

Uyghur Diaspora in Indonesia: from Nationalism to Terrorism

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Abstract

Uyghurs, especially ethnic Turkestan originating from northwest China in Xinjiang province, have become a real part of jihad terror groups that are globally active. Uyghur jihadists first spread to various parts of the world when the United States and its allies attacked Afghanistan in 2001. While continuing their cooperation with the Taliban under the banner of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Uyghur jihadists have now spread to Southeast Asia and the Middle East. ETIM members are part of the Turkestan Islamic Party fighting with the Al-Qaeda umbrella group in Syria, but other Uyghurs have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and others have joined local terror groups in Indonesia. However, Uyghurs are currently under-examined as active participants in jihadist organizations. Their struggle against the Chinese Government or narrowly describes certain groups where Uyghurs have become participants. This paper explores the scope and scale of activities of foreign Uyghur fighters in various locations, their implications and how their participation in global jihad groups can develop in such a way.

Suku Uighur, khususnya suku Turkestan yang berasal dari barat laut Tiongkok di provinsi Xinjiang, telah menjadi bagian nyata dari kelompok teror jihad yang aktif secara global. Para jihadis Uighur pertama kali menyebar ke berbagai belahan dunia ketika Amerika Serikat dan sekutunya menyerang Afghanistan pada tahun 2001. Sambil melanjutkan kerja sama mereka dengan Taliban di bawah panji Gerakan Islam Turkestan Timur (ETIM), para jihadis Uighur kini telah menyebar ke Asia Tenggara dan Timur Tengah. Para anggota ETIM merupakan bagian dari Partai Islam Turkestan yang berperang dengan kelompok induk Al-Qaeda di Suriah, tetapi suku Uighur lainnya telah bergabung dengan ISIS di Suriah dan Irak, dan yang lainnya telah bergabung dengan kelompok teror lokal di Indonesia. Namun, suku Uighur saat ini kurang diteliti sebagai peserta aktif dalam organisasi jihad. Perjuangan mereka melawan Pemerintah Tiongkok atau secara sempit menggambarkan kelompok-kelompok tertentu di mana suku Uyghur telah menjadi peserta. Makalah ini mengeksplorasi ruang lingkup dan skala kegiatan pejuang Uighur asing di berbagai lokasi, implikasinya dan bagaimana partisipasi mereka dalam kelompok jihad global dapat berkembang sedemikian rupa.

Keywords: Uyghur, China, Indonesia, Diaspora, Terrorism

Introduction

Lately, the international world has begun to pay attention to the fate of ethnic Uyghurs, Xinjiang, China who are predominantly Muslim. The reason is the repressive and coercive attitude of the Chinese communist government that arrested around 1 million Muslims and included them for re-education into special camps that looked more like prisons. Uyghur Muslims in China are reportedly forced to give up their Muslim beliefs and identities by the Chinese government¹.

Re-education camps, mosque monitoring, extensive security inspection networks – these are just a few of the features of a Chinese-developed surveillance system to monitor Uyghur Muslims. Uyghur Muslims face the problem of Sinicization (noun): It is the process where traditionally non-Chinese societies are placed under the influence of the Han Chinese (the dominant ethnicity of China) in order to adapt the latter's culture, customs, and way of life.²

China's oppression of the Uyghur ethnic group has intensified after the events of September 11, 2001 following the emergence of a policy of 'war on terror' led by the United States. With the US 'war on terror' policy, China benefited and exploited it to be more massive and far in repressing and eliminating local residents in Xinjiang by accusing the Uyghur nationalist movement as a terrorist group. The US terror war since September 11, 2001 has given legitimacy and political reasons as well as benefiting the PRC, because it has caused a reduction in international attention to the humanitarian persecution by the Chinese government.³

Since the 1990s, China has responded to the growth of the Uyghur rebellion with intense oppression. The arrest of moderate Uyghurs such as Ibrahim Tohti, "Hanization" of the city of Xinjiang and the systematic suppression of the Muslim community and the tangible manifestations of their faith have led to a steady exodus of Uyghurs from China to Turkey through Southeast Asia. This is a crisis caused by the mistakes of China's own policies.⁴

Between 1990 and 2010, the Chinese government gradually changed the national identity and practices of Uyghur Islam to become a national security threat, that is, weakening / securing them. men to shave their beards. China has banned women from using headscarves or veils, collecting DNA samples in bulk, taking passports and preventing Uyghur Muslim children from receiving religious education.⁵

The crackdown in Xinjiang increased in 2013 and 2014, with around 700 people killed in violence. In Xinjiang in 2014, there were a total of 27,164 arrests, an increase of 95 percent from 2013. In 2014, the Chinese court sentenced 712 people to charges of separatism, terrorism and related allegations. In 2015, that number jumped to 1,419. Almost all convicts are Uyghurs.⁶ While most terrorist attacks were carried out in Xinjiang, militant Muslims were able to detonate car bombs at Tiananmen Square in 2009. That was a wave of attacks in places where attackers using knives in Kunming killed 29 people and injured 143 others in a crowded train station - which sparked outrage on Chinese social media and forced the government to intensify their repressive measures and pressures.

The exodus of Uyghur refugees and migrants turned into a steady stream of human flow. In April 2014, Thailand arrested 16 of them. That month, 16 other Uyghurs tried to cross into Vietnam. After being detained, they attacked the Vietnamese police, which resulted in a shootout. In December 2014, Vietnam returned 43 more Uyghurs to China.⁷ In 2014, there was increasing evidence of a well-organized human trafficking network. Thai police rescued around 200 Uyghurs from a human smuggling ring in southern Thailand. In 2014, Thailand detained 350 Uyghurs. In October 2014, Malaysian

authorities arrested 155 Uyghurs, 44 of them children, who were found jostling in two apartments in Kuala Lumpur. Many Uyghurs carry Turkish passports, which are suspected of being fake. ⁸

In 2001-2002, around 3,000 Uyghurs were reported to have been detained. Steps to control education and publications are also taken seriously. XUAR Governor Abdulahat Abdurixit, in early 2002, had talked about public education in order to improve their ideology.

