
The Role of Dozer Volunteers in the Electoral Winning Strategy of Andi Asman Sulaiman and Andi Akmal Pasluddin in the Political Contestation of Bone Regency

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Abstrak

Penelitian ini menganalisis peran Relawan Dozer dalam kemenangan pasangan BerAMAL pada Pilkada Bone 2024 (199.954 suara; unggul di 24 kecamatan). Menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif studi kasus, analisis ini mengintegrasikan *Political Mobilization Theory*, *Brokerage Politics*, dan *Electoral Geography*. Temuan menunjukkan korelasi positif antara kepadatan relawan dengan perolehan suara; kemenangan dominan terlihat di Libureng dan Kahu (relawan tinggi) dibandingkan Tonra (relawan rendah). Koordinator Desa (*Kordes*) berperan vital sebagai broker politik yang menjembatani kandidat dengan pemilih melalui jaringan sosial lokal. Kesimpulannya, kemenangan BerAMAL tidak hanya ditopang mesin partai, tetapi secara signifikan ditentukan oleh mobilisasi relawan non-partai yang terstruktur, adaptif, dan berbasis desa. Penelitian ini memberikan bukti empiris mengenai peran strategis jaringan relawan dalam memperkuat efektivitas mobilisasi akar rumput pada kontestasi politik lokal.

Kata Kunci: Mobilisasi Politik; Relawan Politik; Broker Politik; Geografi Elektoral; Pilkada

Abstract

This research analyzes the role of "Dozer Volunteers" in the victory of the BerAMAL pair in the 2024 Bone Regency Election (199,954 votes; winning in 24 districts). Adopting a qualitative case study approach, the analysis integrates Political Mobilization Theory, Brokerage Politics, and Electoral Geography. The findings indicate a positive correlation between volunteer density and vote acquisition; dominant victories were observed in Libureng and Kahu (high volunteer density) compared to Tonra (lower density). Village Coordinators (*Kordes*) played a vital role as political brokers, bridging candidates and voters through local social networks. In conclusion, BerAMAL's victory was not only supported by formal party machinery but was significantly determined by structured, adaptive, and village-based non-party volunteer mobilization. This study provides empirical evidence of the strategic role of volunteer networks in strengthening the effectiveness of grassroots mobilization in local political contests.

Keywords: Political Mobilization; Political Volunteers; Political Brokerage; Electoral Geography; Local Election.

Introduction

Regional Head Elections (Pilkada) constitute a highly dynamic arena of local political competition in Indonesia in the post-reform era. Pilkada enables citizens to directly elect regional leaders in accordance with their aspirations. This competition involves not only political elites but also mass bases at the subdistrict and village levels. Local issues such as infrastructure, agriculture, and public welfare often become the primary determinants of electoral victory. Since the implementation of direct regional elections in 2005, the intensity of political competition has increased in every electoral period. Candidates are required to build broad support, particularly in predominantly rural areas. Pilkada has also become an important indicator of the health of decentralized democracy in Indonesia. Therefore, understanding electoral winning strategies at the local level has become highly relevant (Stange, 2017).

The transformation of campaign patterns from traditional political party-based approaches to non-party volunteer models has become increasingly evident in Pilkada contests. Political volunteers offer greater flexibility compared to rigid party machines. This trend has strengthened since the simultaneous regional elections in 2015 and continued through the 2024 Pilkada. Volunteers are capable of conducting direct and personal voter mobilization at the grassroots level. Studies indicate that voter loyalty toward political parties has continued to weaken in the digital era. Conversely, emotional closeness and local issues are more effectively developed through volunteer networks. The phenomenon of non-party volunteers has become a decisive factor in many regions. This transformation reflects the evolution of political strategies in contemporary Indonesia (Aspinall & Mietzner, 2019).

In Bone Regency, South Sulawesi, this shift in campaign patterns was particularly visible during the 2024 Regent and Vice Regent Election. The pair Andi Asman Sulaiman and Andi Akmal Pasluddin, popularly known as BerAMAL, achieved a landslide victory. They secured 199,954 valid votes, equivalent to 49.89 percent of the total valid votes. The BerAMAL pair dominated 24 out of 27 subdistricts across Bone Regency. This victory demonstrated the effectiveness of massive grassroots mobilization strategies. Official data from the General Election Commission of Bone Regency confirmed their electoral dominance in the majority of subdistricts. This success did not solely depend on the support of political parties. Non-party volunteers became a crucial element that

distinguished them from their competitors (Komisi Pemilihan Umum Kabupaten Bone, 2024).

The emergence of Dozer Volunteers as a significant political actor further strengthened the winning strategy of the BerAMAL pair at the subdistrict level. This volunteer team possessed a well-organized structure extending to the village level through Village Coordinators (Kordes) and polling station witnesses. Dozer Volunteers were recognized for actively conducting door-to-door approaches and intensive mass consolidation. They successfully recruited thousands of volunteers spread across several selected subdistricts. The role of Dozer Volunteers complemented the strength of party machinery with a more personal and local approach. Their presence reflected a new trend of non-party political actors in Indonesia. This organized mobilization provided a significant competitive advantage for the candidate pair. The phenomenon further enriched studies on volunteer politics at the regency level (Putra et al., 2022).

Although the phenomenon of political volunteers has become increasingly prominent in the literature on Indonesian elections, in-depth empirical studies concerning the role of non-party volunteers at the subdistrict level remain very limited. Most studies tend to focus on the national level, such as volunteer movements in the presidential elections of 2014, 2019, and 2024, or on political elites at the provincial level (Rinaldi et al., 2024; Suaedy, 2014; Syahbana & Prasetyo, 2024). Research on volunteer dynamics within the context of regency and municipal elections, particularly analyses of spatial distribution and its relationship with vote acquisition at the subdistrict level, remains scarce. This situation creates a significant research gap, considering that local politics in Indonesia is strongly shaped by contextual and clientelistic mobilization mechanisms at the village and subdistrict levels.

