

## **COALITION CHOICE AND ELITE PERSONALISATION IN *PARTAI AMANAT NASIONAL* (NATIONAL MANDATE PARTY) FACTIONALISM 2020**

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### **ABSTRACT**

This paper seeks to analyze the causes of factionalism within PAN in 2020. The findings show that a combination of two factors caused factionalism. First, the policy regarding coalition choice after the 2019 presidential election and elite personalization within the party. We interviewed several DPP PAN (PAN's Central Executive Board) officials and collected documents from the media, previous research, and the party's internal document to obtain the data. PAN's coalition choice was divided into three key factors. First, pragmatism to maximize power (office-seeking) instrumentally by influencing the government's policy. Second, the ideological factor related to party elites' effort to return PAN to a centrist party based on the 2019 election results evaluation where PAN's proximity to Islamic conservatives failed to boost votes. Third, there is regime intervention through legal criminalization threats to several PAN cadres. The personalization of Amien Rais exacerbated this coalition choice in PAN. Amien's influence can bring PAN tendency to be Jokowi's opposition even though it is not a formal party decision. PAN's coalition choice policy led to divisions due to Amien Rais' camp support to the Mulfachri Harahap candidacy in Congress.

**Keywords:** factionalism, PAN, coalition choice, elite personalization

### **INTRODUCTION**

This paper will explain the impact of the choice of government coalition after the presidential election on intra-party factionalism. This finding is interesting because the choice of coalition often brings friction within the party; hence it can not be separated from the efforts to gain political parties in the circle of power. This argument will be elaborated with the personalization factor of the elite within the party, which gave rise to intra-party groups. Since the reformation era, several parties in Indonesia became victims of intra-party factionalism, which led to divisions of the party (Fiona and Tomsa, 2017). Several cases of internal party factionalism were caused by various things, such as ideological differences, social and cultural differences, and personal leadership struggles. While on external factors, factionalism can occur due to the electoral system, political system, to regime pressure. After the fall of the New Order,

factionalism in Indonesia was caused mainly by the interests of the party elites. It was based on pragmatism—power struggles in the General Chairman succession—and elite pragmatism through coalition support in the presidential election. Even the competition between these elites led to an internal conflict that led to divisions (Budiatri et al., 2018).

The National Mandate Party (Partai Amanat Nasional/PAN), which was established at the beginning of the reformation, was not an exception to the phenomenon of factionalism. At the beginning of PAN formation, the party experienced internal ideological debates regarding the proposal on the party platform. It gave rise to two opposing camps, the Islamist faction led by A.M. Fatwa, which led PAN towards a platform of faith and piety, with Islamist tendency. Meanwhile, the pluralist camp led by Faisal Basri, Toeti Heraty, Arif Arryman, Bara Hasibuan wants an inclusive and open party platform. This feud ended with 16 key figures from the PAN pluralist faction after the 2000 Congress. PAN internal disputes continued in 2006, and PAN experienced a split after PAN support group from the Muhammadiyah Youth Group (Angkatan Muda Muhammadiyah/AMM) were disappointed with the party and eventually founded the National Sun Party (Partai Matahari Bangsa/PMB) (Arya, 2006).

Factionalism also occurred under the leadership of Soetrisno Bachir related to the coalition choice in the 2009 presidential election. This split began with Amien Rais' stance, where he wanted PAN to support Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) by building a bargaining position as a vice-presidential candidate. In contrast, Soetrisno Bachir himself wanted to provide support to Prabowo Subianto in the 2009 presidential election (Nainggolan and Wahyu, 2016). Periodically, the factor of coalition choice during the presidential election also led to the PAN factionalism in 2014 and 2019, although it did not result in significant party division. A small group within the party supported Jokowi in the 2014 and 2019 elections against the party's institutional decision.

The party's factionalism occurred again in 2020 after the 5th Party Congress. It was due to opposing views between the Amien Rais and Zulkifli Hasan camps regarding the coalition choice after the 2019 presidential election. Amien Rais wanted PAN to oppose the Jokowi government in the second period, while Zulkifli Hasan and several other DPP PAN officials wished PAN to join the government coalition. The conflict between the two camps led to divisions with the departure of the Amien Rais camp after the support for Mulfachri Harahap during the Congress was defeated by Zulkifli Hasan. The case of factionalism proves that Amien Rais is a critical factor in party division. This finding expands Bima Arya's study in 2006, which wrote that Amien Rais has always been a middle ground for the emergence of PAN internal disputes, and his character plays a significant role in creating stability within the party.