Until 2008, violence in Xinjiang actually "reached an unprecedented level" and the actions of separatism in Xinjiang were increasingly sophisticated and increasingly related to religion. The religious expression that characterizes the resistance actions against the Chinese government in this matter is only the form used to oppose economic injustice which is the root of the problem. But it seems that the Chinese government is turning a blind eye to the source of the problem and is now taking extreme steps that make it the international spotlight today. ⁹




Figure 1. Infrastructure in Chinese Central Asia Since The 1990s

After 9/11 and the war on terror called on by the US, China's drive to combat the 'three crimes' of terrorism, separatism and religious extremism has intensified. China has historically stated that anti-foreign actors have used Uyghurs to trigger problems in the country; However, after 9/11, this narrative was empowered and China used it to participate in the war on terror to justify their crackdown on the Uyghurs. Under the pretext of terrorism, China punishes Uyghurs by resorting to harsh tactics: first, to reduce international pressure on how China treats Uyghurs by increasing global anxiety about Islamic extremism; and, second, to mobilize public support in the country by using discourse that categorizes each call for autonomy as 'terrorism'.

The latter in turn deepens the existing divisions between the Uyghurs and Hans (and the state) and has caused terrorist attacks by each ethnic group on the other as well as riots and communal violence. The 'co-opt' strategy rewards China with some short-term dividends, because they can categorize the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) as an international terrorist outfit, but in the long run they increasingly alienate

the Uyghurs and internationalize their persecution of this community. That made frustrated Uyghurs more vulnerable to understanding Islamic fundamentalism, and instead allowed terrorist groups to use Chinese Islamophobic intrigue to radicalize the community.

Analyst Adrien Morin stressed that China used a risky strategy to defame the Uyghurs as a whole and failed to distinguish the shift of Uyghur opposition groups from political goals (greater autonomy) and cultural tolerance) towards Islamic fundamentalism.¹⁰ Meanwhile, Uyghurs see the same pattern that Beijing is doing on the Chinanization agenda in Uyghur as well as in Tibet: how China treats Tibetans and how they currently treat Uyghurs. The state wants Uyghurs to behave in certain ways. The path required by this country includes and forces how people must dress, what can and cannot be stated openly, how to worship if it is completely different, which version of history should be studied, what language should be spoken, and which TV channel must be watched and so on. Although the aim of such a hard road is ironic to unite all people as 'China', doing so is actually very embarrassing and threatens ethnic minority culture, language, religion and identity.

While China has granted autonomy to five regions, which have a non-Han majority, the ultimate goal seems to be the Sinicization of the Uyghur region and ethnicity. Clarke stressed that since 1949, China wanted to integrate Xinjiang completely with China, politically, culturally, and economically including the Xinjiang non-Han ethnic group into China's "unitary, multi-ethnic state".

Terrorist attacks and ethnic violence have increased in Xinjiang. The most tragic event was riots in the Xinjiang capital, Urumqi, in 2009, which claimed the lives of around 200 people while injuring more than 1,700. The violence was triggered by rumors circulating at the Guangdong factory, which found no evidence, that two Han women were raped by six Uyghur men, which caused Han's workers to kill two of their Uyghur colleagues. The Uyghur community blamed the authorities for not arresting Hans who was responsible for the attack or protecting the workers killed. This caused a domino effect and in the riots in Urumqi, angry Uyghur communities protested and killed several Han people. Two days later, the police were deployed and now Han hordes armed with hammers and axes targeted and attacked the Uyghurs.

Immediately after the riots, hundreds or even thousands of Uyghurs disappeared or were eliminated through Chinese security agents and have not been seen since. Other terrorist acts included the 2010 Aksu bombing in which a Uyghur man detonated explosives which killed 7 and also a 2011 Kashgar attack in which two Uyghurs hijacked a truck, killed the driver, and drove to pedestrians after which they stabbed 6 people to death. This is the lifting of the Uyghur's state rights which not only turned Xinjiang into an ethnic divisive region symbolized by communal violence, but also placed the Uyghur's identity in an existential crisis in such a way that some of them had been hijacked by fundamentalism.

China has responded to the violence by further supporting their security forces in Xinjiang, especially in Urumqi, which has become a police state. Urumqi is loaded with "Practical Police Stations" which are equipped with face recognition cameras that are guarded every 200 meters. Dissent said that the city has become a "police laboratory" where the minority of Muslims are considered test subjects in their Islamophobic experiments.¹¹ Cameras are everywhere and mainly focus on mosques. Checkpoints have been upgraded and metal detectors are present at the entrances to all shopping centers, residential areas, etc., while the number of police has increased sharply in recent years. The state has even used urban renewal projects in the city which have caused the destruction of lower-class areas that hold many Uyghurs.

Because of this, many Uyghurs had to leave the city or resettle elsewhere because of such activities. Currently invasive security systems also exist in cities that identify residents as "safe", "normal", or "unsafe" based on determinants such as religion, age, and foreign contacts, etc. - Uyghur Muslims are most vulnerable to this system. Mosques are constantly monitored and security personnel make Muslims pass face scanning technology before entering the mosque. Furthermore, mosque architecture is also being tarnished, such as by banning domes and other aspects of Islamic architecture, so - they must now realize Chinese characteristics. Billions of dollars have been spent on Xinjiang securitization, which includes the establishment of detention centers / internment camps (what China calls a vocational center). In these centers, Uyghur Muslims were identified as dangerous groups, then were given lessons and classes on Chinese history, language and culture.¹²

In discussions with the BBC, former Uyghur prisoners stated that they were made to sing songs from the Communist Party and if they refused they would suffer beatings. According to Gay McDougall, a member of the United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the United Nations has received this credible report and that China has even opposed the use of Islamic words. Words like "God willing," "Asalam-u-Alaikum", and others have been banned, and have certain Islamic names for babies. Then there are government-run initiatives such as Islamophobia "Project Beauty", which began in 2011, encouraging Muslim women not to wear headscarves, but to show off their beauty to the world by decorating themselves with modern and more Han-centric fashions. The government also describes daily religious activities as "extremist" and has stated they violate the law - this includes if they want to eat and / or sell halal food, use Islamic greetings, refuse to marry Han Chinese, and so on. The use of headscarves, veils or guarding beards is still branded by the government as a violation of the law, as well as if they refuse to watch state television.