Based on the background and research gap outlined above, this study focuses on analyzing the role of Dozer Volunteers in the winning strategy of Andi Asman Sulaiman and Andi Akmal Pasluddin in the local political contestation in Bone Regency. Specifically, this research examines how Dozer Volunteers contributed to grassroots support mobilization, how the distribution patterns of Dozer Volunteers and Village Coordinators (Kordes) were organized in selected subdistricts, and how the relationship between volunteer density and the vote acquisition of the BerAMAL pair manifested in those subdistricts. In line with this focus, the study aims to comprehensively analyze the strategic role of Dozer Volunteers in local political victory, map the distribution and intensity of volunteer networks down to the village level, and explain the relationship

between volunteer mobilization strength and variations in candidate vote achievement in the Bone Regency Pilkada.

This study holds significance theoretically, practically, and in terms of policy implications. Theoretically, this research contributes to enriching the literature on non-party volunteer politics and grassroots mobilization at the local level, which has thus far been dominated by national-level perspectives. Practically, the findings of this study may serve as a reference for campaign teams in designing effective volunteer-based campaign strategies in rural areas. From a policy perspective, the findings are expected to provide input for local political parties and election organizers in understanding the dynamics of substantive democracy at the regency level, including the regulation of volunteer campaign financing and the prevention of clientelistic practices.

Political Volunteers in Electoral Contestation

The Concept of Political Volunteers

Political volunteers are strategic actors in modern electoral contestation that no longer rely entirely on formal political party structures. In contemporary political dynamics, the presence of volunteers has emerged as a response to candidates' needs for more flexible political marketing strategies based on public participation Putra et al. (2022) explain that political volunteers grow and develop due to presidential candidates' demand for political marketing services, indicating that the development of political volunteerism is closely linked to the increasing need for nonformal support systems.

This phenomenon became even more prominent during the 2024 Election, where political volunteers had already emerged before the official campaign period began. In terms of motivation, Kende et al. (2017) explain that volunteer engagement is driven by politicized motivations, namely the use of intergroup assistance as a means of achieving social change. Thus, political volunteers contribute not only through voluntary work but also by carrying ideological dimensions and agendas for social transformation. Artero (2024) further argues that contemporary volunteerism has undergone a process of hybridization between volunteer activities and activism, accompanied by politicization that influences volunteer practices themselves. Overall, political volunteers function as strategic bridges connecting candidate elites with grassroots mass bases at the local level.

Differences Between Party Volunteers and Non-Party Volunteers

Party volunteers and non-party volunteers demonstrate fundamental differences in organizational structure, motivation for participation, and patterns of political engagement. In the context of party volunteers, Foos & John

(2018) emphasize that “Parties are No Civic Charities,” highlighting that political parties no longer function as purely civic charitable organizations but rather as strategically oriented political machines, particularly in voter contact activities. In line with this argument, Herdiansah (2019) through an analysis of strengthening partisan volunteer roles in the 2019 Election, demonstrates the convergence of political participation, where party volunteers became increasingly integrated into candidates’ official campaign strategies and party structures.

Conversely, non-party or independent volunteers tend to possess more flexible characteristics and are often driven by personal and contextual issues. Kurnia & Al-Hamdi (2019) found that the motivations of independent volunteers in supporting candidates are more strongly influenced by electability considerations and emotional closeness than by ideological loyalty to political parties. Since they are not bound by rigid party discipline and structures, non-party volunteers are generally more adaptive to local dynamics and issues. These differences become increasingly relevant in the context of regional head elections, where independent volunteers are often capable of penetrating voter segments that are difficult for formal political machines to reach.

The Role of Volunteers in Local Electoral Democracy

Volunteers play a crucial role in strengthening political participation at the local level in Indonesia, particularly within the context of regional head elections. Operationally, volunteers function as the primary drivers of voter mobilization through direct engagement with communities. Handan-Nader et al. (2021) demonstrated the effectiveness of voter turnout enhancement programs based on neighbor-to-neighbor approaches, showing that volunteer-based door-to-door methods significantly increase voter participation rates. These findings reinforce the perspective that local political participation depends not only on formal campaigns but also on social closeness and interpersonal trust developed by volunteers. Similarly, Suyatno (2016) argues that regional elections and the challenges of local democracy in Indonesia require strong grassroots mobilization to overcome public political apathy resulting from decentralization processes.

Within this context, volunteers become essential instruments for bridging the gap between electoral processes and citizens. Fadli et al. (2018) also observed the involvement of local elites in increasing political participation during regional elections, where volunteers frequently collaborate with village elites and community leaders in mobilizing voter masses. Furthermore, the presence of non-party volunteers enriches the quality of electoral democracy by introducing region-specific issues that are often overlooked in formal political

party campaigns. Overall, the role of volunteers contributes not only to increasing vote acquisition but also to deepening public engagement in local democratic processes.

Political Mobilization Theory

The Concept of Political Mobilization and Resources

Political mobilization is defined as the process of collecting, managing, and utilizing various resources to achieve collective goals within the political arena. From the perspective of resource mobilization theory, McCarthy & Zald (1977) argue that social movements require resource mobilization in order to survive, develop, and achieve political objectives. These resources include human labor, social networks, financial resources, and knowledge that are managed strategically and systematically. Furthermore, Hujo & Bangura (2020) explain that the politics of domestic resource mobilization for social development involves power negotiation processes at the local level, positioning non-state actors as important providers of alternative resources. This concept emphasizes that the success of political mobilization is determined not only by formal state institutions or political parties but also by the capacity of local actors to organize support.

In the electoral context, political mobilization focuses on organizing voter masses to support particular candidates through the utilization of available resources. Political mobilization theory views volunteers as primary assets that can be mobilized efficiently to expand campaign outreach and strengthen grassroots support. Overall, the concept of political mobilization serves as the principal theoretical foundation for understanding political winning strategies at the subdistrict level.

Volunteers as Agents of Voter Mobilization

Volunteers function as the primary agents in grassroots voter mobilization processes, particularly in the context of regional head elections. At the operational level, volunteers possess the ability to directly reach voters through personal approaches that are generally more effective than the work of formal political party machines. Adityawan (2025) states that money politics practices in campaign strategies are often integrated with the effectiveness of voter mobilization through volunteer networks, indicating that volunteers play a strategic role in influencing voting behavior. In addition, Farisi (2020) emphasizes that democracy volunteer programs constitute social movements aimed at improving political participation and voter quality.