Year	Factions	Background of factionalism	Tendencies
1998-2001	Pluralists vs Islamists	The debate over the direction of the faith and piety party platform vs open and inclusive	Ideological
2004-2006	Muhammadiyah vs Entrepreneurs	The discontent of the Muhammadiyah faction in the party due to the distribution of power	Elite pragmatism
2009	Soetrisno Bachir vs Amien Rais	Coalition support for the 2009 presidential election	Coalition choice
2019-2020	Zulkifli Hasan vs Amien Rais	Coalition support for the 2019 presidential election	Coalition choice and elite personalisation

**Table 1.** History of Factionalism in PAN

*Source: Data processed by the authors through Arya (2006), Nainggolan and Wahyu (2016), Budiatri (2018).*

## THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This paper will use the factionalism theory from Francoise Boucek regarding *party specific*. Boucek argues how the party's institutional incentives (*party specific*) have implications for factionalism. The concept that we will use to explain the factionalism phenomenon in PAN is how the party policies affect the existence of internal party factions. The coalition choice indirectly affects the response from internal parties, considering that the party is a heterogeneous entity and comprises various interests. These conflicting pressures increase the risk of dissent and defection by providing opportunities for those deprived of both ideas and political rights to challenge party leaders through collective action that may involve the formation of factions (Boucek, 2012).

The choice of a government coalition can also cause internal party divisions when the policy is carried out based on mere pragmatism, especially only to maximize power (*office-seeking*). Budge and Laver argue that coalition bargaining by parties is motivated by two things. First, the strategic position of the government as in political positions that can be intrinsically rewarding for political parties. Second, the office-seeking coalition can be assessed instrumentally where political parties can influence the government's policy. Politicians who want to influence public policy feel better to do so inside the government rather than outside, since apart from providing input based on the constituent's request. The success of the policies carried out by the incumbent will gain public recognition, which can help the party's relationship with the voters and affect the increase of electoral factors. (Budge and Laver, 1986).

The coalition choice is related to the future interests of the party. Ambardi argues that the opposition's proximity to the government coalition attracts parties to

carry out rent-seeking activities to finance party operations. In other words, government positions promise material incentives where political parties can make money through several vital positions in government, both executive and legislative (Ambardi, 2008). The coalition choice is also inseparable from ideological factors. Ideology triggers a conflict between groups because of differences in the party's constituent base and political preferences. The more differences in political ideology mean the greater the potential for conflict within the party to lead to factionalism. (Imawan, 2018).

Disagreement with party policies is also related to elite personalization. An influential figure within the party can influence several cadres to reject the existing party policies. PAN itself falls into the latter category when there is a dominant elite. One other indicator is the interaction between leaders and party politicians in terms of loyalty rather than a commitment to the party's program, ideology, or organizational rules or referring to patron-client and figures that can direct party policies. Elite personalization affects the party itself, an internal division that can develop into conflict (Thiebault, 2017). The elite can form factions to organize and mobilize party cadres to gain support for political leadership. Even these elites will compete for strategic positions within the party and form or join certain factions to support their candidacy and interests (Bettcher, 2005). Power also becomes the motivating factor for competition between politicians, which we can see in the leadership succession in Party Congress (Sartori, 1976).

## METHODOLOGY

This study was done through qualitative research by explaining the phenomenon of one case and then doing an in-depth analysis to explain the theoretical aspects. This study seeks to explain the conflict process as a combination of two causes, the coalition choice and the elite personalization in the PAN organizational structures, which cause the emergence of intra-party factions. This study reveals the political process up to factionalism in PAN, why the DPP PAN officials joined the government coalition after the presidential election. This study also seeks to reveal elite personalization within the party, which will explain why Amien Rais rejected the party's policy by choosing to bring PAN as Jokowi's opposition.

To obtain the data, we interviewed and mapping out two clashed camps within PAN. First is the pro-Zulkifli Hasan camp, dominated by several DPP PAN officials. Second, the Amien Rais camp. Before conducting field research, we start by doing literature research and analysis of media discourse to map the actors that cause the emergence of PAN internal factions. The result from literature research was then used to formulate research questions to collect data through in-depth interviews.

## THE COALITION CHOICE FACTORS IN THE 2019 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION

We cannot separate the case of factionalism that hit PAN in 2020 from the party's policy of coalition choice that took place after the 2019 presidential election. Long before this friction occurred, this issue can be traced to the party stance that supported Prabowo to re-enter the 2019 presidential election on 9 August 2018. Opinions from provincial-level cadres (Dewan Perwakilan Wilayah/DPW) drives party direction regarding party coalition in the 2019 presidential election. Among 34 DPWs throughout Indonesia, 30 of them supported Prabowo to run for the 2019 presidential election. Meanwhile, the remaining 4 DPWs—Papua, NTT, South Kalimantan, and Riau Islands—supported Jokowi for re-candidacy (Interview with Ahmad Yohan, 22 March 2021).