Perhaps the most despicable act carried out by the Chinese is to determine the version of the Qur'an approved by the state. The Scriptures have also been confiscated from many Uyghurs. Friday's sermons were supervised by the state and pro-Chinese narratives were attached to them. In 2017, Muslims are forced to sing the national anthem under the Chinese flag before the Eid prayer at the Yanghang Mosque. Such practices have become so routine that people have stopped attending prayer services altogether - surely for the pleasure of an atheistic Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Regarding the political penetration of Uyghurs in the Xinjiang CCP, the ethnic group remains a political minority. This may be due to the fact that religion must be abandoned before joining the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Meanwhile in the country (Xinjiang), the Chinese government has implemented a 'stick and carrot' policy. Violent actions, including the immediate establishment of the Lima Group in Shanghai. Between 1997 and 1999, nearly 200 death sentences were established in Xinjiang.¹³ The victims are mostly Uyghurs and many without fair trial. The death penalty in Xinjiang is the highest in China. Even when there were no more serious riots in the years that followed, the government's repressive attitude continued. This repressive policy was then referred to as "Hard Blow" (Hard Strike) whose explicit goal was "hit the enemy forces, clean the community, and educate the crowd".¹⁴

At the same time, the Chinese government seeks economic improvement in the western region of China, especially Xinjiang, assuming protests will decrease as the economy improves. Since the early 1980s, the Chinese government has built the East Coast region economy. Now, to avoid gaps, large-scale economic programs are carried out in Xinjiang. Xinjiang is reserved as a powerhouse Government investment is pouring into the region. Various industries were established, including cotton. Between 1991 and

1994, investment in infrastructure in the region increased from 7.3 to 16.5 billion yuan. Provincial GDP doubled from 7.5 to 15.5 billion yuan.¹⁵

Other data shows that economic development in this area has also begun to be carried out in earlier times. Before 1949 it could be said that there were no industries in Xinjiang. But between that year and 1957 259 factories were built in the region, and in the next two years the Chinese government claimed to have built 1,513 modern factories. In 1949 there were only 12 cities with a population of more than 2,000 in Xinjiang. But in 1964, the number of cities grew to 70-80 cities. This policy made the Xinjiang economy grow rapidly. However, this did not eliminate, even strengthen, Uyghur protests against the Chinese government. Why? Existing data shows that those who benefited the most through this policy were Han ethnic, not Uyghur. For this reason, it is necessary to understand geographical conditions, population changes, as well as the conditions and economic disparities that occur in this region.¹⁶

Xinjiang has an area of 626,600 square miles, which covers one-sixth of China's total area, or equal to three times the size of France. Its location is far on the northwestern tip of China with a relatively small population (population density of only about 6 people per square mile in 1949 and 11 in 1962, pen.). The Tianshan Mountains, which reach 20,000 feet in height, separate two broad basins: Tarim in the south and Dzungarian in the north. Edge oases - among them large Kashgar, Khotan, Aqsu - provide water for local residents. Rainfall is relatively low, only around 4 inches per year for Kashgar, for example, and 10 inches per year in the Dzungarian Basin. However, water needs are helped by the presence of ground water and melting snow and summer glaciers from the surrounding mountains. In the Xinjiang region there are a number of indigenous tribes namely Uyghur, Khazak, Hui, Tajik, Uzbek and Tartar who all embrace Islam. While the Han, Khalkhas, Mongols, Xibes, Manchus, Russians, and Daurs embraced other beliefs or not at all. Islam spread in the region through trade and conquest, or in other words war.

The Xinjiang region includes rich natural resources. In this region there is a very high content of iron ore, copper, gold, sulfur, gypsum, uranium, zinc and jade. Large oil reserves are found in Karamai and Tushangtze. Coal reserves are also very large [in the written text 3,000,000 million tons]. While other data stated that coal reserves in Xinjiang reached 38% of total reserves in all of China and oil reserves were estimated at 30 million tons or more than 25% of national reserves. Iron reserves reached 730 million tons, salt 318 million tons, and mirabilite 170 million tons.¹⁷

The dominant ethnic groups in Xinjiang are ethnic Uyghurs who are Muslim (Sunni). In addition, there are also other ethnicities in this area such as Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks, and Tajiks, the majority of whom are also Muslim (Sunni). Ethnic Han [non-Muslims], who are the dominant ethnic group in China, are also found in Xinjiang. The same goes for Han ethnic Muslims who are called Hui.¹⁸

The population in Xinjiang developed since 1949 from around 3.7 million to 4.8 million in 1953, then 5.6 million in 1957, and reached 7 million in October 1962. In 1949, there were only 200,000-300,000 ethnic Han in Xinjiang. In 1953 it was still more or less the same. But in the following decade the Han population expanded to millions, estimated at 2.6 million at the end of 1962. In 1990, the Uyghur population in Xinjiang reached 7.1 million, while the Han population was 5.6 million, or the second largest in the region. The third and fourth largest ethnic groups are Kazakhs (1.1 million) and Hui (more than 670,000). These four ethnic groups represented 97% of Xinjiang's total population that year. Uyghurs and Kazakhs are Turkish races, while Han and Hui are the same Chinese race, differing only in religion. The percentage of the Uyghur population in Xinjiang in 1990 was 47%, while Han was 38%. The percentage of the

entire Muslim population there that year was 60%.¹⁹

The data above shows that there has been a significant increase in the Han population in the Xinjiang region during the Communist rule of China. This increase occurred through Han ethnic migration from other provinces, not through birth - the Han ethnic fertility rate was very low. The percentage of Han population above has actually decreased compared to 1978 which reached 42%. It is estimated that the percentage will continue to decline by 25% by 2030 due to the low Han growth rate. Meanwhile 40% of the ethnic minority population in Xinjiang in 1990 were aged 14 years, which showed a high growth rate. This growth trend raises fears of the Chinese government and strengthening the influence of Han ethnic groups in Xinjiang. It is interesting to note that in November 2000 there was a significant increase in Han ethnicity in Xinjiang to 7.5 million and the percentage to 40.6%, or an increase of more than 30% since 1990.²⁰

