
Political Marketing Communication Strategies of LHKP Muhammadiyah East Java for the 2024 Legislative Elections

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Abstrak

Penelitian ini membedah strategi komunikasi politik terintegrasi yang diterapkan oleh Lembaga Hikmah dan Kebijakan Publik (LHKP) Pimpinan Wilayah Muhammadiyah Jawa Timur untuk mendukung kader-kadernya dalam Pemilu Legislatif 2024. Menggunakan pendekatan kualitatif deskriptif, penelitian ini mengkaji mekanisme kelembagaan serta dampak dari strategi tersebut terhadap kandidat dan pemilih. Hasilnya menunjukkan bahwa LHKP Jawa Timur menerapkan kerangka komunikasi berbasis institusi yang terstruktur, dengan membentuk tim kemenangan khusus, memperluas jaringan lintas wilayah, dan memanfaatkan media internal serta platform media sosial secara strategis. Selain itu, narasi politik dikemas dalam paradigma keagamaan amar ma'ruf nahi munkar agar sejalan dengan identitas ideologis organisasi. Namun, implementasi strategi ini belum sepenuhnya optimal. Meski konstituen "Jipolmu" mengalami efek kognitif, afektif, dan konatif, dampak keseluruhan strategi terbatas karena jangkauan informasinya masih terbatas hingga tingkat akar rumput. Temuan ini menegaskan kompleksitas memobilisasi organisasi masyarakat sipil keagamaan di tengah lanskap elektoral yang kompetitif.

Kata kunci: *Komunikasi Pemasaran Politik, LHKP Muhammadiyah, Masyarakat Sipil, dan Politik Elektoral.*

Abstract

This study examines how the Institute of Public Policy and Wisdom (LHKP) of the East Java Muhammadiyah Regional Board employs political communication strategies to support its candidates in the 2024 Legislative Election. Using a qualitative descriptive approach, it investigates the institutional mechanisms and their influence on candidates and voters. The findings reveal that LHKP East Java implemented a structured communication system that included forming dedicated winning teams, strengthening inter-regional networks, and strategically using internal and social media platforms. Moreover, political messages were crafted around the religious concept of amar ma'ruf nahi munkar to resonate with the organization's ideological identity. Nonetheless, these strategies were not executed optimally. While the "Jipolmu" constituency produced cognitive, affective, and conative effects, the overall impact was limited by the narrow

scope of grassroots outreach. These results underscore the difficulties faced by religious civil society organizations in a competitive electoral landscape.

Keywords: *Political Marketing Communication, LHKP Muhammadiyah, Civil Society, Electoral Politics.*

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Introduction

Religious civil society organizations play a fundamental role in safeguarding democratic consolidation in Indonesia. Drawing on the paradigm of Civil Islam (Hefner, 2000), Muhammadiyah has long positioned itself as a state balancer and a moral guardian of constitutionalism (Argenti et.al., 2017). However, as contemporary political dynamics become increasingly complex, Muhammadiyah's articulation of political participation has been compelled to undergo a fundamental transformation. Its participatory political stance, which in the past largely manifested as a cultural movement distanced from power, has now shifted toward a more proactive need for interest aggregation. This transformation is an empirical necessity to ensure that public policies produced at the legislative level continue to represent Islamic values and the principles of good governance.

The tactical shift was clearly evident during the 2024 Legislative Elections, particularly in East Java—one of the most fiercely contested electoral arenas in Indonesia. In response to the organization's "independent-active" instruction to encourage the diaspora of its cadres into various political parties (Abdul Mu'ti, t.t.), the East Java Regional Board of Muhammadiyah (PWM) took progressive institutional steps. The PWM strategically delegated electoral political oversight to the Institute of Public Policy and Wisdom (LHKP) by forming a specialized tactical task force, the Muhammadiyah *Political Jihad Team* (Jipolmu). The establishment of this dedicated task force marks a managerial leap for Muhammadiyah, rationalizing and centralizing its political support and transforming its cultural mass base into a systematically institutionalized electoral instrument without violating its foundational identity (*khittah*) as a non-partisan entity.

This systematic effort to mobilize voters raises a significant academic issue, especially in adapting the Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC) concept (Kotler & Armstrong, 2018) to the operations of a civil society organization.