This duality of support is due to the pragmatism to gain votes for the two opposing camps in the 2019 presidential election, the Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin and Prabowo-Sandi camps. The figures affiliated with Jokowi consistently supported Jokowi in the 2014 presidential election, such as Soetrisno Bachir, Bara Hasibuan, and several regional cadres who felt the need to support Jokowi because they were 'forced' to gain electoral advantage. Viva Yoga Mauladi confirmed that PAN duality is related to the simultaneous implementation of elections; hence PAN cadres in the regions prefer the incumbent to get the coattail effect (Interview with Viva Mauladi, 22 March 2021).

While the Prabowo-supporter camp was initially based on several PAN cadres' stances, which did not want the re-election of Jokowi, this choice of support also comes from the hope of an alternative figure besides Prabowo. However, because the Presidential Threshold rule reaches 20%, giving support to Prabowo is the last resort (Agus Mustofa, 13 March 2021). PAN departure from the government coalition also triggered its sound choice not to support Jokowi in the 2019 presidential election. This argument is based on two things. First, the PAN stance always differs with the government in two political agendas in parliament, the revision of the 2019 Election Law and the rejection of the Perppu Ormas (Law of Mass Organization) formulated by the government. Second, Amien Rais' role is also influential in directing PAN's opposition to the government. Frequently, Amien has become Jokowi's critics, both on his policies and on identity politics (Merdeka, 24 July 2017).

Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin won the 2019 presidential election with 85.607.362 votes (55.50%), while Prabowo-Sandi received 68.650.239 votes (44.50%). At the end of the 2019 presidential election, there was a discourse to build a large coalition as a middle way to overcome the election polarization. Gerindra Party, as the main supporting party for Prabowo-Sandi, joined the government coalition after Prabowo met Jokowi at MRT Jakarta on 13 July 2019 (Kompas, 13 July 2019). Gerindra's move

to the governing coalition also triggered the transfer of support for several parties and closed the possibility of a permanent coalition of the Prabowo-Sandi party. PAN itself followed Gerindra to support the government when the 2019 presidential election was over. This coalition shift is divided into three key factors. First, elite pragmatism is based on a *policy blind coalition*, which was not based on policy considerations but only to maximize power (office-seeking). Second, the ideological factor within the party, and third, regime intervention.

### **Elite Pragmatism**

Elite pragmatism is associated with the historical factor that political parties cannot be far from power. Two main things affect this, first, the wide use of resources in the circle of power. Second, a political party will be considered parties involved in policies made by the government so that they positively impact public perception. Kuskridho Ambardi believes political parties will not be far from the power sphere because the state has an essential role in the financial resources of political parties. The strategic position in the government is helpful to find rent-seeking activities carried out by political parties, which bring a broader impact on party finances. The operational pattern of political parties is not enough if they rely on member fees or the state through government assistance funds, political party funds converted per ballot basis (Ambardi, 2009).

PAN history, which has never opposed the government since the party's founding, also confirmed this. In the 1999 election, PAN got four ministerial positions in the Abdurrahman Wahid government cabinet. It resulted from a political compromise made by PAN for supporting Abdurrahman Wahid as president by making a central axis against Megawati Soekarnoputri. The position of PAN in the government coalition also remained even though Abdurrahman Wahid stepped down as president and was replaced by Megawati Soekarnoputri through MPR Special Session. After the 2004 presidential election, PAN and PKB re-entered the circle of power through SBY's invitation for a coalition, in which he won the election. PAN's position as part of the government coalition also continued in the 2009 presidential election when it supported SBY in his second period. PAN itself got three seats in the Second United Indonesia cabinet. In the 2014 presidential election, PAN supported the government in 2015 and got one ministerial position through a cabinet reshuffle mechanism (Romli, 2017).

PAN position, which cannot be far from power, was related to PAN efforts to fulfill its operational needs. Besides entrepreneurs in the party, as Bima Arya argued, such as the emergence of Hatta Rajasa, Zulkifli Hasan, Soetrisno Bachir, and Eddy Soeparno (Arya, 2006), PAN efforts to optimize party operation are also done by joining the government coalition. Eddy Soeparno, PAN Secretary-General, confirmed this by saying that PAN cannot be an opposition and will always be a part of the

government even though as a critical partner. According to him, PAN does not have DNA as an opposition. Eddy Soeparno argues, with such a large party structure to operate, it also requires excellent logistics. So it is not an exaggeration if PAN has always been part of the government. This logistics is used for the day-to-day party's operational needs and the cost of caring for constituents during the election. Eddy further argued, as an opposition, PAN would not be as strong as PDI-P and PKS because these two have a mass party character with a militant constituent. Since if a party becomes an opposition, it will have difficulty accessing the logistics needed to treat constituents and cadres in the regions (Interview with Eddy Soeparno, 29 March 2021).