About Uyghur and Xinjiang

In the past, Xinjiang was under the leadership of the ruling authorities. They were once headed by the Uyghur Khaganate Empire around the 8th to 9th century AD. However, the term Uyghur is not yet commonly used and they are often dubbed 'Turkic People'. The city center is called Urumqi. Then, the Uzbek War Commander Yakub Beg led the local people against the Qing Dynasty, but was conquered. In 1874 the area was taken over and its name was changed to Xinjiang, which means 'New Boundary'.

From 1933 to 1934 a revolt erupted against the Chinese government. They were assisted by the Soviet Union, which aimed to take over the territory to unite with them. The upheaval gave birth to the East Turkestan Islamic Republic which was only one year old. They were then crushed by Hui troops from the Division 36 of the Chinese Red Army, who were subject to Mao Tse Tung. They use Hui ethnicity as well as Muslims to fight separatist groups. Remnants of the rebels fled to the mountains. Rebellion occurred again in the 1940s, which succeeded in arousing the East Turkestan Republic (1944-1949).

Again, this upheaval was aided by the Soviet Union which was then led by the late Joseph Stalin. When the Chinese Communist Party won a civil war and overthrew the Qing Dynasty in 1949, the Xinjiang region was again taken over. However, rebel leaders rejected the Uyghur term to refer to their ethnicity. They prefer to be regarded as Turkic tribes. They also refused to be equated with the Hui ethnicity, although they both embraced Islam.

This is understandable because Uyghur ethnic stature is different from Han or Hui. Their paras and stature lean more towards Eurasia. Some of them look slanted, while others look like Europeans. Mao Tse Tung then set the status of the area as an autonomous region. However, it turned out they were slowly sending ethnic Han into the area and then breed up to twice the number of ethnic Uyghurs. Since 1949, China wants to fully integrate Xinjiang with China, politically, culturally and economically including the Xinjiang non-Han ethnic group into China's 'unitary, multi-ethnic state'. After 1949, Uyghur books that challenged Chinese discourse were banned and Chinese language is an official language in offices, schools, and so on. Taking leaves from the Zionist book on occupation (referring to settlers in Palestine), China gave Hans an incentive to fill Xinjiang to reduce the demography of the Uyghurs.

This terrible and dangerous tactic succeeded: - in 1949, 95% of the population were Muslim and Turkish, while the Han population consists of 45%

(2008) and in 2017 reached 58% of the HAN people in Xinjiang, excluded and removed the Uyghurs from Xinjiang. If a strong majority could be achieved by Hans, China might take regional autonomy, making the Uyghur problem and dilemma even more terrible.

While the Soviet Union still stands and has control over Central Asia, they use Uyghurs in Central Asia, such as in Kazakhstan, to mobilize Uyghurs in Xinjiang against China. There was even one point in 1945 when the Uyghurs and Kazakh nationalists formed the short-lived East Turkistan Republic of Xinjiang supported by the Soviets. This indicates that calming Uyghurs is a priority for modern China even from the start. After the Soviets broke up in 1991, China introduced a new strategy to appease the Uyghurs in Xinjiang. The plan was to develop Xinjiang and increase economic growth in the region to "buy" Uyghur loyalty. One way to do this is to connect and open Xinjiang to the newly formed Central Asian republics. But this allows Uyghurs in Xinjiang and Central Asia to connect or renew relations with each other. The spirit of the independence movement that created several Central Asian republics has only spilled over in Xinjiang and nationalist enthusiasm has increased during this time.

To overcome this, China diplomatically uses new republics not only to increase economic growth but more importantly to reduce separatism in Xinjiang. From 1996-2000, China's diplomatic efforts paid dividends, through Shanghai Five and increased bilateral relations, because they neutralized the threats faced by Uyghur advocacy groups in Central Asia. Although, during the 1990s, China undoubtedly developed the Xinjiang region by road, railroad, industry and other infrastructure, this even had a worse impact on Uyghurs. China's compliance with the development/modernization policy benefited Han immigrants in Xinjiang because they were more educated, already synonymous, and knew Chinese. Because of this, Uyghurs had to compete in their own homeland with Chinese-speaking Hans in an economic environment controlled by Han, the same ethnicity.

According to Jennifer Ang, this economic dichotomy is transparent when one compares the more developed northern regions near Urumqi where there are more Hans with a backward southern region near Kashgar. In addition, the use of resources from Xinjiang to develop other parts of China deepens this gap. Although the economic difficulties faced by the Uyghurs under the modernization strategy were indeed difficult, but the religious restrictions in the 1990s (currently underway) were precisely what led to the increasing violence between the Uyghurs and the Hans family. These constraints include not allowing women to wear headscarves (headscarves) themselves, limiting men from growing beards, prohibiting fasting during the month of Ramadan for civil servants, teachers, and party members and so on. Furthermore, and more surprisingly, children under 18 are not permitted to attend Friday prayers and prayers are not permitted to run more than half an hour.

Because of the introduction of invasive religious boundaries, this country frustrates Uyghurs who have been marginalized and sowed seeds for greater future violence and even terrorism. It's a shame that most of the Islamic world has fallen asleep due to the treatment of the Uyghurs. This is because countries such as Saudi Arabia, UAE, Kazakhstan and even Pakistan are afraid of losing billions of dollars in Chinese investment and trade - and also potentially losing a great ally that can fight American hegemony. The Islamic world is only angry at Myanmar, the bag of slaughter and expulsion of the people, but not caring about the fate of the Uyghurs, it is ironic and embarrassing.