Typically, IMC strategies are crafted for and used by corporations or political parties that rely on extensive patronage, pragmatic political infrastructure, and coercive influence over their party machinery. A theoretical conflict appears when this modern marketing approach is applied by Muhammadiyah's LHKP. The IMC tools, which depend on the rationality of the electoral market, must be carefully aligned with the organization's moral identity, in which political messages and ideas are strictly governed by the religious mission (*da'wah*) value of *amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*. This presents conceptual questions about the compatibility of market-oriented management strategies with the core character of religious movement organizations.

This conceptual tension is supported by an empirical anomaly observed in practice. While, in theory, integrating an institution like Muhammadiyah with a large sociological foundation and a structured political marketing communication strategy should build a strong voting bloc, the 2024 Elections in East Java showed a different picture: Muhammadiyah's diaspora candidates' electability was highly fragmented and fluctuated widely. This indicates that the Jipolmu Team's moral-focused IMC strategy clashed with grassroots voter pragmatism and a costly political environment. The lack of material patronage and limited communication reach to the lowest voter levels prevented the ideal institutional strategy from translating into consistent electoral support.

The gap between institutional communication design and grassroots reality highlights a key research issue in political sociology and electoral communication. Past studies have mostly focused either on analyzing Muhammadiyah's political theology at a macro scale or on measuring voting behavior among its supporters, without examining the management processes behind these non-partisan campaigns. To fill this gap, this qualitative study applies Political Communication (Dan Nimmo, 2005) and IMC frameworks to thoroughly analyze the integrated marketing tactics of the East Java LHKP's Jipolmu Team. The article describes how communication channels are integrated and critically discusses the structural obstacles that limit the success of civil society's efforts to mobilize voters during competitive democratic elections.

From Cultural Da'wah to Electoral Aggregation: Tracing the Institutional Evolution of LHKP

Muhammadiyah's political institutional change began with the creation of the "*Majelis Hikmah*" (Council of Wisdom) at the 33rd Muktamar in Yogyakarta

in 1950. The choice of the word *hikmah* (wisdom) reflects the organization's strategic flexibility in navigating national political developments. This council was intended not only for normative evaluation of political discussions but also as a mechanism for developing public policies that link cultural da'wah (proselytization) strategies to the aim of establishing a "true Islamic society" (LHKP, 2023). Over time, this institution faced structural changes, including leadership gaps during periods of political turmoil (1962–1965, 1971–1977, and 1985–1990), before being reformed and renamed the Institute of Public Policy and Wisdom (LHKP) in 2005. In the 2022–2027 leadership cycle, the central LHKP (PP Muhammadiyah) launched a significant decentralization of authority to provincial and regional levels to better address local political complexities.

As a result of this decentralization policy, the LHKP of the East Java Regional Board of Muhammadiyah (PWM) was established to address the urgent needs of post-1998 Reformation electoral politics. It functions as both a communication channel and a platform for political education for the organization's cadres (M. Mirdasy, personal communication, May 28, 2024). The creation of the East Java LHKP was motivated by the practical need to tactically manage local political dynamics—such as policy lobbying and regional head election successions—while respecting Muhammadiyah's organizational boundaries as a non-partisan group. This institution allows Muhammadiyah to influence legislative processes and ensure that regional policies align with its Articles of Association/Bylaws (AD/ART) and core values.

This tactical approach is implemented through the development of an institutional vision aligned with the main policy direction. The LHKP's primary vision emphasizes increasing Muhammadiyah members' active involvement in national affairs, based on the principles of *akhlaqul karimah* (noble character) and the *khittah* (foundational guidelines) of the struggle (LHKP, 2023). To make this normative vision measurable within electoral strategies, the East Java LHKP (covering 2022–2027) organized its structure into four key strategic divisions: the Human Resources Development Division, the Insight Development Study Division, the Data and Survey Division, and the Public Relations and Information Division. This division-based organization marks a shift in the LHKP's political communication tools from simple cultural discourse to a targeted, systematic movement.

The operational and political communication effectiveness of the East Java LHKP is crucially supported by its personnel composition. Based on the Decree

of the East Java PWM Number 107/Kep/I1.0/D/2023, the managerial structure of this institution comprises figures with strong track records in the practical political arena.