Although PAN has yet to get a strategic position in the Jokowi government for the second period until the party congress is over, PAN's effort to maximize power can be seen from the party elites' pattern of behavior in obtaining instrumental benefits in the governing coalition. Ian Budge and Laver argue that office seeking coalition can be assessed instrumentally where political parties can influence a policy that the government will issue. Political parties will expect benefits such as influencing public policy. As for the impact, the party will benefit from voters' support by exploiting political positions advantage in government. Politicians who want to influence public policy feel better to do so inside the government rather than outside, since apart from providing input based on the constituent's request. The success of the policies carried out by the incumbent will gain public recognition, which can help the party's relationship with the voters and affect the increase of electoral factors. (Budge and Laver, 1986).

It can be found in the statement by a member of the People's Representative Council (DPR) Commission IX, Ahmad Yohan, who mentioned the advantage of PAN being in a government coalition is how the party can convey requests or opinions about a policy well compared to being outside of power. For example, several articles in Omnibus law were saved, such as the education cluster, so it did not include them in the DPR plenary session ratification. This request not only came from internal PAN but also came from the party's constituent, Muhammadiyah. This kind of political proximity will not happen when PAN is in opposition because it demands to be against the government (Interview with Ahmad Yohan, 5 April 2021).

### **Ideological Polarization**

The coalition shift can also be seen from the ideological factor. In the study of intra-party factionalism, ideology became the trigger of internal group conflict. In this context, ideology refers to the group's behavior and political action within the party. The visible trend is that the more differences in political ideology, the more significant conflict potential within the party, resulting in factionalism (Imawan, 2018). Eddy Soeparno emphasized that the PAN coalition shift was also due to the growing

discourse of intra-party groups who wanted to be outside the government. A senior party figure who led this stance, Amien Rais, argues that the desire to be outside the government comes from a conservative-view Muslim constituent (Interview with Eddy Soeparno, 29 March 2021).

Amien Rais' stance, which is close to Islamic conservatives, does not come from a vacuum. Amien Rais is often seen as a figure who builds the narrative of ever-increasing injustice against Muslims in the Jokowi regime. Khairul Fahmi, chief of the DPP PAN for Election Winning, said that Amien Rais' concern for Muslims was due to unfair discrimination in political, legal, and economic matters. The context of these Muslims refers to Islamic conservatives who often have different views on various policies with the Jokowi regime (Interview with Khairul Fahmi, 22 March 2021).

From a historical perspective, Amien Rais' presence in the 411 and 212 Actions to protest religious blasphemy by the then Jakarta governor, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, can be noted as his proximity with Islamic conservatives. It can be said that Amien Rais is building momentum to voice existing injustices, including legal justice, which is considered being in favor of the Jokowi regime. Furthermore, Amien Rais often builds issues of identity politics to garner support from the Muslims. It was seen in Amien Rais' statement that political messages need to be inserted into recitation forums (*pengajian*) ahead of the 2019 presidential election. Amien's closeness to Islamic conservatives can also be seen through moral support given by PA 212 when he was questioned as a witness by Polda Metro Jaya in Ratna Sarumpaet's case about the spreading of false news (hoax) (Kompas, 10 October 2018).

Amien Rais's desire to bring PAN into opposition to the Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin government was met with opposition from several DPP PAN officials. His argument to respect the decision of the Islamic conservatives constituent who opposed Jokowi-Ma'ruf Amin was considered irrelevant. Eddy Soeparno assessed that the proximity of the right-wing Muslim favored PKS over PAN and did not significantly impact electoral factors. By becoming part of the government coalition, PAN is not associated with the Islamic conservatives and returns to an open and centrist party platform because there is a concern that PAN will lose its constituent from the nationalists by becoming opposition. (Interview with Eddy Soeparno, 29 March 2021).