Fortunately, international humanitarian organizations and the United Nations have raised awareness about the ongoing Uyghur tragedy so that this problem becomes more common. China limits freedom of religion, fasting and culture to Uyghurs, even the

PRC replaces Islamic values with Chinese values. For Uyghurs - their physical, mental, economic and social viability is very close to Islam, not China, but they are forced to accept the lifestyle of the Han, communist China, atheists. Byler and Grose mention the same thing: state projects require the Uyghurs to "adopt a completely new set of rules" so that instead of embracing Islam, they must follow 12 communist Chinese secular values. Ang mentioned that the Uyghurs were trapped between Han-chauvinism and Chinese imperialism. Rules that are certain to activate or deactivate Uyghurs so that they do not experience progress in life in Xinjiang. Uyghurs in Xalan's hometown were forced to leave religion, and their speech, clothes, behavior, culture and language were forced to adjust to Han immigrants mobilized by the PRC.

The ethnic Uyghurs were able to breathe a little relieved when Deng Xiaoping's leadership at the end of the Cold War. The government gives them the freedom to worship and actualize themselves and care for culture. After all, when the Soviet Union was in disarray and China was not worried that the locals would return to turbulence. Unfortunately the 'honeymoon' did not last long after Islamic radical groups rose, spearheaded by Al Qaidah. China returned to being harsh towards ethnic Uyghurs because they were considered vulnerable to being exposed to radicalism. Because, a number of Uyghur ethnic representative groups are considered inconsistent with the Chinese government. The organizations targeted by China are the World Uyghur Congress (WUC) and the East Turkestan Independence Movement (ETIM). The latter is even considered a terrorist group by China.

The Chinese government is also reportedly giving different treatment to ethnic Uyghurs, rather than the Hui who are both Muslims. The Hui tribe was freed from fasting during Ramadan, free of Hajj, worshiped in congregation and built a mosque. Whereas the Uyghurs are just the opposite. With a wave of radical groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) which are feared to spread among Uyghurs, the Chinese government is reasonable if they are anxious. Although until now there is no exact data on how many ethnic Uyghurs joined ISIS. That reason was used by the Chinese government to build a special camp for ethnic Uyghurs. They argue that they will re-educate, re-educate the Uyghurs so that they will not be turbulent in the future.

Uyghurs in Southeast Asia

Uyghur foreign fighters have often appeared in parts of Southeast Asia, including Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. From these countries, they have traveled to Turkey and then remained in Turkey or proceeded to Iraq or Syria. In many cases, Uyghurs have been detained in transit countries in Southeast Asia where they travel illegally with falsified Turkish passports or falsely claim to be Turkish citizens. There has been a recent crackdown in Indonesia, where Indonesian security agencies have captured and, in some cases, engaged in a shootout with Uyghur militants affiliated with the Eastern Indonesian Mujahidin (MIT), a terrorist group sympathetic to IS. There are also links between Uyghur terrorists and deadly bombings in Bangkok, Thailand in August 2015.

The media noted that ten thousand foreign fighters flocked to join ISIS from more than 80 countries - one of which was China. As discussed above, the total number of Uyghur foreign fighters in Iraq and Syria is unclear. The Chinese government has suggested the number could reach 300, while other sources set a number close to 100. Whatever the actual number, there is little doubt that Uyghurs have left the restive provinces of China, Xinjiang and joined jihad in the Middle East. Timur, fight specifically under the banner of IS. While there is a long-standing relationship between foreign

fighters and Uyghur groups in South and Central Asia, the Middle East is a fairly new land. The profile of the fighters is also not recorded.

An analysis by the New America Foundation of 4,000 registration records of fighters joining the IS between mid-2013 and mid-2014 found that Uyghur foreign fighters were "generally older, poorer, and more likely to join IS with their families." recorded in *Foreign Policy*, almost without exceptions, Uyghur recruitment is "unskilled, and uneducated." Most of those who travel to Iraq and Syria may intend to move permanently, given the high cost of travel and relocation. The IS recruitment field to the Uyghur emphasizes friendship and educational opportunities available to those who live in the Caliphate. As mentioned earlier, many Uyghurs are likely to flee because of increasingly cruel Chinese policies that specifically target the minority Uyghurs, the main driving factor in their radicalization.

Interestingly, the majority of Uyghur samples from New American reports have no jihadist experience, which means they cannot be connected to ETIMs, TIPs or other well-known Uyghur jihadist organizations. This previously unaffiliated recruit can very well join a TIP that is linked to Al-Qaeda or an ETIM affiliated with IS after arriving in Syria. However, ETIM and TIP are reported to collaborate closely on the battlefield in Syria, suggesting that Al-Qaeda versus IS competition does not always extend to the lower jihadist echelon. However, there are still divisions within the wider Uyghur jihadists. Previous movements, a development that frightened Beijing, because it seems to lead to a spiral of disputes among the main groups. The result was an increase in fiery rhetoric calling for an attack on the Chinese state. A video in March 2017 shows Uyghur militants threatening China with images of Chinese President Xi Jinping before turning to shooting a burning Chinese flag. Some videos appear to have been produced in China, with the threat that Uyghur foreign fighters will return to do jihad. IS and Al-Qaeda have considered the situation in different media products, with ISIS leader Abu Bakar al-Baghdadi alleging that Muslim rights in China have been "forcibly seized" and advocated revenge.

Uyghur fighters in Iraq and Syria may venture outside the region to find another jihad battlefield. Southeast Asia, especially Indonesia, has emerged as an 'alternative land of jihad' for many radical Uyghurs who cannot travel to Iraq, Syria or Turkey. In many ways, Southeast Asia has become a transit center and meeting point for Uyghurs who want to travel to join terrorist groups in the Middle East. Many surrendered and joined local groups with links to Al-Qaeda or IS. It is possible that the UFF who succeeded in reaching Iraq and Syria through Southeast Asia could return to the area and connect with the UFF which had become part of the local jihad group. This will create a strong combination of Uyghurs who harden the battle and Uyghur people who are connected to the local network.