Position/Division	Nama
Expert Team	Zainuddin Maliki, Suyoto, dan Bambang DH
Chairperson	Muhammad Mirdasy
Deputy Chairperson	Tjutjuk Sunario, Ali Mu'ti, Nur Subeki and Alfi Nurhidayat
Secretary	Agung Supriyanto
Deputy Secretary	M. Afwan Al Asgaf, Yatno, Fahrul Syarifuddin dan Hidayaturrizqon
Human Resources Development Division	Husnul Aqib (Ketua), Sholihin Jami, Wahyudin, Ulul Azmi Rizal, Matlubul, Rifa', Samsul Hadi
Division of Insight Development Studies	Amar Saifudin (Ketua), Shobikin Amin, Mochamad Syu'ban Suwaiby, Abdullah As Syi' Abul Huda, dan Muhammad Manu
Data and Survey Division	Yana Syafriyana Hijri, Dedik Fitra, Suhermanto, Antonius Widiyo Utomo, Diki Wahyudi, Khoiron Ayati, Muhammad Nadzir dan Muchammad Mashuri
Public Relations Division	Mohammad Ilham Butsiyanto, Aan Hariyanto, Nu'man Iskandar, Rista, Erfiana Giordano Ridwan, Eko Priyono, dan Naufal Widi Asmoro Rofid

Table 1.1 Structure of the PWM East Java LHKP

Building on this strong personnel framework, the East Java LHKP goes beyond typical civil society roles by actively participating in electoral politics—a sphere usually dominated by formal political parties and their chosen candidates. This participation is carried out through a strategic program called "one electoral district, one Muhammadiyah cadre" (satu dapil satu kader). The

initiative specifically encourages members to run for legislative, regional head, and village head positions, aiming to ensure that Muhammadiyah candidates win in the 2024 Legislative Elections (Hasil keputusan Rapat Kerja Nasional (Rakernas) LHKP, 2023). To show its commitment, the East Java LHKP established a dedicated ad hoc team, the Muhammadiyah Political Jihad Team (Jipolmu). The team operates with a decentralized structure, reaching down to each Regional Muhammadiyah Board (PDM) at the regency and city levels across East Java. This organized setup helps monitor and support Muhammadiyah candidates' campaigns within their districts, serving as an institutional tool to strengthen and unify the Muhammadiyah voter base (10 Pedoman Strategi Pemenangan CalegMu 2024.pdf, t.t.).

Ultimately, this comprehensive institutional setup—featuring meritocracy-based board members and strategic use of the Jipolmu Team—forms the operational backbone for implementing Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC). This framework allows the organization's da'wah narratives to be coordinated through various channels, including elite network engagement, internal media campaigns, and social media outreach. As a result, the East Java LHKP's political marketing strategy offers a new perspective on academic discussions of civil society's influence in electoral politics (Agil Sabani dkk., 2024). It shows that Muhammadiyah has notably broadened its societal impact, moving beyond its traditional roles in social welfare, health, and education to actively participating in electoral activities while maintaining compliance with the non-partisan principles outlined in the 2002 Denpasar Khittah.

Coordinating Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC) at LHKP East Java

As an Auxiliary Unit of Muhammadiyah's Leadership (UPP), the East Java LHKP has shifted from being merely a normative moral force to an active political aggregator. This change challenges the traditional Habermasian perspective of civil society as a domain separate from state and electoral politics. This institutional transformation is clearly exemplified by the "One Electoral District, One Cadre" program, a sophisticated electoral strategy designed to secure the success of Muhammadiyah's cadre diaspora across various political parties in the 2024 Legislative Elections. More than just a slogan, this initiative reflects a deliberate effort in electoral engineering to guarantee victories for Muhammadiyah's cadres in diverse political parties. Achieving this goal involves managing the complex reality that these cadres are spread across multiple, often

competing, secular and Islamic parties—such as PAN, PKS, and Golkar (Muhammad Mirdasy, komunikasi pribadi, 28 Mei 2024).

To navigate this polycentric political framework without fracturing the organization's unity, the LHKP established the Muhammadiyah Political Jihad Team (Jipolmu). According to the East Java Regional Board (PWM) Decree No: 397/Kep/Ii.0/D2023, Jipolmu carefully divided its operational activities into 13 tactical clusters. These include areas like data analysis, surveys, and targeted outreach to youth and women. Such a large, decentralized structure requires careful and organized political communication management (Dan Nimmo, 2005). In reality, this setup acts as an adaptive, grassroots version of the Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC) model—a system typically used by profit-focused companies or political parties to boost market reach and loyalty (Hamad, 2008).