If we look at the election returns in the 2014 and 2019 legislative elections, there was a significant increase in PKS votes compared to PAN. As a comparison, in the 2014 legislative election, PKS received 8.480.204 votes and experienced a significant increase to 11.493.663 votes in the 2019 legislative election. This increase in votes was also comparable to the acquisition of parliamentary seats from 40 seats in 2014 to 50 seats in 2019. Meanwhile, PAN experienced votes stagnation from 9.481.621 votes in the 2014 legislative election and 9.572.623 votes in the 2019 legislative election. Although there was an increase in votes, it meant nothing because the seat conversion had decreased from 49 seats in the 2014 legislative election to 48



seats in the 2019 legislative. Indeed, this was a setback for PAN. They dismissed Amien Rais' argument about his political stance that he wanted to be outside the government to accommodate the interest of the voice of the ummah or the Islamic conservatives. The volatility of Islamic parties' votes during the reformation era showed that Islamic parties always fight over a common constituent, the 'Muslim' with a relatively similar level of competition. It means Islamic parties fight over an identical constituent (Nurhasim et al., 2016).

Party	2014		2019	
	Votes	Seats	Votes	Seats
<b>PKS</b>	8.480.204	40	11.493.663	50
<b>PAN</b>	9.481.621	49	9.572.623	48

**Table 2.** PAN and PKS Election Result in the 2014 and 2019 Legislative Elections

*Source: Data collected and processed from kpu.go.id*

PAN's effort to get closer to the Islamic conservatives did not positively impact PAN's election result; instead, it cost PAN the seats in electoral districts with nationalist voters. As an example, PAN lost the seats in electoral districts with nationalist voters. For example, PAN lost eight seats in Central Java, two seats in East Java, and one seat in Central Kalimantan and North Sulawesi. However, this strategy of getting Islamic conservatives' votes did not mean it lost its electoral advantage altogether. It was recorded that PAN's election result in electoral districts with a Muslim voter such as West Sumatra, Riau, West Java, South Borneo, Central Sulawesi, and DKI Jakarta increased by 1-2 seats in the 2019 legislative election. On the contrary, non-Muslim-dominated electoral districts contributed positively to the PAN seats, such as Papua electoral district with two seats (Interview Ahmad Yohan, 22 March 2021).

Therefore, the party's stance to return as centrist is an effort for the party's strategy in the future to maximize the votes of the nationalists, which have not been adequately handled. If PAN forces their direction to the right-wing by maximizing the ummah's voice, PAN will experience stagnation. PAN will gain an electoral advantage if it works on nationalist constituents such as East Java and Central Java because seats are relatively large compared to Islamic conservatives-dominated electoral districts, such as in several provinces in Sumatra (Aceh, Riau, West Sumatra). It can be said that this ideological debate led to a decrease in PAN votes in the 2019 legislative elections, which resulted in the emergence of elite conflict within the party (Interview with Ahmad Yohan, 22 March 2021).

Province	Seats for 2014 Legislative Election	Seats for 2019 Legislative Election	PAN Seat's Volatility
Aceh	1	1	0
North Sumatra	3	3	0
West Sumatera	1	3	+2
Riau	1	1	+1
Riau Islands	1	1	0
Jambi	1	1	0
South Sumatra	2	2	0
Bangka Belitung	0	0	0
Bengkulu	1	1	0
Lampung	2	2	0
DKI Jakarta	0	2	+2
West Java	7	8	+1
Banten	2	2	0
Central Java	8	0	-8
DI Yogyakarta	1	1	0
East Java	7	5	-2
Bali	0	0	0
West Nusa Tenggara	1	1	0
East Nusa Tenggara	1	1	0
West Kalimantan	1	1	0
Central Kalimantan	1	0	-1
South Kalimantan	0	1	+1
East Kalimantan	0	0	0
North Kalimantan	0	0	0
North Sulawesi	1	0	-1
Gorontalo	0	0	0
Central Sulawesi	0	1	+1
South Sulawesi	3	3	0
Southeast Sulawesi	1	1	0
West Sulawesi	0	0	0
Maluku	0	0	0
North Maluku	1	0	0
Papua	1	2	+1
West Papua	0	0	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>-5</b>

**Table 3.** PAN Seat in The 2014 and 2019 Legislative Elections*Source: collected and processed from kpu.go.id*

The data above also supports Bima Arya's argument that political parties with an Islamic platform cannot generate electoral power outside their primary constituent. Therefore, moving towards a centrist and open party is considered the best option for

the party's survival (Arya, 2006). From a historical point of view, it can be said that PAN has also slowly moved towards a centrist party when entrepreneurs who joined and dominated the party officials structure reduced the role of an Islamic group within the party. The impact was the disillusionment of the Muhammadiyah group, which eventually established the Matahari Bangsa Party in 2004, initiated by the Muhammadiyah Youth Group (Arya, 2006). However, the pattern that occurred in 2020 is how the PAN elite strives to return the party's fundamental purpose (*khittah*) to the centrist spectrum to become an open and moderate party. This tendency to become an open party is also known as a *catch-all party* which positions itself as a party that does not adhere to the political party's ideology, either right or left, but is in the center. This way, the party will gather as much support as possible from various circles of society without being divided into specific groups. (Hague and Harrop, 2001).