The role of volunteers becomes increasingly significant in regional elections, where voter preferences are frequently shaped by emotional closeness, social relationships, and personal trust. In this context, volunteers act

as intermediaries between candidates and local communities while simultaneously managing human resources directed toward achieving vote targets at each polling station. Therefore, volunteers can be understood as key elements within the framework of political mobilization theory that explains the success of electoral winning strategies at the local level.

The Relevance of Political Mobilization Theory in the Context of Regional Elections

Political mobilization theory is highly relevant for explaining the dynamics of regional head elections in Indonesia, particularly in the context of simultaneous regional elections. Wahyuni et al. (2022) emphasize the importance of empowering anti-money politics villages to realize elections with integrity through clean and participatory resource mobilization. This perspective demonstrates that political mobilization is oriented not only toward vote acquisition but also toward strengthening the quality of democracy at the local level. In the implementation of simultaneous regional elections, candidates face limitations in political party resources, thereby requiring volunteers to serve as the primary actors in voter mobilization processes. Hanida et al. (2025) observed that the simultaneous national and local elections of 2024 generated voter fatigue while simultaneously creating opportunities for coattail effects that could be maximized through intensive volunteer mobilization.

Political mobilization theory helps explain how non-party volunteers are capable of filling mobilization gaps at the subdistrict level through direct door-to-door approaches and voter mass consolidation. The relevance of this theory is also evident in its ability to explain the influence of volunteer density and intensity on candidate vote acquisition. Therefore, political mobilization theory, as a grand theory, is considered highly appropriate for analyzing political winning strategies in the case study of the Bone Regency Regional Election.

The Position of Dozer Volunteers as Grassroots Mobilization Actors

Dozer Volunteers occupy a strategic position as grassroots mobilization actors in the Bone Regency Regional Election. This team utilized a Village Coordinator (Kordes) structure extending to the village level to mobilize human resources on a massive scale. Jihan & Linda Susanti (2025) explain that “political communication strategies in digital campaigns” can be strengthened through volunteer mobilization in the field. Dozer Volunteers functioned as political vehicles connecting candidate elites with rural voters. Lumbantobing et al. (2025) provide a similar example by arguing that “women’s credit unions as grassroots women’s economic-political vehicles” demonstrate the potential of community-based organizations in political mobilization.

The position of Dozer Volunteers was further strengthened by personal and local approaches consistent with McCarthy and Zald's theory. They successfully transformed potential mass support into actual votes through organized mobilization. Thus, Dozer Volunteers represent a concrete manifestation of the grand theory of Political Mobilization Theory within the context of Indonesian local politics (Jihan & Linda Susanti, 2025; Lumbantobing et al., 2025)

Brokerage Politics and Clientelism

The Concept of Political Brokers in Local Democracy

Political brokers are key actors who connect candidate elites with voters within the context of local democracy. In studies of electoral politics in Indonesia, Aspinall & As'Ad (2015) explain that village brokerage networks constitute the primary pattern in the distribution of patronage during elections, particularly at the local level. Political brokers generally originate from community leaders, both formal and informal, who possess social influence and public trust, enabling them to act as intermediaries between candidates and voters. Koster (2016) defines brokers as connectors or intermediary agents who actively link government actors and citizens, institutions, and resources by combining formal and informal political practices. This concept demonstrates that brokerage practices are not merely material transactions but rather hybrid and multilayered political processes.

In local democracy, political brokers manage patronage networks characterized by fragmented patronage patterns, where various forms of clientelistic relationships operate simultaneously. Therefore, the role of political brokers becomes highly central within contemporary clientelistic systems and constitutes an important foundation for understanding political dynamics at the village and subdistrict levels.

Volunteers and Village-Level Coordinators as Political Intermediaries

Volunteers function as strategic political intermediaries within electoral campaign structures, particularly at the local level. In the context of campaign management, Chewning et al. (2024) explain that volunteers can be understood as loyal and representative agents in addressing principal-agent problems within political campaigns. These findings indicate that volunteers not only carry out candidate instructions but are also trusted to represent candidates' interests and political messages at the grassroots level.

In practice, Village Coordinators perform brokerage functions by recruiting, coordinating, and supervising voter bases within their respective areas. Kordes are involved not only in delivering campaign messages but also in

managing and distributing campaign resources informally. This role resembles that of village brokers who organize informal campaign teams within local political networks.

Non-party volunteers, such as Dozer Volunteers, possess greater flexibility as political intermediaries compared to formal political party structures because they are not bound by rigid organizational hierarchies. Their presence shortens the distance between candidates and grassroots voters. Thus, volunteers and Kordes can be understood as crucial elements within intermediary political practices.

The Relationship Between Candidates, Volunteers, and Voters

The tripartite relationship between candidates, volunteers, and voters constitutes the core of brokerage politics and clientelism within local democracy. In campaign structures, candidates rely heavily on volunteers to deliver political messages aimed at building positive public images among voters. Zaini & Ramziya Amjad Bakhitah (2025) emphasize the importance of effective political messaging in constructing candidate images, particularly among young voters who tend to respond to persuasive and personal communication. Within this relationship, volunteers act as agents representing candidate interests while simultaneously serving as channels for grassroots voter aspirations and needs.

Interactions between volunteers and voters are reciprocal in nature, characterized by exchanges of political support for various forms of benefits, both material and symbolic. Voters generally respond more positively to personal approaches carried out by volunteers and Village Coordinators (Kordes) than to impersonal formal campaigns. This dynamic ultimately strengthens clientelistic ties at the local level and shapes sustainable political relationship patterns. Overall, the tripartite relationship between candidates, volunteers, and voters becomes a determining factor in the effectiveness of political winning strategies (Zaini & Ramziya Amjad Bakhitah, 2025).

The Relevance of the Broker Concept in the Context of Indonesian Local Politics

The concept of political brokers is highly relevant for analyzing local politics in Indonesia, which remains strongly characterized by patronage practices. Aspinall & As'Ad (2015) found that "the centrality of brokers in clientelistic systems" is highly prominent in Indonesian elections. In Bone Regency, Dozer Volunteers and Kordes functioned as village brokers who mapped and mobilized votes across subdistricts.