The East Java LHKP orchestrated its complex IMC strategy by developing a customized information ecosystem. This involved a powerful mix of advertising and interactive marketing designed to capture political attention. The key tool for this digital campaign is the affiliated online media platform, Maklumat.id, which extensively produces and shares political advertorials. The consistent publication of candidate profiles from July 2023 through the election in February 2024 demonstrates their ongoing campaign effort. Articles that emphasize certain narratives—such as depicting a candidate's journey as "Struggling in the Hell Electoral District" or highlighting their "Potential to Win a Seat"—serve purposes beyond mere promotion (Redaksi, 2023). In fact, this platform is designed as a carefully curated, interactive space. By using search features such as hashtags or the "Jipolmu" category, the platform creates an echo chamber that shapes readers' perceptions. This approach helps shape Muhammadiyah members' views, framing the endorsed candidates as true representatives of the organization's religious and social values, rather than mere self-interested contenders.

Although this custom online media infrastructure has been successfully established, Jipolmu's broader communication strategy reveals a significant contradiction compared to the mainstream social media environment today. The LHKP's noticeable failure to leverage its official Instagram accounts (@lhkpjatim and @nderesyok) highlights a major strategic oversight. In a time when the mediatization of politics means that algorithmic visibility often determines political success, ignoring popular visual platforms greatly limits campaign outreach. This is especially harmful when trying to engage rational

voters, swing voters, and young Millennials and Gen Z individuals who tend to steer clear of traditional organizations and primarily consume political content via short videos and algorithm-driven feeds (Abid et.al., 2025).

To address its significant weakness in algorithmic cyberspace penetration, the LHKP strategically shifted its focus to public relations. It leveraged what formal political parties often lack: strong, deeply embedded socio-religious structural capital. This public relations role is intentionally assigned to the Regency/City-level LHKP boards, giving them a dual responsibility. They serve as regional promoters of the centrally endorsed candidates and as key crisis managers to reduce tensions among cadres competing within the same Electoral District (Dapil). This localized approach helps prevent the intense zero-sum electoral rivalry from damaging social cohesion and grassroots solidarity, thereby protecting Muhammadiyah's organizational unity during political upheaval (Andriyani et.al., 2021).

This structural network's systemic optimization enables a highly localized, culturally resonant approach to direct marketing and sales promotion. Instead of traditional, chaotic mass rallies typical of secular political parties—which often rely on clientelism and vote-buying—Jipolmu opts for a more subtle, covert infiltration into existing cultural and educational spaces. Routine forums like *'Ideopolitor'* (Ideology, Politics, and Organization) gatherings in Sidoarjo or Public Discussions in Malang Regency are strategically used as sites for political consolidation. In these seemingly civic and communal environments, political promotion is conducted through deep psychological persuasion that leverages shared theological identity and in-group favoritism. The Jipolmu Team consistently promotes a sophisticated rationalization: while the presidential vote is officially left to individual choice (to maintain a facade of neutrality), legislative votes are presented as a binding collective duty. Voters are told that supporting affiliated candidates is essential to protect the organization's dignity, sustainability, and honor (*muruah*) amid competing ideological factions in parliament.

This political marketing feat chiefly hinges on the exceptional effectiveness of personal selling, which clearly gives LHKP a key edge in the electoral landscape. Unlike typical campaigns that rely on paid partisans or volunteers, in Indonesia's religious communities, personal selling depends on the Weberian charismatic authority of religious and cultural leaders. The visible involvement of prominent figures, such as East Java Jipolmu Chairman M. Mirdasy and Kediri City Regional Board Chairman KH. Achmad Khoiruddin, who offers direct

political endorsements, forges a powerful psychological and spiritual bond with grassroots voters.

When these figures speak from the podium, they skillfully redefine the essence of electoral support. They turn voting from a mundane political act into a sacred duty connected to the Islamic religious struggle of "enjoining good and forbidding wrong" (*amar ma'ruf nahi munkar*). This rhetorical mastery elevates the endorsed candidate beyond being just a politician to a messenger with theological authority. Such sacralization of the ballot is a strategic and rhetorical achievement that secular political marketing, regardless of its resources, cannot replicate. It mitigates voter apathy by linking civic participation to divine consequences, leading to high turnout and steadfast loyalty to Muhammadiyah's chosen candidates.

The empirical results from carefully integrating these six IMC elements form a strong, multidimensional argument showing that the East Java LHKP's actions are not merely reactive or fragmented partisan reactions. Theoretically, this well-organized, deliberate institutional engagement indicates Muhammadiyah's significant development within the realm of New Social Movements (NSM) (Sahputra, 2019). Unlike traditional Marxist-influenced social movements that focus mainly on economic issues, labor rights, and class conflicts, Jipolmu's actions are driven by a modern intersection: the powerful combination of religious beliefs, identity politics, and the strategic mobilization of educated middle-class political resources. This serves as a clear empirical example of how a contemporary civil society actor can strategically blur the boundaries historically separating the civic sphere from the formal political process, pursuing a partisan agenda without ever officially registering as a political party.