### **Regime Intervention**

One of the critical factors why PAN changed its direction in favor of the government was regime intervention. During the Jokowi government, the state's involvement in internal party intervention occurred during his 2014-2019 presidential, where the conflict between PPP and Golkar was part of the regime intervention against the party after the 2014 presidential election. Government intervenes by siding with one of the opposing sides within the party. This authority is formally vested in the Minister of Law and Human Rights, who issued decrees (SK) to party leaders the government viewed as pro-Jokowi (Mietzner, 2016).

Mietzner further divides two distinct efforts of each country's behavior toward politics. First, efforts are made subtly or called giving carrots. Carrots here means offering political resources such as cabinet seats and other strategic positions within the government. Second, using coercion, Mietzner uses the analogy of using a stick to force political opposition to join the government. This coercive effort is carried out by utilizing the government by taking sides with one policy that conflicts with the use of legal instruments as an effort to threaten political parties in opposition (Mietzner, 2016).

The regime intervention toward PAN is shown through legal instruments to provide political threats to PAN cadres. As the incumbent, Jokowi has broad access to political resources in the government; this includes the power of economic and political resources to legal means. Formally administrative power is divided into several types: remunerative power, coercive power, legitimate power, and referent power (Sitepu, 2012). Regarding the threat to regional cadres, it can be proven through Eddy Soeparno's statement that PAN's coalition shift is also based on the regional cadres' aspirations who feel that PAN should be in the government coalition. Hence, cadres in regions who fill public positions such as regional heads and leaders in DPRD

do not get political interference, e.g., caught in a legal case or criminalization because PAN was too harsh in criticizing the Jokowi government in the first period (Interview with Eddy Soeparno, 29 March 2021).

Ahmad Yohan's argument supports Eddy Soeparno's statement that different stances that are too harsh on the government will backfire against political parties, including PAN. It refers to the arrest of the South Lampung Regent, Zainuddin Hasan, the younger brother of Zulkifli Hasan, as the PAN General Chairman. This incident coincided with PAN's consistent stance in the 2017 Jakarta gubernatorial election that Basuki Tjahaja Purnama (Ahok) should be named a suspect for blasphemy (Interview with Ahmad Yohan, 22 March 2021). Even Amien Rais himself was also briefly linked to the medical device case by the defendant, former Minister of Health Siti Fadilah Supari, by receiving a stream of funds from the case. This issue is political because it relates to Amien's critical attitude towards the government by urging the Jokowi regime to process Ahok's blasphemy case; even Amien Rais became the driving force of the masses when he was present at the 212 Action (CNN, 5 June 2018).

The data shows that there is a tendency for the regime to intervene within the party through coercion. The case above is part of the alternative coercive method by utilizing legal instruments as threats against party elites to make political decisions and the involvement of law enforcement officers during Congress. It differs from the first period of the Jokowi government, which was used to strengthen the government coalition because the government coalition party structure is still a minority and can create political stabilization. What Jokowi did in the second period was more focused on shifting Amien Rais, who was considered a threat because his role was quite central as a figure who consistently criticized the government. This argument is quite logical considering that in the first period, even though PAN was in the government coalition, the political stance conveyed by Amien Rais often contradicted government policies which in the end became a 'thorn in the flesh' (Interview Agus Mustofa, 13 March 2021).

## **AMIEN RAIS PERSONALISATION WITHIN THE PARTY**

The coalition choice indirectly affects the response from internal parties, considering that the party is a heterogeneous entity and comprises various interests. We can see this in Amien Rais' response, who rejected the discourse of coalition shift after the 2019 presidential election. What Amien did was pressure from internal parties to challenge party leaders by taking collective action of resistance, which ultimately resulted in the formation of internal party factions (Boucek, 2012). Amien has done this in line with Sartori's view that political parties will experience division because of disagreement, resistance, and fights between politicians within the party. The party elite became the key to the formation of factions (Sartori, 1976).

Amien Rais, who serves as the PAN Honorary Council, criticized the government coalition's plan and consistently opposed Jokowi. This stance manifests in his criticism that PAN should not join the government coalition to get a ministerial position in the Jokowi government. Amien's accusation confirms that PAN's desire to join the government coalition is part of an effort to maximize power, hoping to get a ministerial position akin to the political stance that occurred in Jokowi's first term. Amien felt that the attempt to join the government coalition was part of the party's betrayal of its voters or constituent (Amien Rais, 5 July 2019).