China's repressive tactics in Xinjiang, such as banning the names of certain religions for Uyghur babies, limiting the length of men's beards, limits to observing Ramadan and preferential treatment for Han Chinese in work and education, have increasingly hardened Uyghur identity and increased radicalization of Islam. This persecution is also a factor in the increasing Islamization of what was previously a separatist rebellion.

The Uyghur Jihadists first came to the attention of the world in 2001, when the United States (US) and coalition forces killed and captured some of those who fought with the Taliban and Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan under the banner of East Turkestan Islam Movement (ETIM). However, Uyghur jihadists have now spread to the Middle East and Southeast Asia. ETIM members not only continued their operations in Afghanistan and parts of Pakistan but were part of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) which fought the Al-

Qaeda umbrella group Jabah Fatah al Syam (JFS) in Syria. Other Uyghurs have joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq while others have joined local terror groups in Indonesia.

Even though they participate in different organizations with different objectives, diaspora Uyghur fighters have unique characteristics as a group. Uyghurs consider themselves separate and different in ethnicity, culture, and religion from the majority of the Han Chinese who govern them. These differences form the basis of Uyghur religious ethnonationalist identity, which caused some of them to engage in violent activities aimed at establishing their own country, East Turkestan. Indeed, over the past two decades, Uyghurs have launched several terror attacks in China to achieve this goal. Some of the latest attacks include:

- October 2013: ETIM attacks on Tiananmen Square in Beijing killed five people.
- February 2014: A knife attack at a railway station in Kunming killed 30 people.
- April 2014: Knife and bomb attacks on Urumqi South Railway Station killed three and injured 79 people.
- May 2014: Two cars hit the market and attackers lobbed explosives, killing 31 people in Urumqi.
- September 2014: Bomb blasts (including suicide bombers) and clashes killed 50 people and 50 others were injured.
- October 2015: A knife attack on a coal mine killed 50 people.

Uyghur Diaspora

Uyghur identity and Islamic radicalization have been strengthened from outside the Chinese border as well. Turkey has historically sympathized with Uyghurs because Turkey shares ethnic relations with them. In fact, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan once stated, "East Turkestan is not only the home of Turks. The Uyghurs who were also born were related to the history, civilization and culture of Turkey. East Turkistan martyrs are our martyrs. "Turkish sympathy may also be translated into assistance for Uyghurs who want to join jihadist groups in Syria. Despite Turkish kinship and support, the appeal of radical Islamic ideology outside of China has many Uyghurs to participate in violent jihadism as part of their religious identity and as a way to continue their struggle against the Chinese government. This appeal is evident in a recent IS video, in which two Uyghurs directed their threat to the "henchmen of the Chinese communist stooge" and promised to shed "rivers of blood" in China as "retaliation for tears flowing from people's eyes. oppressed people. Therefore, Uyghur fighters abroad are a product of encouraging oppression at home and ethnic and religious appeal abroad.

The special characteristics of these Chinese Uyghurs have created different contours in their participation as foreign fighters in jihad operations. However, Uyghurs are currently under-examined as foreign fighters. The analysis of the Uyghurs was carried out little by little - with a strong focus on their struggle against the Chinese government or narrowly describing the operations in which Uyghurs participated. Given the difficulty of developing quantitative studies or conducting research on clandestine groups involved in violent operations in a number of different battlefields along with the difficulty of foreigners gaining access to Uyghurs in Xinjiang, relying on secondary sources continues to portray portraits of broad participation of Uyghur participation among jihadists. This Policy Summary uses media reports and think tank studies to explore the scope and scale of UFF in various locations, their implications for international security and ways in which their participation in global jihad groups can develop in such a way.

East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM)

The East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) is a Muslim separatist group founded by Uyghur militants, members of a Turkish-speaking ethnic majority in northwest China's Xinjiang province. The US Department of Defense registered ETIM as a terrorist organization in 2002 during the period of increasing US-China cooperation against anti-terrorism after the September 11, 2001 attacks. This group and its relationship with Muslim fundamentalism have added to China's concerns about the increasing threat of terrorism in the country who were turbulent in the face of a spate of terrorist attacks in 2014. Xinjiang Province, where the Uyghur resistance group is centered, is a sparsely populated area that shares borders with eight countries, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. The first mention of the ETIM emerged around 2000, when a Russian newspaper reported that Osama bin Laden had promised funding for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and ETIM during 1999 met in Afghanistan. Reportedly founded by Hasan Mahsum, a Uyghur from the Kashgar Xinjiang region, ETIM has been registered by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as one of the more extreme separatist groups. Looking for an independent country called East Turkestan which will include areas including parts of Turkey, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

After Mahsum's assassination by Pakistani forces in 2003 during a raid on suspected al-Qaeda hideouts near the Afghan border, the group was led by Abdul Haq, who was reportedly killed in Pakistan in 2010. In August 2014, Chinese state media released a report stating that Memetuhut Memetrozi, one of the founders of ETIM who is serving a life sentence in China for his involvement in a terrorist attack, has been indoctrinated in a madrasa in Pakistan. The report, which Memetuhut said had met Mahsum in 1997 and launched the ETIM later that year, was marked by a rare entry of Pakistani ties to Uyghur militancy.

The Chinese communist regime, which is worried that China can split if regional separatist movements acquire land, has long called ETIM a terrorist group; after September 11, 2001, China warned the Bush administration that ETIM had relations with al-Qaeda and bin Laden. The group is also registered by the UN Security Council's Al-Qaeda / Taliban Sanctions Committee, although it is not on the main list of foreign terrorist organizations by the US State Department. Since 2002, the People's Liberation Army has conducted military exercises in Xinjiang with Central Asian countries, as well as Russia, to fight what China calls "East Turkistan terrorists." In August 2002, after months of pressure from Beijing, the Bush administration announced it would freeze U.S. assets. group.