To gauge the scale of this transformation, a historical comparison is necessary. During the intensely polarized 2019 General Elections, Muhammadiyah's central leadership launched a "Constitutional Jihad," mainly through elite, non-confrontational legal actions, such as submitting judicial reviews to the Constitutional Court to challenge unjust laws. In contrast, the rise of the "*Political Jihad*" (Jipolmu) in East Java in 2024 signifies a far more pragmatic, aggressive, and confrontational approach. The East Java LHKP has shifted from merely contesting political outcomes—such as laws—to actively challenging the root sources of political power, such as parliamentary seats. Their ability to combine the organization's noble theological principles with highly strategic political communication demonstrates that a religious civil

society organization can effectively emulate and even surpass the electoral tactics of traditional party machinery.

This bold paradigm shift also brings long-term systemic risks that require careful academic review. The future viability of this highly integrated campaign structure (M. Mirdasy, personal communication, May 28, 2024) will depend largely on Muhammadiyah's ability to balance its new, explicit goal of direct political representation with the potential for practical conflicts within its grassroots. Framing pragmatic, often compromised electoral politics as a "Jihad" risks turning the organization's sacred identity into a commodity, thereby diluting its core moral authority. If the endorsed candidates do not fulfill their promises or become embroiled in Indonesia's endemic corruption, it could damage not only the reputations of those politicians but also Muhammadiyah's moral standing.

This strategy also raises significant epistemological questions about Indonesia's future civil society. The success of the LHKP's IMC model challenges existing democratic transition theories, showing that in a highly contested, transactional democratic environment, avoiding normative neutrality is increasingly seen as a disadvantage rather than an advantage. As a result, major civil society players are quickly moving away from traditional non-partisanship toward integrated, identity-based electoral strategies. Whether this structural political engagement will ultimately enhance democratic representation by bringing moral actors into the legislature, or whether it will speed up the secularization and polarization of religious institutions, is the most urgent issue for future political communication studies in the region.

The Anatomy of Electoral Inaction: Exploring the Gap Between LHKP's Political Marketing Strategy and Grassroots Realities

Institutionally, the East Java LHKP's "One Electoral District, One Cadre" (Jipolmu) program was crafted within an optimistic political framework. M. Mirdasy, the chair of the East Java LHKP, described this initiative as aiming to produce three mutually reinforcing outcomes: facilitating cadre nomination pathways, offering psychological support from the organization to candidates, and ensuring that successful parliamentary cadres could serve as representatives of Muhammadiyah's goals. Nonetheless, when faced with real electoral conditions and evaluated by those directly involved in the field, this ideal plan faced immediate challenges and conflicts.

The initial dissonance arose from the elite leaders who successfully secured victory. Suli Da'im, a Member of the East Java Provincial Parliament (DPRD), noted that, in practice, the LHKP's role had yet to reach its full potential. He noted that the LHKP's existing function remained limited to normative moral encouragement rather than acting as a strategic driving force (Suli Daim, personal communication, 24 Juli 2025). Therefore, he emphasized that moving forward, the LHKP must evolve into a more progressive entity—no longer just offering blessings, but actively guiding diaspora cadres with functional and technical strategies in the complex landscape of national politics.

Dr. Zuhrotul Mar'ah, Chairwoman of the Surabaya City LHKP and a member of the Surabaya City Parliament, echoed similar concerns about this political deadlock. She pointed out that the LHKP's political marketing strategy had not significantly boosted the electability of its cadres, mainly because its outreach remained largely confined to social media (Zuhrotul Mar'ah, personal communication, 15 September 2025). To address this strategic shortfall, she suggested four key areas for institutional reform: establishing a political school, implementing measurable cadre branding management, expanding cross-sector communication networks, and institutionalizing a political fund-raising mechanism to deepen campaign engagement within society.

The lack of institutional political funding led to a significant dissonance: the conflict between Muhammadiyah's symbolic prestige and its material resources in practical competition. Dikky Syadqumullah, a member of the Surabaya City Regional Leadership (PDM), experienced this firsthand when he failed to win a seat in the National Parliament (DPR RI). He explained that, despite the cultural influence cultivated through the LHKP program, this dominance was eventually overridden by pragmatic money politics—often referred to as *'isi tas'* or 'the contents of the bag'—used by rival candidates. He believed that cadres were left to struggle alone without sufficient institutional political means to succeed in such highly transactional contests (Dikky Syadumullah, personal communication, 16 December 2025).