This relevance is reflected in brokers' ability to combine formal and informal politics.. Koster (2016) supports this argument by emphasizing that

brokers become important intermediaries within participatory governance. This concept helps explain why volunteer density influences the vote acquisition of the BerAMAL pair. Brokerage politics theory complements the grand theory of mobilization through a clientelistic perspective. Therefore, this approach serves as an appropriate supporting theory for subdistrict-level case studies.

Electoral Geography

The Influence of Regional Context on Voting Behavior

Regional context influences voting behavior through social, economic, and cultural mechanisms that are specific to each locality. In electoral geography studies, Agnew (1996) argues that conventional mapping approaches and explanations of locality effects are often problematic because they ontologically separate space from social practice, despite the fact that both are inherently interconnected. This perspective emphasizes that regional context is not merely an additional variable but rather a central element in understanding political behavior and electoral choices. Consequently, geographic space is understood as a social arena that shapes voters' political preferences and actions. Temple (2023) adds a contemporary perspective by highlighting the role of spatial mediation and the politics of knowledge in voting and campaigning practices, demonstrating that electoral processes are always influenced by how space is socially interpreted and managed.

Therefore, voting behavior cannot be understood separately from the geographical and social characteristics of a region. At the local level, factors such as community proximity, social networks, and region-specific issues become major determinants in the formation of political support. This theoretical framework explains why non-party volunteers, such as Dozer Volunteers, can operate more effectively in certain regions than in others. Overall, regional context constitutes a crucial variable shaping voter support patterns and local political winning dynamics.

The Legitimacy of Using Selected Subdistrict Case Studies

The use of case studies in selected subdistricts possesses strong theoretical legitimacy within the framework of Electoral Geography. Agnew (1996) supports this approach by emphasizing that context matters and therefore requires in-depth analysis at specific local levels. The case study approach enables researchers to capture place-based political dynamics that are often invisible in aggregate data analyses.

Temple (2023) strengthens this argument by emphasizing the importance of spatial mediation, whose effects are most visible at smaller territorial scales such as subdistricts and villages. Through a case study

approach, researchers can gain deeper understanding of how volunteers interact with local social, economic, and cultural contexts. This methodological legitimacy becomes increasingly relevant within the Indonesian political context, which is strongly influenced by local factors, village social networks, and clientelistic practices.

Moreover, subdistrict-level case studies allow for more accurate mapping of the distribution and density of Dozer Volunteers according to regional characteristics. Therefore, the use of subdistrict case studies is consistent with the fundamental principles of the Politics of Place theory in explaining local electoral political dynamics.

Theoretical Synthesis and Conceptual Framework Integration of Political Mobilization Theory, Brokerage Politics, and Electoral Geography

The synthesis of Political Mobilization Theory, Brokerage Politics, and Electoral Geography constitutes the primary conceptual foundation of this study. Political Mobilization Theory, developed by McCarthy & Zald (1977) serves as the grand theory explaining how Dozer Volunteers mobilize human resources rationally, systematically, and strategically to achieve electoral objectives. This theory emphasizes that political success is determined not only by voter preferences but also by the ability of political actors to manage available resources.


Brokerage Politics, as proposed by Aspinall & As'Ad (2015) complements this framework by positioning volunteers and Village Coordinators (Kordes) as political brokers who connect candidates with voters through patronage networks and clientelistic social relationships. Meanwhile, Electoral Geography, introduced by Agnew (1996) provides a spatial perspective by emphasizing that regional context is highly influential in electoral processes, meaning that political mobilization does not occur within neutral or homogeneous spaces.

These three theories reinforce one another: mobilization theory explains the mechanisms of resource mobilization, brokerage politics explains the role of intermediary actors, and electoral geography explains the regional context in which mobilization occurs. Their integration enables a comprehensive analysis of political winning strategies at the subdistrict level. Hujo & Bangura (2020) support this perspective by emphasizing that the politics of domestic resource mobilization must be understood within specific local political contexts. Temple (2023) further adds a contemporary dimension

through the concept of spatial mediation, which is increasingly relevant in the dynamics of electoral politics in the digital era.

Thus, the synthesis of these three theories produces a coherent and applicable analytical framework for examining political winning strategies in the case study of the Bone Regency Regional Election (Agnew, 1996; Aspinall & As'Ad, 2015; McCarthy & Zald, 1977)

Figure 1.1 Conceptual Framework



Source: Author's Compilation, 2026

Conceptual Framework of the Study

Dozer Volunteers function as the primary agents initiating the mobilization process by recruiting, coordinating, and organizing human resources at the village and subdistrict levels. McCarthy & Zald (1977) argue that the resource mobilization perspective provides a set of concepts and propositions that position mobilization as a crucial step in the success of political movements. Through the role of brokerage politics, as explained by Aspinall & As'Ad (2015), volunteers and Village Coordinators (Kordes) act as intermediaries who manage the relationship between candidates and voters through clientelistic mechanisms and local social networks. Furthermore, regional context, as emphasized by Agnew (1996) determines the level of mobilization effectiveness, since differences in social, economic, and cultural characteristics produce variations in electoral outcomes across subdistricts.

The relationship among these concepts is sequential and causal: the denser the presence of Dozer Volunteers in a particular subdistrict, the stronger the political mobilization process carried out, thereby increasing the likelihood of greater vote acquisition for the BerAMAL pair.

Chewning et al. (2024) strengthen this argument by stating that volunteers who act as loyal and representative agents are capable of translating mobilization strategies into tangible voter support. Temple (2023) further

emphasizes that spatial context mediates the entire process, from mobilization to the conversion of support into votes. Therefore, this conceptual framework logically explains why the density and intensity of volunteer activities are positively correlated with candidate victory in selected subdistricts.