The pressure to become an opposition is also related to maintaining a balance between the executive and the legislature. The PAN Deputy Secretary-General, Agus Mustofa, who is close to Amien Rais' camp, assessed that the desire to be in the opposition was part of Amien's criticism of the party elite's pragmatic stance under the pretext of Pancasila democracy which ruled out any opposition (Interview with Agus Mustofa, 13 March 2021). Since Jokowi government coalition's map in the second period shows the dominance of the government coalition over the opposition. PAN's support for the government coalition has further strengthened the government's position with 471 seats (82%) compared to the total opposition seats, which were only 104 seats (18%). Borrowing Esti Ekawati's term (2019), the coalition with many parties is known as the *koalisi turah* (overflowed coalition), which affected the lack of government control over the legislature as all political decisions in parliament will be dominated by the government coalition party; and the lack of checks and balances because the opposition control will have collided with the minimum number of seats in parliament (Esti, 2019).

In the historical context, Amien Rais' personalization in PAN is related to the historical factor of his role as the party founder. Even further, Amien can carry out his role as a vote-getter to direct party policies even though he did not hold a structural position within the party (Fiona, 2016). The visible role of Amien is determining the election of the PAN General Chairman such as Soetrisno Bachir for the 2005 Congress, Hatta Rajasa at the 2010 Congress, and Zulkifli Hasan at the 2015 Congress. This role can be seen through the party's unwritten policy that requires the General Chairman to serve only one term under the pretext of party regeneration. This, of course, strengthens Amien's influence by giving his blessing to a non-incumbent General Chairman candidate (Budiatri et al., 2018).

During Zulkifli Hasan's leadership, Amien Rais' dominance in the party was intense. This personalization attitude is divided into two most important things: encouragement to oppose the Jokowi government and support for Mulfachri Harahap in the 2020 Congress. The drive for PAN's opposition to the Jokowi government can be seen from Amien's consistent stance in criticizing the Jokowi government with various narratives, including policies, identity politics, and the development of democracy (Amien Rais, 2020). The criticisms conveyed by the elite are standard in

terms of politics and the state. Besides freedom of expression and speech, criticism is also intended as a check and balance in the democratic space. This attitude showed his consistency as a national figure. Looking back at history, Amien Rais is one of the figures who consistently criticizes the leadership of each regime (Interview with Eddy Soeparno, 29 March 2021). Even Amien Rais was once called a *muezzin* of reform (Amir, 2003: 132 and 144).

The criticism conveyed by Amien Rais becomes a problem when personalization is always inherent within the party. As a result, Amien's various criticisms often contradict the party's stance. Here, we can see that various criticisms conveyed by Amien Rais during the first period of Jokowi's leadership were contrary to the PAN coalition choice that supported the Jokowi government. This issue has become a stumbling block for PAN; it made the party walk and chew gum that is a government coalition partner and becoming an opposition figure (Interview with Viva Yoga Mauladi, 22 March 2021).

In line with Thiebault (2017), Amien Rais has transformed into a party elite who has the personal power to influence important decisions within the party. He can even carry out party strategies for a broader scope, such as the choice of party coalition, whether to be in the government coalition or the opposition, even though he was not in the party structure. What Amien did has expanded his informal influence. Amien's influence as a party figure could make PAN appear as Jokowi's opposition even though it was not through a formal party decision, instead of through his constant criticism of the Jokowi government. His constant criticism also led to the coalition's decision to become the opposition after the 2019 presidential election.

### **Support to Mulfachri Harahap**

Internal friction in PAN increased ahead of the 5th Party Congress in 2020. Amien Rais, who rejected PAN's plan to join the government coalition, was at odds with Zulkifli Hasan's re-candidacy as General Chairman in Congress. Amien Rais is suspected of giving his blessing to Mulfachri Harahap's candidacy. This support from Amien Rais was proven during a meeting between DPW and DPD cadres from Central Java, East Java, and Yogyakarta and was attended by Mulfachri Harahap. The meeting was initiated by Amien Rais, which was held in Yogyakarta. (Freedom People, 2019).

Amien Rais' stance to support Mulfachri Harahap is part of his refusal of the party's decision to join the government coalition. Amien Rais, in his political speech with DPW and DPD PAN officials on 30 November 2019 at his residence, said that PAN during Zulkifli Hasan's leadership began to leave the social base and merely oriented to a momentary pragmatism by discussing coalitions with the ruler. Amien's statement shows that pragmatism took the form of PAN's coalition shift by joining the government coalition after the 2019 presidential election to distance the party from its constituent (Amien Rais, 30 November 2019). Amien's efforts to strengthen his

legitimacy in the party were also seen in the nomination of Hanafi Rais as Secretary-General. The duet earned the nickname 'Mewujudkan Harapan' (Realizing Hope), abbreviated as MH, taken from the first name of Mulfachri-Hanafi. (Tempo, 15 January 2020).