Additionally, the failure to withstand pragmatic political pressures is linked to the lack of a strong political command within the organization. Dikky pointed out that the LHKP did not give candidates clear, binding mandates for Muhammadiyah members. The absence of organizational directives, such as a political pledge to grassroots voters, made support very fragile. As a result, campaign strategies were limited because candidates recommended by the LHKP found they lacked a guaranteed core support from their own organization.

In response to this fragile structural command, lower-level leaders tried to implement tactical electoral safeguards. Muhammad Asyraf Al-Hafiz from the Pabean Cantikan Branch of Muhammadiyah Youth (PCPM) explained that his group developed a systematic escort mechanism for supporting candidates. This approach involved deploying cadres as election organizers at the Voting Committee (PPS), District Election Committee (PPK), and Bawaslu to protect the integrity of voters' choices (Muhammad Asyraf Al-Hafiz, personal communication, 12 December 2025). However, despite claiming to be free from transactional politics, this effort struggled against the large flow of money in the field. Therefore, he emphasized that the LHKP should conduct precise research to map a candidate's social capital before mobilizing institutional support.

The challenge of mobilizing lower-level vote banks highlights a significant cultural fragmentation issue. Nurul Huda, serving as Chairman of the Wonocolo Branch Leadership (PCM), noted that although his faction had fully mobilized its organizational resources—from sub-branch levels, mosque congregations, to Muhammadiyah Charitable Enterprises (AUM) employees—the actual potential for vote conversion was very limited. During the pre-election period, he realized there was no clear political preference aligning with leadership directives or the rationality of Muhammadiyah members (Nurul Huda, personal communication, 30 December 2025). This situation prompted him to suggest that grassroots political education should start well before the electoral cycle begins.

This fragmentation highlights that LHKP's marketing efforts largely fail to reach the rational voters' consciousness, remaining confined within the internal echo chamber of leadership. Muhammad Tanwirul Huda, a representative of the educated youth and General Chairman of IMM UINSA, recognizes the noble intent of the Jipolmu program. However, he analytically states that LHKP's outreach is neither compelling nor coercive enough to influence his political choices, indicating that LHKP's strategy is disconnected from the collective psyche (Muhammad Tanwirul Huda, personal communication, 27 June 2025).

This breakdown in vertical institutional communication reached its peak when it faced the experiences of cultural congregants in various remote regions. Faridhotul Khasanah from Nganjuk and Iskandar Dzulkarnain from Pamekasan shared testimonies revealing inconsistencies in the LHKP's dissemination of information. Both agreed that their electoral choices were entirely unaffected by the Jipolmu program. Interestingly, Iskandar only realized the organization's strategic political agenda after the election was over, exposing the fragile communication chain from regional levels to distant sub-branches (Faridhotul

Khasanah & Iskandar Dzulkarnain, personal communication, 28 December 2025).

The findings suggest that the East Java LHKP's political communication marketing strategy is still in an early, undeveloped stage. The intended cognitive and emotional impacts faded at the elite levels and did not translate into strong electoral actions (conative effects) among grassroots members. Ultimately, the institutional effort faces four key challenges: a lack of material resources (logistics), ineffective organizational instructions, weaknesses in voter behavior research, and stalled grassroots communication efforts. Addressing these issues is essential for Muhammadiyah to evolve its political role from moral support to an effective partnership in future political landscapes.

Conclusion

This study finds that the East Java LHKP's Jipolmu program adopts an Integrated Marketing Communication (IMC) framework, blending advertising, interactive media, and personal selling presented as a moral duty (dakwah). While this multifaceted approach effectively raised initial cognitive and emotional awareness among the target audience, its electoral results remained modest. The main limitation was its limited reach; the marketing strategy resonated mainly with elite circles and struggled to inspire strong conative support or vote conversion at the grassroots level. This gap between institutional design and electoral outcomes stems from four key issues: a lack of campaign resources, the absence of organizational mandates to encourage support, insufficient research on voter segmentation, and poor vertical communication. Overcoming these challenges is essential to creating a mutually beneficial relationship among the organization, its candidates, and voters. Ultimately, these findings reaffirm that although Muhammadiyah remains officially non-partisan, it nonetheless exercises meaningful and evolving political influence within the democratic landscape.

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