This study employs a qualitative approach with a case study design to gain an in-depth and contextual understanding of the role of Dozer Volunteers in local political winning strategies. The qualitative approach was selected because it allows the exploration of meanings, processes, and socio-political dynamics that cannot be adequately explained through quantitative approaches. Creswell & Poth (2016) explain that qualitative research aims to understand the meanings individuals or groups assign to social problems. A case study design was adopted because this research examines a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context in depth, as emphasized by Yin (2018)

The research location was focused on eleven selected subdistricts in Bone Regency, South Sulawesi, namely Patimpeng, Libureng, Tellulimpoe, Bengo, Kajuaru, Bontocani, Lamuru, Salomekko, Lappariaja, Kahu, and Tonra Subdistricts. The selection of these subdistricts was conducted purposively by considering the dominance of the BerAMAL pair's electoral victory as well as the density and intensity of Dozer Volunteer activities within these areas. Purposive sampling was employed because it is considered the most appropriate technique for selecting cases and units of analysis capable of providing rich and relevant information aligned with the objectives of the study (Ahmad & Wilkins, 2025)

The primary unit of analysis in this study consists of Dozer Volunteers and Village Coordinators (Kordes) as grassroots political mobilization actors, while the secondary unit of analysis comprises the vote acquisition data of the BerAMAL pair at the subdistrict level. All data utilized in this study are secondary data, including election result recapitulations from the General Election Commission (KPU) of Bone Regency and internal documents of Dozer Volunteers, such as membership lists, Kordes organizational structures, and activity reports. The use of secondary data was chosen to maintain objectivity and preserve the non-interventionist nature of the research. Yin (2018) emphasizes that documents and archives constitute strong sources of evidence in case study research.

Data collection was conducted through document studies using procedures of systematic data tracing, coding, and categorization. Creswell & Poth (2016) state that document analysis is a systematic procedure for reviewing and evaluating written materials to gain in-depth understanding. The data were analyzed using a descriptive-comparative approach across selected

subdistricts with a pattern matching technique, namely by comparing the density of Dozer Volunteers with the vote acquisition of the BerAMAL pair. The analysis was conducted through stages of data reduction, data presentation, and gradual conclusion drawing.

Results and Discussion

Overview of the 2024 Bone Regency Regional Election Results

The results of the 2024 Regent and Vice Regent Election in Bone Regency demonstrated the strong dominance of candidate pair number 3, Andi Asman Sulaiman and Andi Akmal Pasluddin (BerAMAL). Based on the Decree of the General Election Commission (KPU) of Bone Regency Number 5720 of 2024, candidate pair number 1, Andi Rio Idris Padjalangi and Amir Mahmud (Sipakario), obtained 86,717 votes, while candidate pair number 2, Andi Islamuddin and Andi Irwandi Natsir (Tegak Lurus), secured 114,083 votes. In contrast, the BerAMAL pair achieved 199,954 votes, equivalent to approximately 49.89 percent of the total valid votes. The vote margin between BerAMAL and its closest competitor exceeded 85,000 votes, indicating a quantitatively significant advantage.

The distribution of electoral victories across subdistricts reveals that BerAMAL dominated in 24 out of 27 subdistricts in Bone Regency. Their electoral dominance was particularly evident in several strategic subdistricts. In Tellu Siattinge Subdistrict, BerAMAL obtained 12,917 votes. In Lappariaja, the pair secured 10,419 votes. In Libureng, the vote acquisition reached 10,107 votes, while in Kajuara it totaled 9,653 votes, and in Bengo 9,176 votes. In Kahu Subdistrict, BerAMAL also achieved a strong lead with 9,234 votes. Meanwhile, the Sipakario pair only prevailed in East Tanete Riattang and Tonra Subdistricts, whereas the Tegak Lurus pair won in Dua Boccoe and Ajangale Subdistricts.

Tabel 1.1 Distribution of Candidate Pair Victories by Subdistrict

Subdistrict	Sipakario Votes	Tegak Lurus Votes	BerAMAL Votes	Winner	Vote Margin
Ulaweng	3,469	5,176	6,201	BerAMAL	1,025
East Tanete Riattang	9,618	4,694	7,778	Sipakario	1,840
West Tanete Riattang	6,914	5,884	9,799	BerAMAL	2,885
Tanete Riattang	7,973	5,828	10,097	BerAMAL	2,124
Palakka	2,993	4,268	6,306	BerAMAL	2,038
Sibulue	4,130	5,798	8,593	BerAMAL	2,795
Ponre	364	2,028	6,291	BerAMAL	4,263

Dua Boccoe	2,286	7,059	6,983	Tegak Lurus	76
Cina	3,198	4,626	7,031	BerAMAL	2,405
Bengo	1,699	2,505	9,176	BerAMAL	6,671
Barebbo	4,873	3,897	7,245	BerAMAL	2,372
Awangpone	3,257	4,479	9,732	BerAMAL	5,253
Amali	878	3,286	6,653	BerAMAL	3,367
Ajangale	1,390	7,253	5,376	Tegak Lurus	1,877
Kahu	4,430	7,065	9,234	BerAMAL	2,169
Tonra	3,615	2,229	2,343	Sipakario	1,272
Tellu	2,958	5,782	12,917	BerAMAL	7,135
Siattinge					
Tellu Limpoe	856	1,882	4,689	BerAMAL	2,807
Salomekko	1,506	2,612	4,417	BerAMAL	1,805
Patimpeng	1,942	2,402	4,223	BerAMAL	1,821
Mare	4,059	4,746	6,130	BerAMAL	1,384
Libureng	1,942	4,109	10,107	BerAMAL	5,998
Lappariaja	1,442	1,353	10,419	BerAMAL	8,977
Lamuru	2,822	2,335	7,977	BerAMAL	5,155
Kajuara	3,370	5,180	9,653	BerAMAL	4,473
Cenrana	3,852	3,461	6,123	BerAMAL	2,271
Bontocani	881	4,148	4,461	BerAMAL	313

Source: General Election Commission (KPU) of Bone Regency (Decree No. 5720/2024, dated December 5, 2024).

Spatially, the pattern of BerAMAL's victory demonstrates a broad and relatively even distribution of support across both rural and semi-urban areas. The widespread victories in nearly all subdistricts indicate that the mobilization strategy was not centralized, but instead reached voter bases across various parts of Bone Regency. The position of the BerAMAL pair in the contestation can therefore be categorized as dominant both numerically and geographically.