Amien's involvement in internal party contestation aligns with Bettcher (2005) that the elite can form factions used to organize and mobilize political party cadres to gain support for political leadership. Even these elites will compete for strategic positions within the party and form or join certain factions to support their candidacy and interest (Bettcher 2001:63). The competition between politicians is also motivated by power-seeking through leadership succession, such as the Party Congress (Sartori, 1976). Amien's interests were built through the agenda of Congress, hoping Amien's camp won the contest for the PAN General Chairman and was expected to control the party organization structure; thus, it could change the direction of party policy, as the opposition to Jokowi.

The Congress itself resulted in Zulkifli Hasan's victory with 331 votes, while Mulfachri Harahap got 225 votes, Drajad Wibowo with only six votes, and three invalid votes (Kompas, 11 February 2020). The result also broke PAN's tradition that the General Chairman's leadership only lasts for one period and breaks the notion that Amien Rais' blessing in the party plays a vital role in winning the General Chairman election. This victory also strengthened PAN's plan to join the government coalition and dashed Amien Rais' hope of directing the party's policy to become an opposition to Jokowi.

The defeat of the Amien Rais camp in the PAN General Chairman election in the 5th Congress became the peak of friction between the Zulkifli Hasan and Amien Rais camps. As a result of Zulkifli Hasan's victory, Amien Rais was absent in the 2020-2025 PAN organization structure. It is in line with Sartori's view that party cohesiveness will affect cutting cadres who are not in line with party leaders. Amien Rais and his loyalists responded by establishing a new Ummah Party (Partai Ummat) on 1 October 2020 and declared it on 29 April 2021. Amien, as political patronage, was also supported by his loyalists such as Chandra Tirta Wijaya, Putra Jaya Husin, Muhammad Asri Anas, and Agung Mozin. (Antara, 29 April 2021).

## CONCLUSION

PAN factionalism in the 5th Congress in 2020 was not a single event that caused division within the party. Internal frictions have occurred and are related to the political agenda of the 2019 presidential election. The split of support in the 2019 presidential election proves that elite pragmatism within PAN is quite strong. The group that supports Jokowi is driven by several PAN cadres who are consistently part of Jokowi's supporters in the 2014 presidential election and several regional cadres

hoping to get a coattail effect to support the incumbent Jokowi, expected to boost votes during the legislative election.

Factionalism encounters its peak after the 2019 presidential election due to the party's decision to join the second term of the Jokowi government. Three key factors cause the decision of the coalition. *First*, elite pragmatism to maximize power (office seeking) within the Jokowi government. By joining the government coalition, PAN can give policy input to the government. Furthermore, this factor is based on a historical tradition where PAN has never been outside of power. This problem also led to financial benefits that the party could use to carry out logistics. *Second*, the ideological factor in returning the PAN party platform to centrist due to Amien Rais' effort to build proximity with the Islamic conservatives is considered electorally detrimental. The decline in DPR seats on nationalist votes such as East Java and Central Java is evidence that PAN is being abandoned by its nationalist constituent and is not benefiting from the Islamic conservatives, which positively impacts PKS. *Third*, the regime intervention factor can be seen in legal instruments to provide political threats to several PAN cadres. This effort can be seen from the suggestions of several regional cadres who do not want to be politically troubled through criminalization threats and PAN's elite conflict of interest tendency due to legal cases involving them; hence the coalition choice can be seen as an effort to secure the elite position in the party.

The phenomenon of robust personalization in PAN is suspected to be the seed for forming the camps within the party. Amien Rais as the principal actor in PAN still has a powerful influence on PAN various policies. His critical stance of the Jokowi government, the invitation to form a coalition with Prabowo-Sandi, to wanting PAN to become the opposition are forms of Amien's influence on party policies. The peak was during the contestation for the PAN General Chairman candidacy during the 5th Congress 2020, where Amien Rais' support for Mulfachri Harahap strengthened his influence within the party. Since apart from being able to direct party policies regarding coalitions, Amien also wants to strengthen his influence by making Hanafi the PAN Secretary-General. This factionalism shows a significant anomaly throughout the establishment of PAN, that is, the role of Amien Rais, which faded related to the defeat of Mulfachri Harahap in the 2020 Congress. Throughout the history of PAN establishment, Amien Rais' has a significant role in the election of Soetrisno Bachir, Hatta Rajasa, to Zulkifli Hasan as chairman because Amien Rais' blessing actualizes through an unwritten rule: one period of leadership is enough for each PAN General Chairman to create cadres' regeneration. \*

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