equipment produced by Korean firms will not only be enough for domestic needs, but also to be exported to other countries including the US (Lee & Kim, 2020). This policy provides medical supplies for other countries to help them implement various Covid-19 containment measures, which had been successfully practiced previously in South Korea (Lee & Kim, 2020).

Finally, Turkey managed to help other states by providing Covid-19 humanitarian packages despite being one of the most severely affected country in the region. Initially, Turkish airlines helped evacuate foreign citizens from Canada, the US, UK, Germany, Italy, South Korea, Russia, Indonesia, and India from Wuhan when the first outbreak occurred (Wasilewski, 2020). Afterwards, Tukey had received 50,000 rapid detection kits and shared medical knowledge from China (Gupta & Singh, 2020). Then in March 2020, Turkey enhanced cooperation with private firms to produce test kits and breathing devices (Gungor, 2021).

Once the humanitarian packages are ready, the Turkish government distributed aid (TurAid) reaching out to 140 countries in total, including the US, UK, China, Spain, Italy, as well as Balkan and African countries (Aksoy, 2020 & Colakoglu, 2020). TurAid packages contain medicines, gloves, masks, goggles, test kits, disinfectants and ventilators (Gungor, 2021). Some countries in the Balkan and African region also received ambulances from Turkey (Colakoglu, 2020). As a result, Turkey's health diplomacy through humanitarian packages distribution has strengthened its diplomatic position among European countries, who have been criticized for their late response in helping developing countries during the pandemic (Wasilewski, 2020).

MIKTA's Multilateral Health Diplomacy during Covid-19 Pandemic

Middle power Advocator's role in multilateral affairs is characterized by *ad hoc* and issue-based coalition, beyond regional diplomacy, and having short term influence which needs to be frequently renewed through agreements and protocols (Hidayatullah, 2017). In the context of multi-stakeholder diplomacy, MIKTA member states' multilateral health diplomacy during Covid-19 pandemic include having consensus on the need to conduct health diplomacy on behalf of MIKTA, representing developing countries' interest for international assistance in the G20 and UN forums, and strengthening commitment in global health diplomacy by supporting COVAX.

First, MIKTA member states have unanimously agreed on the need to conduct health diplomacy on behalf of MIKTA, not limited to each member states' independent foreign policies. MIKTA's health diplomacy during the Covid-19 pandemic started on 10 April 2020 by launching a Joint Statement on Global Health. This joint statement emphasized MIKTA member states' commitment to strengthen communication and cooperation with major countries to join the global policy coordination in overcoming Covid-19. One of MIKTA's agenda is to keep the economy running by removing unnecessary trade barriers and facilitate the movement of people and goods for humanitarian, scientific and business purposes, while respecting each state's domestic regulations in curbing the spread of the virus (MOFA, 2020).

Furthermore, MIKTA member states have implemented their health diplomacy agenda on a national level through coordinated domestic policy making between MIKTA member states' legislative bodies. On 17 December 2020, MIKTA Speakers' Consultation invited each member state's speakers of the House of Representatives and Senates to enhance partnership on Covid-19 information sharing, vaccine distribution, economic cooperation amidst the crisis, and global health governance centered on the WHO (Da-min, 2021). Being the bridge between develop and developing states, MIKTA member states have unanimously agreed on the need to support international efforts in providing Covid-19 vaccine availability for all countries.

Secondly, when participating in multilateral forums such as the UN and G20, MIKTA member states would represent the interest of neighboring states from their respective regions. During the 17th MIKTA Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 17 July 2020, MIKTA member states decided to extend cooperation in overcoming Covid-19 through multilateral organizations such as the United Nations (Colakoglu, 2020). Interestingly on 21 September 2020, President Moon Jae-In spoke on behalf of MIKTA during the High-level Meeting to Commemorate the 75th Anniversary of the United Nations, which marks the first time MIKTA was officially represented by a head of state in the UN, no longer limited to foreign ministers' representation (United Nations, 2020). During the UN meeting, President Moon accentuated MIKTA member states' contribution in health diplomacy.

For instance, Australia adopted the resolution launching an impartial, independent, and comprehensive evaluation on the role of WHO in handling the health crisis (Lemahieu, in Bland, 2020). During a G-20 meeting, Prime Minister Scott Morrison had also emphasized the need for international support towards Pacific Island states during the pandemic (Dayant & McLeod in Bland, 2020). While the US withdrew its funding from the WHO, Australia organized a consortium of donors to fund the WHO, as well as promoting a stronger legal authority for WHO's programs related to Covid-19 response (Lemahieu, in Bland, 2020).

On the other hand, Indonesia strived to support Covid-19 vaccine availability for all countries through bilateral and multilateral lobbying. As vaccine producing states compete with one another in health diplomacy, a lot of developing states do not have sufficient resources to produce or purchase vaccines for their citizens (Wangke, 2021). As a result of Indonesia's diplomacy, the UN General Assembly has approved a resolution on Global Health and Foreign Policy: Strengthening Health System Resilience through Affordable Healthcare for All (Wangke, 2021).

Meanwhile, Mexico drafted the resolution on improving global access to medicines, vaccines, and medical equipment (Valderrama, 2021). Besides that, Turkey promoted global solidarity through humanitarian aid distribution (Colakoglu, 2020). Finally, South Korea strengthened healthcare cooperation with other middle powers as the current chair of MIKTA (United Nations, 2020).

Finally, during the 18th MIKTA Foreign Ministers' Meeting on 3 February 2021 via video conference, MIKTA member states decided to support WHO's Covid-19 Vaccines Global Access initiative (COVAX). Currently, COVAX is the only multilateral platform which attempts to provide free Covid-19 vaccine doses for developing countries (Valderrama, 2021). MIKTA supports COVAX by providing Covid-19 Tools Accelerator and COVAX facility along with other UN member states. Besides supporting COVAX, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi highlighted the need for MIKTA to promote multilateralism while strengthening cooperation in the creative digital economy to overcome economic difficulties during the pandemic (Kemlu, 2021). MIKTA's meeting ended with a concrete result of establishing MIKTA Development Cooperation Agency Network (DCAN) to support long-term development among MIKTA member states.

Conclusion

This article concludes that MIKTA member states' role in health diplomacy during the Covid-19 pandemic remain significant in domestic, regional, and multilateral affairs. Domestically, Australia and South Korea's effective Covid-19 containment policies have served as an example for other states to follow. Regionally, MIKTA member states' assistance towards neighboring states highlight their commitment towards regional leadership. Multilaterally, all MIKTA member states have unanimously agreed on the need to support Covid-19 vaccine availability for all countries.

Unlike the G7 and BRICS member states' competitive health diplomacy, MIKTA implements collaborative health diplomacy which supports international actors' efforts on the same cause (Kim, Haug & Rimmer, 2018). MIKTA member states have both the political will to collaborate, and the resources required to support global governance by establishing common grounds among middle powers,

connecting regional organizations, representing neighboring states' interests, information sharing, applying agreed principles and guidelines, while implementing policies based on best practices (MIKTA, 2015).

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