These findings are reinforced by statements from informants among subdistrict-level volunteers. A Village Coordinator (Kordes) in Libureng Subdistrict stated:

“We worked in almost all villages, not just focusing on one point. Every polling station already had volunteers assigned to it. That is what made our votes evenly distributed and not concentrated in only one area.” (Kordes Libureng, 2025)

This statement demonstrates the existence of a systematic distribution of volunteer work at the grassroots level. Another informant from the volunteer team in Kajuara Subdistrict also emphasized:

“The strategy was not only about large campaigns, but also direct approaches to residents’ homes. We visited almost every hamlet. So, by election day, the support had already been established beforehand.” (DTDC Volunteer of Kajuara Subdistrict, 2025)

These interview excerpts illustrate that the success of the BerAMAL pair was determined not only by formal political party support, but also by structured volunteer mobilization that reached voters down to the village and polling station levels. Therefore, the results of the 2024 Bone Regency Regional Election demonstrate a strong relationship between the distribution of grassroots mobilization and the dominance of BerAMAL’s vote acquisition across the majority of subdistricts.

The position of the BerAMAL pair in the political contestation can be categorized as dominant both spatially and numerically. Numerically, the vote margin against the closest competitor exceeded 85,000 votes. Spatially, victories in 24 subdistricts indicate that support was not concentrated in only one or two areas, but rather distributed evenly throughout most parts of Bone Regency. This pattern reflects the success of a political mobilization strategy capable of converting grassroots support into actual votes during the electoral process. Thus, overall, the results of the 2024 Bone Regency Regional Election positioned the BerAMAL pair as the dominant actor in local political contestation, supported by a broad and significantly distributed voter base across subdistricts.

Profile and Distribution of Dozer Volunteers

The profile of Dozer Volunteers in the 2024 Bone Regency Regional Election reveals a systematic organizational structure distributed down to the village level through Village Coordinators (Kordes). These volunteers were known as DTDC (Door To Door Campaign), functioning as the spearhead of grassroots mobilization efforts in the field. The distribution of volunteers across the eleven selected subdistricts demonstrates considerable variation in density, both in terms of the number of members and the number of Kordes responsible for coordinating activities at the village level.

Quantitatively, the number of volunteers and Kordes in each subdistrict is as follows:

Table 2.2 Number of Dozer Volunteers and Village Coordinators (Kordes) by Subdistrict

Subdistrict	Number of DTDC Volunteers	Number of Kordes
Patimpeng	135	10
Libureng	277	20

Tellulimpoe	124	11
Bengo	156	9
Kajuara	216	18
Bontocani	181	11
Lamuru	168	12
Salomekko	116	8
Lappariaja	170	9
Kahu	265	20
Tonra	96	11

Source: Dozer Volunteer Data, 2024

The data indicate that Libureng and Kahu Subdistricts had the highest number of volunteers, with 277 and 265 members respectively, supported by 20 Kordes in each subdistrict. Meanwhile, Tonra Subdistrict had the lowest number of volunteers, totaling only 96 individuals, despite having 11 Kordes. This variation reflects differences in mobilization intensity and organizational capacity across regions.

Based on this distribution, volunteer density can be classified into three categories. First, the high-density category (≥ 200 volunteers), which includes Libureng (277), Kahu (265), and Kajuara (216). Second, the medium-density category (150–199 volunteers), which includes Bontocani (181), Lappariaja (170), Lamuru (168), and Bengo (156). Third, the low-density category (< 150 volunteers), which includes Patimpeng (135), Tellulimpoe (124), Salomekko (116), and Tonra (96).

This classification demonstrates that volunteer density was unevenly distributed across subdistricts. Areas with high volunteer density were generally subdistricts with large voter bases and therefore became priorities for mobilization efforts. In contrast, subdistricts with low volunteer density tended to face limitations in volunteer numbers or had narrower territorial coverage.

These findings are reinforced by statements from informants at the subdistrict level. A DTDC volunteer coordinator in Kahu Subdistrict stated:

“In Kahu, we intentionally prepared larger teams because the area is extensive and the voter base is large. Every village has a Kordes, and each already has volunteers assigned to every polling station.” (DTDC Volunteer of Kahu Subdistrict, 2025)

Meanwhile, a DTDC volunteer in Tonra Subdistrict explained:

“Our numbers are indeed not as large as in other subdistricts, but we still tried our best. We focused on potential villages and maintaining the votes we already had.” (DTDC Volunteer of Tonra Subdistrict, 2025)

These statements indicate that the volunteer distribution strategy was adaptive to regional characteristics. Therefore, the profile and distribution of

Dozer Volunteers reveal a structured and village-based mobilization pattern that was adjusted to the electoral needs of each subdistrict.

Vote Acquisition in Selected Subdistricts

In analyzing the variations in the electoral achievements of the BerAMAL pair across the eleven selected subdistricts, this study establishes three categories—dominant, moderate, and low—based on two primary indicators: the position of victory and the vote margin against the closest competitor. The dominant category is assigned when BerAMAL obtained the highest number of votes with a significant margin of at least 1,000 votes over the nearest rival. The moderate category is assigned when BerAMAL won the election but with a margin of fewer than 1,000 votes, indicating a relatively close level of competition. Meanwhile, the low category is assigned when BerAMAL failed to secure the highest number of votes or experienced defeat in the subdistrict. The following table presents the Recapitulation of Vote Acquisition and Mapping of Volunteer Strength of the BerAMAL Candidate Pair by Subdistrict Based on Category.

Table 3.3 Recapitulation of Vote Acquisition and Mapping of Volunteer Strength of the “BerAMAL” Candidate Pair by Subdistrict Based on Category

Subdistri ct	Sipakari o Votes	Tega k Luru s Vote s	BerAMA L Votes	BerAMAL Vote Classificatio n	Number of DTDC Volunteer s	Numbe r of Kordes
Patimpen g	1,942	2,40 2	4,223	Dominant	135	10
Libureng	1,942	4,10 9	10,107	Dominant	277	20
Tellu Limpoe	856	1,88 2	4,689	Dominant	124	11
Bengo	1,699	2,50 5	9,176	Dominant	156	9
Kajuara	3,370	5,18 0	9,653	Dominant	216	18
Bontocan i	881	4,14 8	4,461	Moderate	181	11
Lamuru	2,822	2,33 5	7,977	Dominant	168	12
Salomekk o	1,506	2,61 2	4,417	Dominant	116	8

Lappariaja	1,442	1,353	10,419	Dominant	170	9
Kahu	4,430	7,065	9,234	Dominant	265	20
Tonra	3,615	2,229	2,343	Low	96	11

Source: General Election Commission (KPU) of Bone Regency (Decree No. 5720/2024, dated December 5, 2024) and Dozer Volunteer Data, 2024.