The number of Uyghurs is around ten million in China, mostly in Xinjiang, which became a province in 1884. Ethnically Turkish, they spoke Uyghur and most practiced Sufi Islam. The Uyghurs briefly achieved state status twice after the fall of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) - after that from 1931 to 1934, and once again from 1944 to 1949, when communists took power and brought the region under their full control. In 1955, Xinjiang became classified as an "autonomous region" in the People's Republic of China, although many Uyghurs complain about forced assimilation. There is no Uyghur agenda put together, writes Elizabeth Van Wie Davis for the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies in a 2008 paper. While some Uyghurs are looking for separate countries, others prefer to maintain cultural differences and autonomous relations with China, he said. Some are also satisfied with the integration into the Chinese system.

In addition, ETIM has never acted as a sole representative Uyghur separatism. Many separatist political organizations among the Uyghur émigré community which have millions of people are not radical, they also do not advocate violence. It is clear that

the Chinese leadership is concerned that Xinjiang separatism has and will continue to gain support from transnational Muslim extremists, with possible good consequences for other latent Chinese separatist movements without Muslim connections and for other Chinese Muslims without separatist agenda. In 1996, China signed a Shanghai Agreement with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, using the agreement to pressure Central Asian countries to deter them. Uyghur ethnic minorities from supporting separatism in Xinjiang and to guarantee the extradition of Uyghurs who fled China.

Tensions between Han ethnic Chinese and Uyghurs have caused sporadic hostility. In July 2009, a fight broke out in a factory in the southern province of Guangdong when Uyghurs accused Han of Chinese counterparts of racial violence. A demonstration as a result organized by more than a thousand Uyghur protesters increased to riots in the Xinjiang capital, Urumqi, which killed more than 150 victims; it was the deadliest public violence in the country since the 1989 crackdown on protesters at Beijing's Tiananmen Square. Ilham Tohti, a prominent Uyghur economist who has written critically about government policies towards ethnic groups, was later detained and has been temporarily placed under house arrest. The incident made the Guangdong Party committee secretary Wang Yang suggest that China needs to reform ethnic minority policies or face further "difficulties." A series of recent knife attacks has raised concerns.

The attack outside the train station in Guangzhou in May 2014 marked the third of its kind since March, when a group of Uyghurs killed twenty-nine people at a train station in Kunming, Yunnan province. In late April, a bomb attack and knife killed three people outside the train station in Urumqi, Xinjiang. President Xi Jinping ordered the Xinjiang government to take "decisive steps" and destroy "cruel terrorists" after the attack.

Since the 1990s, China has openly linked ETIM with Al-Qaeda, as well as the Taliban, although the claim has been debated. In January 2002, a Chinese government study reported that ETIM had received money, weapons and support from terrorist organizations. According to the report, ETIM militants were trained by al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and crossed back to Xinjiang, where they established terrorist cells. ETIM leader Mahsum denies this, claiming the group has no organizational ties with al-Qaeda or the Taliban.

The crackdown on China's ongoing ETIM rebellion in Xinjiang has forced the most militant Uyghur separatists into turbulent neighboring countries, such as Pakistan, where they have formed strategic alliances with, and even led to, jihadists. factions affiliated with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. "As a result, Uyghur militant groups are likely to deepen their collaboration with a dense network of international terrorist organizations, and potentially activate the ability of these groups. In March 2014, TIP leader Abdullah Mansour swore from his hiding in Pakistan a holy war against China, which he called an "enemy" of all Muslims. TIP separatists are mostly hiding in the turbulent North Waziristan region – an unsettling association that has pushed Beijing to pressure Islamabad on counter- terrorism efforts.

Uyghur Diaspora in Indonesia

Militant Uyghurs have been found in Southeast Asia too. According to Soliev (2016), Uyghurs were arrested in September 2014 when they tried to connect with the Timorese Indonesian Mujahideen, an organization that pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. On August 5, 2016, Indonesian police arrested five people related to a terrorist

group funded by TIP, Katibah Gigih Rahmat on Batam. The footsteps of the Uyghur tribe in terrorist networks in Indonesia are not just this time. Foreign nationals who are ethnic Uyghurs, China who are ready to become "brides" aka suicide bombers who had been hidden in Batam are still being hunted by Densus 88 (Special Detachment 88).

Together with Terrorist Santoso / Ali Kalora in Poso

The trail of involvement of Uyghurs from Xinjiang Province, China to Poso to join the terrorist group Santoso. At that time, Central Sulawesi Regional Police Chief Inspector General Rudi Sufhariadi said that Santoso- led terrorist groups were foreign nationals from ethnic Uyghurs. The majority of the ethnic groups in Xinjiang Province, China, even have a special role in the East Indonesian Mujahideen group in guerrillas in the mountains of the Poso region, Central Sulawesi. Because of his stronger physical abilities, they (Uyghurs) were given the task of carrying logistics. the duties of ethnic Uyghurs in Santoso's group are known from four who have been arrested from a number of lists of searches for Tinombala's operations.

The physical strength of the Uyghur ethnic group in Santoso, is likened to Rudi's strength in lifting up rice sacks of food supplies. In a guerrilla campaign to avoid the pursuit of a joint apparatus of the Tinombala operation, the foreigner was more agile in his movements. From the confession of Santoso's captured men, said Rudi, there were six Uyghurs in the MIT group. However, five of them were killed during the Santoso hunting operation and one was caught. Three Uyghur terrorists, Ahmet Mahmud, Altinci Bayram, and Abdul Basit Tuzer, in the North Jakarta District Court, July 13, 2015.

Ahmed Bozoglan, 27, was arrested by police in Poso, Central Sulawesi, in mid-September 2014. Preliminary information from the Indonesian police stated that they were allegedly linked to an Islamic State or ISIS group in Indonesia. They were arrested along with a member of the East Indonesian Mujahidin Assembly group led by Santoso. Preliminary information from the Indonesian police stated that they were allegedly related to the Islamic State or ISIS group in Indonesia. They were arrested along with a member of the East Indonesian Mujahidin group led by Santoso. In mid-July, three of his colleagues, Ahmet Mahmut, 20, Altinci Bayram, 29, and Tuzer Abdul Basit, 23, were convicted of an "evil conspiracy" and were considered to violate the terrorism law.