Based on this classification, nine subdistricts fall into the dominant category. In Patimpeng Subdistrict, BerAMAL obtained 4,223 votes and led by 1,821 votes over the closest competitor, supported by 135 volunteers and 10 Kordes. In Libureng, the pair secured 10,107 votes with a margin of 5,998 votes, supported by 277 volunteers and 20 Kordes. Tellu Limpoe recorded 4,689 votes (margin of 2,807), Bengo 9,176 votes (margin of 6,671), Kajuaara 9,653 votes (margin of 4,473), Lamuru 7,977 votes (margin of 5,155), Salomekko 4,417 votes (margin of 1,805), Lappariaja 10,419 votes (margin of 8,977), and Kahu 9,234 votes (margin of 2,169). In general, these subdistricts possessed relatively high volunteer density or were effectively organized through Kordes structures extending to the village and polling station levels.

The moderate category was identified in Bontocani Subdistrict, where BerAMAL obtained 4,461 votes and led by only 313 votes over Tegak Lurus, despite being supported by 181 volunteers and 11 Kordes. Meanwhile, Tonra Subdistrict was classified in the low category because BerAMAL secured only 2,343 votes and fell behind Sipakario, which obtained 3,615 votes, with support from 96 volunteers and 11 Kordes.

This pattern demonstrates a tendency toward a relationship between volunteer density and the level of vote dominance, although the relationship is not entirely linear. Subdistricts with high numbers of volunteers, such as Libureng (277 volunteers) and Kahu (265 volunteers), displayed very strong vote acquisition. In contrast, Tonra, which had the smallest number of volunteers, fell into the low category. However, the case of Bontocani illustrates that a relatively large number of volunteers does not automatically produce a large vote margin, as local competition factors also play a significant role.

A Kordes in Libureng Subdistrict explained:

“We clearly divided the working areas. Every village had a Kordes, and every polling station had at least four volunteers. Mobilization had started long before the quiet period, so support was already consolidated.” (Kordes of Libureng Subdistrict, 2025)

Meanwhile, a Kordes in Tonra Subdistrict stated:

“Tonra is indeed a difficult area because the opponent’s support base has existed for a long time. Volunteers were present, but their numbers were not as many as in other subdistricts, so their influence was not as strong as in Libureng or Kahu.” (Kordes of Tonra Subdistrict, 2025)

These statements from informants reinforce the finding that the density and intensity of volunteer activities contributed to the vote acquisition of the BerAMAL pair, although their effectiveness remained influenced by the competitive structure and socio-political characteristics of each subdistrict. Therefore, the variation in vote acquisition across subdistricts reflects the interaction between the strength of volunteer mobilization and differing regional contexts.

The Pattern of Relationship Between Volunteers and Vote Acquisition

An analysis of the eleven selected subdistricts demonstrates a consistent relationship between the density of Dozer Door To Door Campaign (DTDC) Volunteers and the vote acquisition of the BerAMAL pair. Within the field organizational structure, each village or urban ward was assigned at least four DTDC volunteers, adjusted according to the number of polling stations in the area. This scheme was designed to ensure that every polling station had volunteers responsible for voter registration, personal outreach, voter mobilization, and vote monitoring on election day. Consequently, the greater the number of polling stations within a subdistrict, the greater the number of volunteers required.

The first pattern indicates that subdistricts with a high number of volunteers tended to produce high vote acquisition and were categorized as dominant. Libureng Subdistrict, with 277 volunteers and 20 Kordes, obtained 10,107 votes. Kahu Subdistrict, with 265 volunteers and 20 Kordes, secured 9,234 votes. Kajuara, with 216 volunteers, recorded 9,653 votes, while Lappariaja, with 170 volunteers, generated 10,419 votes. The large number of volunteers distributed down to the polling station level enabled mobilization efforts to operate intensively and systematically, allowing support to be converted into votes more effectively.

The second pattern shows that subdistricts with a moderate number of volunteers generated relatively moderate electoral outcomes. Bontocani Subdistrict had 181 volunteers and 11 Kordes; however, BerAMAL only obtained 4,461 votes and won by a narrow margin of 313 votes over the closest competitor. This condition indicates that although the number of volunteers was relatively large, the level of local competition and the strength of the opponent’s voter base still significantly influenced the margin of victory.

The third pattern reveals that subdistricts with a low number of volunteers tended to produce narrow vote margins or even electoral defeat. Tonra Subdistrict had 96 volunteers and 11 Kordes and recorded only 2,343 votes for BerAMAL, below Sipakario's total of 3,615 votes. The limited number of volunteers meant that not all polling stations could be reached optimally, resulting in lower mobilization intensity compared to other subdistricts.

A Kordes in Kahu Subdistrict explained the distribution mechanism as follows:

"Each polling station had at least four active volunteers. They were not only guarding the votes but also ensuring that registered voters actually came to vote. That is why our votes remained stable in almost all villages." (Kordes of Kahu Subdistrict, 2025)

A DTDC volunteer in Libureng Subdistrict also emphasized the importance of polling station-based distribution:

"We divided the working areas according to the number of polling stations. Because we had enough volunteers, the outreach could be more intensive and evenly distributed. Almost all voter bases had been approached before election day." (DTDC Volunteer of Libureng, 2025)

Meanwhile, a Kordes in Tonra Subdistrict described the challenges they faced:

"Our number of volunteers was limited compared to other subdistricts. There were several polling stations that could not be reached optimally because of distance and the large territorial coverage." (Kordes of Tonra Subdistrict, 2025)

These findings demonstrate that the higher the density and distribution of volunteers down to the polling station level, the greater the opportunity for candidates to obtain dominant electoral support. Conversely, limitations in volunteer numbers reduced the intensity of mobilization and potentially lowered electoral outcomes. Therefore, the relationship pattern between volunteers and vote acquisition in the Bone Regency Regional Election indicates a strong positive correlation between grassroots mobilization capacity and electoral results at the subdistrict level.