Until now there is still one ethnic Uyghur who joined the Santoso group. According to the search, seven people from ethnic Chinese minorities were detected in Poso since 2014. Four of them, who carried Turkish passports, were arrested in Parigi Moutong, Central Sulawesi. In 2015, they were sentenced to six years in prison. The four were Ahmed Bozoglan, Ahmet Mahmut, Altinci Bayram and Tuzer Abdul Basit. When the panel of judges concluded, they were proven legally and convincingly violated the Terrorism Act and the Immigration Act.

Outside the Poso Terrorist Network

In addition to joining the Santoso network in Poso, terrorist networks from the Uyghurs also guerrilla with other terrorist networks outside Poso. While serving as National Adjunct Senior Commissioner of BNPT, Tito Karnavian once explained that after joining a terrorist network in the country, the Uyghur network used networks in Indonesia to hide, practice, and jihad. So it is not surprising that ISIS figures in Syria both from Indonesia and from the Uyghur can join in there, "said the Head of BNPT, Inspector

General of Police Tito Karnavian, March 21, 2016.

The Uyghur network takes advantage of the changing global situation of ISIS network groups. Uyghur groups use it in separatism, independence or the economy by forming a local caliph. They communicate and interact to form a global network. They can move the network in their respective countries to connect. Six suspected people from Uyghur are known to exist. Four people were arrested and convicted in 2015, one was arrested in Bekasi, and two were shot in Bekasi.

But that does not mean that the existence and behavior of an international network of terrorists from the Uyghurs has not closed their books in the country. At least the ambush of four terrorists in South Tangerang is proof. Also before the incident was a suspected terrorist from the Uyghur tribe, China was questioned by the National Police Headquarters Detachment 88. This inspection is a result of the wrong landing of a Lion Air plane which should be on foreign flights but on the domestic. Until finally the terrorist suspect escaped from immigration checks at Soekarno- Hatta Airport, Cengkareng, May 10, 2016.

Immigration provided information to the police about the existence of Uyghurs who escaped the incident. Likewise, the coordinating minister for Politics and Security Wiranto revealed the results of his meeting with the Ambassador of the People's Republic of China, Xie Feng, namely a joint agreement to hold Uyghur ethnic groups belonging to the ISIS group into the territory of both countries and Malaysia. It is known, Malaysia is the entrance to ethnic Uyghur residents affiliated with the ISIS group to Poso, Central Sulawesi. Many Uyghurs are now leaving for Syria to join and train with the ISIS group and it is feared that they will return to China or to Indonesia. The Uyghur problem has developed so quickly that many Uyghur people who were later trained in ISIS were in Syria there and very, may later when they returned to passing Malaysia or Indonesia back to their area and this we agreed not to make room for them.

Conclusion

Attacks supported by jihad on Chinese interests in Southeast Asia are also possible, and can be designed to exploit existing ethnic tensions involving ethnic Chinese populations in the Malay Peninsula or in Indonesia. The pressure of jihad on Chinese interests in Pakistan is also possible, but it is likely that relatively marginalized groups try to distinguish themselves and provoke interest from the Pakistani state, which greatly respects its relationship with China. Uyghur Muslims, according to Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch records, were forced to swear allegiance to President Xi Jinping, detained indefinitely, treated as a source of disease, and were encouraged to call for Communist Party slogans. In addition, the Chinese government also closely monitors the movements of the Uyghur community through monitoring identity cards, checkpoints, face identification, and collecting DNA from millions of residents.

Imprisonment often leads to torture, hunger and death. Reports of human rights violations were immediately denied by Beijing. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Hua Chunying said that the diverse ethnic population in Xinjiang lived and worked in "peace, satisfaction, and enjoying a peaceful and progressive life." For centuries, Xinjiang and Beijing relations have experienced ups and downs. After the Chinese Communist Party won the civil war, Beijing officially claimed Xinjiang as its territory. The government gave it the status of an autonomous region called the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.

The granting of autonomy is based on economic factors, given that Xinjiang has considerable oil and mineral reserves. Not only that, Xinjiang became the entrance to China to Central Asia and the Middle East; two regions that are now one of China's two investment barns. The Council on Foreign Relations note states that shortly after the granting of autonomy status, China launched various kinds of development projects. In 1954, China established the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (XPCC) to work on settlements and agriculture. This project lasted for approximately half a century. In the early 1990s, special economic zones were implemented in Xinjiang. Beijing subsidizes local cotton farmers and overhauls its taxation system. In the same period, the central government poured capital into infrastructure projects, for example by building the Tarim Desert Highway and the railway line to western Xinjiang.

The high flow of development has triggered the influx of migrant workers to Xinjiang, especially the Han ethnic group, who is none other than the largest tribe in China. As a result, Han's population in Xinjiang increased dramatically; from originally only 6.7% (220,000) in 1949, it jumped to 40% (8.4 million) in 2008 and in 2018 to 58%. The long-term impact of Han migration is social friction. Access to the Uyghur community to clean water and land is increasingly limited. Economic inequality is increasing due to discriminatory labor recruitment practices. Ethnic Han is getting richer, while Uyghurs are poorer in their own ancestral lands. Beijing prohibits Uyghur people from fasting Ramadan or wearing a veil. Then, in the name of infrastructure development, the Chinese government also did not hesitate to tear down ancient buildings in Kashgar.

In 2009, ethnic Uyghurs and Han were involved in major clashes after the deaths of two Uyghur workers in Guangdong. As a result of this clash, 197 people were killed, more than 1,600 people were injured, and 718 people were detained. The problem in the Uyghurs will not be as severe today if Beijing's policies are more accommodating to the cultural expressions of the Uyghur people. The more repressed, the stronger the dissatisfaction of the Uyghur population. However, can such an approach be taken, given the problems rooted in the economy and the hard work of Beijing to pursue the status of the world economic superpower with billions of dollars in infrastructure projects? The situation worsened with the emergence of separatist movements such as the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM) which had existed since the 1990s. By Beijing, ETIM is categorized as a terrorist and is claimed to be affiliated with Al Qaeda so it is worth to be fought.

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