Dozer Volunteers as Agents of Political Mobilization

The findings of this study indicate that Dozer Volunteers functioned as the primary agents of political mobilization in the victory strategy of the BerAMAL pair in Bone Regency. This role can be analyzed using the Political Mobilization Theory proposed by McCarthy dan Zald (1977). From the perspective of resource mobilization, the success of a political movement is

determined not only by voter preferences, but also by the ability of actors to organize, distribute, and optimize available resources. In this context, Dozer Volunteers functioned as human resources that were systematically mobilized down to the village and polling station levels.

The distribution of at least four volunteers per polling station demonstrates a rational and structured management of resources. This scheme reflects the principles of mobilization that emphasize organization, coordination, and efficiency in converting support into votes (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Findings from dominant-category subdistricts, such as Libureng and Kahu, reveal that high volunteer density correlated with significant vote acquisition. This aligns with the argument of Hujo and Bangura (2020) who state that political resource mobilization operates through the negotiation and organization of local actors within specific contexts.

Therefore, Dozer Volunteers did not merely serve as symbolic supporters of the candidate pair, but rather functioned as instruments of electoral mobilization that connected campaign strategies with the social realities of grassroots voters. The success of this mobilization demonstrates the relevance of Political Mobilization Theory in explaining the dynamics of electoral victory in the Bone Regency Regional Election.

The Role of Kordes as Local Political Brokers

In addition to DTDC volunteers, Village Coordinators (Kordes) occupied a central position as political brokers at the local level. This role can be understood through the framework of Brokerage Politics developed by Aspinall and As'ad (2015). In clientelistic political systems, brokers function as intermediaries who connect candidates with voters through village-based social networks.

Within the structure of Dozer Volunteers, Kordes performed this function by recruiting volunteers, mapping voters, and coordinating the distribution of campaign resources. This role resembles the concept of *village brokerage networks* described by Aspinall and As'ad (2015), in which village brokers become key actors in the distribution of patronage and the mobilization of political support. Koster (2016) also emphasizes that brokers are intermediary actors who combine formal and informal political practices.

In the context of the Bone Regency Regional Election, Kordes not only conveyed campaign messages from the candidates but also established personal relationships with voters, thereby strengthening voter loyalty and support. This intermediary role helps explain why, in most subdistricts, volunteer mobilization was successfully converted into significant electoral victories. Therefore, an analysis based on Brokerage Politics demonstrates that the

effectiveness of Dozer Volunteers was closely linked to the role of Kordes as managers of social and political networks at the village level.

Regional Context and Variations in Volunteer Effectiveness

Although there was a tendency toward a positive relationship between volunteer density and vote acquisition, findings from Bontocani and Tonra Subdistricts demonstrate that the effectiveness of mobilization was not uniform. This variation can be explained through the perspective of Electoral Geography as proposed by Agnew (1996). Agnew argues that regional context plays a determining role in shaping voting behavior and electoral outcomes.

Differences in social characteristics, local patronage networks, and the strength of competing political bases across subdistricts created variations in vote acquisition, even in areas with relatively large numbers of volunteers. Temple (2023) further argues that electoral processes are always mediated by specific spatial contexts, meaning that mobilization strategies cannot be understood separately from regional characteristics.

The case of Bontocani, which produced only a narrow victory despite having 181 volunteers, indicates that intense local competition affected the effectiveness of mobilization. Meanwhile, Tonra, which had the smallest number of volunteers, also reflects the limitations of mobilization capacity within a less favorable regional context. Thus, Electoral Geography Theory helps explain that political mobilization operates within socially heterogeneous spaces, making variations in electoral outcomes across subdistricts a logical consequence of differing local contexts.

Implications of the Findings for the Study of Local Politics

The findings of this study have important implications for the study of local politics in Indonesia. First, the results strengthen the argument that informal non-party volunteer networks play a strategic role in local electoral democracy. Volunteer-based mobilization demonstrates that political machinery no longer depends entirely on formal party structures, but also on the organizational capacity of flexible and adaptive non-party networks. This finding is consistent with Aspinall and As'ad's (2015) argument regarding the centrality of brokers in Indonesia's local political system.

Second, this study reaffirms the relevance of Political Mobilization Theory in explaining the dynamics of regional elections at the regency level. McCarthy and Zald (1977) argue that political success is determined by the ability to manage resources effectively, and the findings in Bone Regency provide a concrete manifestation of this concept within the context of local democracy.

Third, from the perspective of Indonesian local democracy, the existence of non-party volunteers can strengthen public political participation when mobilization is conducted in a participatory rather than purely clientelistic manner. Wahyuni et al. (2022) emphasize the importance of integrity-based mobilization in maintaining the quality of elections. Therefore, the strengthening of volunteer networks should be balanced with transparent democratic governance in order to avoid falling into exclusive patronage practices.

Overall, this study demonstrates that the integration of Political Mobilization Theory, Brokerage Politics, and Electoral Geography provides a comprehensive explanation of the relationship between volunteers, village intermediary structures, regional contexts, and variations in electoral outcomes at the subdistrict level. These findings enrich the literature on Indonesian local politics by providing empirical evidence regarding the role of non-party volunteers in regency-level regional election contestations.

Conclusion

Based on the overall findings of this study, it can be concluded that Dozer Volunteers played a strategic role in the victory of Andi Asman Sulaiman and Andi Akmal Pasluddin (BerAMAL) in the 2024 Bone Regency Regional Election. The dominance reflected in the acquisition of 199,954 votes and victories across 24 subdistricts demonstrates that organized grassroots mobilization became a key factor beyond formal party support.

From the perspective of Political Mobilization Theory, the density and distribution of volunteers down to the polling station level were proven to correlate positively with vote acquisition. Subdistricts with high numbers of volunteers, such as Libureng and Kahu, demonstrated dominant victories, while areas with lower volunteer density, such as Tonra, produced weaker electoral outcomes.

Through the framework of Brokerage Politics, Kordes functioned as political brokers who bridged candidates and voters through village-based social networks. Meanwhile, the perspective of Electoral Geography explains that the effectiveness of mobilization was still influenced by regional contexts and the level of local political competition.

Overall, the victory of BerAMAL was the result of the integration of structured non-party volunteer mobilization, the intermediary role of village coordinators, and adaptation to regional characteristics. Dozer Volunteers proved to be an effective instrument of electoral mobilization in converting social support into tangible political votes at the subdistrict level.

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